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ABSTRACT 
 
Following the understanding that incentives influence behaviour both in terms of eliciting 
and sustaining it, this thesis seeks to explore the link between incentives and knowledge 
production at the University of Nairobi. Given the backdrop, higher education institutions have a 
key role to play in economic development through knowledge production; the study seeks to see 
how academics can be steered to produce knowledge. The principal-agent model primarily 
informs the study, whose primary argument is that for incentives to attract, motivate and retain       
employees, these incentives have to be sufficient, fair and consistent. Additionally, the model 
predicts that a higher sum of monetary incentives triggers higher effort, resulting in higher 
productivity. Using a single case study approach, the study focused on the University of Nairobi 
in Kenya. The data for the study was mainly provided by the structured interviews, institutional 
documents and archival. The findings of this study show that there are several incentives related 
to research at the University of Nairobi. These include: promotion opportunities, time resources, 
research funding, and financial allowances for publications and successful supervision of 
postgraduate students. Multiple principals including the government, national research council 
and the university itself provide these incentives. The general perception of academics is that, the 
incentives are weak and do not encourage the maximization of the University’s research goals. In 
addition, academics are also confronted with other principals who reinforce non-research 
behaviour. These principals offer significant rewards for consultancies, and incentives for 
teaching on the full-fee-paying stream by providing additional payments, over and above regular 
salaries, to academics that teach on these programmes. Given the weak nature of the incentives 
for research, academics at the University of Nairobi seem to respond more favourably to the non-
research incentives. Overall, the study confirms the economic principle that individuals, in this 
case, academics, respond to incentives. However, in the context of competing incentives, the 
research incentives have to be adequate, systematically applied and continuous to reinforce a 
vibrant research culture.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
	  
Introduction and Background to the Study 
	  
1.1 Background 
 
The concept of the ‘knowledge economy’ has continuously gained significant attention from 
international development organizations, scholars, commentators and policy makers. In the 
knowledge economy era, knowledge is increasingly acknowledged as a major factor in economic 
development and key to a country’s competitive advantage in the global economy (Powell & 
Snellman, 2004; Metcalfe & Ramlogan, 2005; Chen & Dahlman, 2005; Sorlin & Vessuri, 2007). 
Generally, the global knowledge economy characterizes economies that “create, disseminate and 
exploit scientific and technological knowledge, as well as other intellectual assets, as a means of 
enhancing growth and productivity” (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
[OECD] 2004, p. 11).  The current study seeks to explore the incentives and dis-incentives for 
research and supervision of postgraduate students; and how they influence knowledge production 
and productivity in a Kenyan public university, particularly at the University of Nairobi. 
 
Consequently, the idea that knowledge is a major driving force of national development has 
resulted in an increasing focus on the role of higher education institutions in knowledge 
production, dissemination and utilization for improved productivity (Chen & Dahlman, 2005; 
Castells, 2009; Guruz, 2011). Castells (1994) argues, if knowledge and information are the 
electricity of the knowledge economy, then it is a valid assumption that the university, argued to 
be the main knowledge producing institution in the society, will increasingly become important, 
as well as its apex research and training product, new knowledge and the PhD.  
 
Universities are assumed to contribute to economic growth and development through pathways 
directly linked to its core functions of teaching, research and innovation (Clark, 1983; see also 
Oketch, MacCowan & Schendel, 2014). Higher education institutions are required to contribute 
to formation of human capital by training qualified, high-level skilled and adaptable workforce 
for the knowledge economy, among them, professionals, scientists, technicians, basic and 
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secondary school teachers, future government civil service and business leaders (World Bank, 
2002; Santiago, Tremblay, Basri & Arnal, 2008). Studies have shown a relationship between 
high-level skills and competencies, such as the postgraduate training, and economic growth and 
development (Castells, 1994; Sorlin & Vessuri, 2007). According to Brown, Green and Lauder, 
(2001) cited in Oketch et al. (2014), high-level skilled and competent graduates are a prerequisite 
for economic growth and development, not only for their increased earnings and ‘capabilities’; 
rather such labour force  plays a key role in interaction with existing knowledge, adaptation and 
transfer of innovations and technology to local industries and contexts (see also Castells, 1994; 
Powell & Snellman, 2004). However, according to World Bank (2002) both developed and 
developing countries have not produced sufficient knowledge in terms of research and graduates 
to steer economic growth. .  
 
Furthermore, universities are required to support innovation systems by producing new 
knowledge, directly through basic and applied research, and indirectly through dissemination of 
knowledge and advanced training and research programmes at postgraduate level (Etzkowitz, 
Webster, Gebhardt & Terra, 2000; World Bank, 2002: see also Oketch et al., 2014).  Notably, 
new knowledge has advantages including the replication linked to production of new 
technologies and processes, thus, reduced costs of production of such technologies over the 
years. Equally, new knowledge results in efficiency, through processes and innovation, which 
leads to profitability, when new knowledge is converted to processes and products of practical 
value (Castells, 1994; Pillay, 2010).  
 
Studies analyzing determinants of national innovation systems illustrated that “countries that 
have located a higher share of research and development in the education sector have been able 
to achieve significantly higher patenting productivity (Stern, Porter & Furman, 2002, p. 25). 
Graduates with high-level skills are expected to form the human resource of the public and 
private R&D institutions, together with high technology manufacturing firms and industries 
(Etzkowitz et al., 2000; Castells, 2010). According to Etzkowitz et al., (2000), the above 
institutions are key agents of transfer of knowledge and technologies. Also, postgraduate 
programmes, especially at the PhD level, are keys in training of university professors, hence 
enhancing the quality of the universities that are keys for the global economy.  
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Following the increased acknowledgement of the importance of knowledge in economic 
development, both developed and developing countries have incorporated knowledge and 
innovation policies, together with higher education into their national development plans 
(Maassen & Cloete, 2006). Successful known examples of these countries include: Finland, 
South Korea, China, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, Denmark and Taiwan (Pillay, 2010; 
Cloete, Bailey, Pillay, Bunting & Maassen, 2011). The experience gained from the above-
mentioned countries influenced African countries enabling them to realize the importance of 
higher education institutions as knowledge producers in economic development. This realization 
is manifested as African countries are increasingly recognizing the need to invest in science 
technology, and innovation capabilities, as well as commit to supporting and promoting research 
innovation activities and the prerequisite human capital in order to address the socio-economic 
challenges they face (African Union–New Partnership for Africa’s Development [AU-NEPAD], 
2010).   
 
At a national level, amongst other Sub-Sahara African countries, Kenya has exhibited awareness 
of the concept of the knowledge economy and the role of higher education in economic growth 
and development.  The country, as espoused in its Vision 2030, intends to become a globally 
competitive and prosperous nation by 2030. To realize its national developmental goals, Kenya 
recognizes that it has to rely on creation, adaptation and use of knowledge as its key factors for 
enhancing economic growth and development. Therefore, this awareness is manifested in the 
emphasis on education and training that inculcates use of knowledge in science, technology and 
innovation to create wealth, improve social welfare and promote democratic governance by 2030 
(Government of Kenya, 2007; see also Ministry of Higher Education Science & Technology 
[MHEST], 2008). 
 
However, despite the awareness of the knowledge economy in the African context, Sammoff and 
Carroll (2004), argue that it is far from clear that increased attention to knowledge production 
and knowledge dissemination will enhance national competitiveness and sustainable 
development for most of African countries. The above observation is also illustrated in a study 
conducted by Cloete et al. (2011), in eight African universities, including the University of 
Nairobi, to establish the presence of long-term commitment of higher education institutions in 
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their role of knowledge production entities in national development plans. Cloete et al., (2011), 
among other things, established minimal emphasis on the role of higher education in socio-
economic development, coupled with non-articulation of the policies and practice both at the 
national and university levels.  
 
Furthermore, according to Cloete and his colleagues, knowledge production in terms of research 
and graduate output at the eight African universities does not seem strong enough to enable the 
universities to make a sustainable contribution to economic development. In their view, the 
universities are not changing from their predominant undergraduate teaching roles to contribute 
to new knowledge production required for the economy. Inasmuch as a number of universities 
were reported to have the relevant input factors such as: substantial numbers of qualified 
academics with doctorates, manageable student ratios particularly in the Science, Engineering 
and Technology programmes and increased enrolment at the Master’s and PhD level, the 
research output and PhD graduates remained at a low base. For instance, at the University of 
Nairobi, research publications were found to be low at the ratio of 0.11 per permanent academic 
staff implying production of an article in 10 years (see Cloete et al., 2011, pp. 92-93).  
 
According to the United Nations Education, Science and Culture Organization (UNESCO) 2010 
statistics, Sub-Saharan Africa has fallen behind in its contribution to world science output. 
Furthermore, the UNESCO 2010 science report shows that, Sub-Saharan Africa produced about 
11, 142 scientific articles in 2008. Although the share of the world output rose from 0.9 percent 
in 2002 to 1.1 in 2008, the increasing scientific output has grown more slowly relative to the 
international growth rate. Furthermore, most Sub-Sahara African countries were not able to 
produce 100 publications in the natural sciences in 2008 (UNESCO, 2010; see figure 1.1) Thus, 
according to the UNESCO report these figures were below the theoretical threshold that would 
allow a virtuous interaction between science and technology.  
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Figure 1.1: Scientific publications in Sub-Saharan Africa, 2000-2008: for those countries that 
produced more than 100 publications in in the natural sciences in 2008 - top seven countries in 
terms of productivity (Adapted from the UNESCO Science Report 2010) 
 
Correspondingly, the SIR World Report 2011: Africa Supplement, based on quantitative data of 
citations and publications illustrates that in terms of the scientific output, the Kenya Medical 
Research Institute (KEMRI) and the South African Medical Research Council had normalized 
scientific impacts of more than 1.80.  Normalized citation impact as a value expressed in 
percentages to show the relationship of an institution’s scientific impact, at 1.80 implies the two 
institutions were rated at 80% above the World averages. This shows that some research 
institutes outperform other knowledge producing institutions including universities, hence the 
significant deviations in the normalized citation rates. South Africa benefiting from the historical 
factors, has old and well-established research universities, therefore has advantages over the 
systems where higher education was established four or five decades ago. Thus, the higher 
education sector in South Africa accounts for the bulk of the country’s research output, 
accounting for almost 86 percent in 2007 (Mouton & Gevers, 2009). However, the case differs 
across other Sub-Sahara African countries. In Kenya, although the major universities (UoN, 
Kenyatta, Moi, Egerton, JKUAT), contribute significantly to the country’s research output, the 
country has an array of other scientific institutions including government funded laboratories and 
institutes and internationally based agencies that characterize Kenya’s low scientific output (AU-
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NEPAD, 2010). The contribution of higher education to scientific output in these countries 
cannot be over-estimated, as knowledge production is dominated by the academics in the major 
universities.  
 
Further, in terms of production of human capital, a study at eight Sub-Saharan African countries 
carried out by the Higher Education Research and Advocacy Network in Africa (HERANA) 
project, illustrated sub-optimal levels in doctoral training manifested both in terms of enrolment 
and graduation rates. The total doctoral enrolment at eight Sub-Saharan African countries in 
2011 stood at 2,614 (Bunting, Cloete & Schalkwyk, 2014), a number that is argued to be low 
given the high enrolments at the Master’s level at Universities such as UoN (12 percent increase 
annually) and University of Ghana (13 percent increase annually). To substantiate the above 
observation, Wangenge-Ouma (2008) writing in a Kenyan context noted that, following the 
introduction of parallel programmes (privately sponsored students), there has been a rise in non-
research Master’s (Master’s by project). Wangenge-Ouma (2008a) states several University 
departments stopped teaching full Master’s theses that require research as a mode of 
examination. Hence the argument, that the Master’s graduates lack sufficient research skills 
mainly required for doctoral training. According to Bunting et al., (2014), the total number of 
doctoral graduates at the eight African universities increased from 154 in 2001 to 367 in 2011. 
Further, the statistics show that, the University of Nairobi, the University of Cape Town and 
Makerere University produced 80 percent of the doctoral graduates in 2001,  82 percent in 2007, 
and 76 percent in 2011 consecutively.  
 
As signaled earlier, several authors have argued that new knowledge and technology cannot be 
adopted in production without sufficient research, innovation and high-level skilled manpower, 
hence the need to establish capacity that produce, disseminate, use, and adapt knowledge and 
information. Based on the above perspectives of sub-optimal levels of knowledge production in 
African Universities, Cloete et al., (2011) claim that incentives for academics to conduct 
research, publish and supervise postgraduates, as is the case in other countries, are a challenge in 
African universities. The study recommended that African universities and countries should 
invest in incentives for academics to engage in knowledge production. Citing the example of 
South African universities that have attached monetary rewards to research publications and 
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graduate output, the authors argue that incentives will encourage academics to publish and 
supervise postgraduate students (Cloete et al., 2011). 
  
According to Milne (2007), many organizations are currently implementing or planning to 
implement incentive programmes trusting that such programmes will assist in bringing about the 
desired behaviour or productivity that will stimulate the organization. In some institutions, 
principals, for instance, invest in extrinsic incentives such as: compensation, recognition, 
rewards and appreciation to motivate the agents (Milne, 2007; Gneezy, Meier, & Rey-Biel, 
2011). However, this theoretical standpoint on incentives is not necessarily specific to 
universities, but may be suited to any setting where productivity is a concern. Proponents of 
using incentives for employees argue that application of higher incentives would motivate 
workers and, as a result, lead to greater effort that will cause higher performance and 
productivity, retain employees, attract and recruit skilled employees, reward high performance 
and foster teamwork (Milne, 2007; Gneezy et al., 2011). 
 
Against this background, the current study seeks to find answers to the main research question 
and sub-questions in order to establish reasons for both incentives and dis-incentives for 
academics to engage in research and supervise postgraduate students in a Kenyan public 
university, particularly at the University of Nairobi. The next section provides a brief overview 
of knowledge economy, knowledge production and incentives that developed over time in the 
Kenyan context.  
 
1.2  Higher Education and Knowledge Production in Kenya 
	  
The history of universities in Kenya can be traced back to the early years of independence in 
1963. University education started with the establishment of the University of Nairobi, the oldest 
university, first established in 1956 as a Royal Technical College of the University of London. In 
1961, the Royal Technical College was transformed to a second university college of the 
University of East Africa under the name Royal College Nairobi, awarding students degrees of 
the University of London. In 1964, the Royal College Nairobi was renamed University College 
Nairobi, a constituent college of the Federal University of East Africa, alongside Makerere and 
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Dar Es Salaam University colleges.  Following the dissolution of the Federal University of East 
Africa in 1970, UoN became the first independent national university in Kenya (Mwiria, 
Ng'ethe, Ngome, Odero, Wawire & Wesonga, 2007). During this period, the government 
controlled services such as education in order to ensure equal participation and access of all 
socio-economic groups to the system (Pillay, 2010b). 
 
Following independence, university education was expected to play a key role in national 
development. During the early 1960s, Africa’s new national universities were expected to train 
and produce large numbers of high-skilled human resources for the country, in particular in 
producing person power for the profession and bureaucracy (Yesufu, 1973). This was to fill in 
the shortages in this sections that had resulted due to departures of the expatriates following 
independence and the underdevelopment of the colonial education system. By early 1970s there 
was a shift, as was illustrated during the Association of African workshop held in Accra, where 
the focus was on the role of African universities in development (Yesufu, 1973). 
 
 In aligning the education sector to the development of the nation, the Kenyan government 
introduced a number of reforms recommended by the Kenya Commission of Education in 1964 
to replace the colonial education policies that were considered discriminatory in training the 
Kenyan populace and lacked integration of programmes for the nation’s well-being. These 
reforms included:  an education system that would help in enhancing national unity, serve 
Kenyan citizens without discrimination and invest in human capital for the advancement of the 
country (Republic of Kenya, 1964; Republic of Kenya, 1965; see also Eshiwani, 1993; Njeru & 
Orodho, 2003; Pillay, 2010b).  
 
Notwithstanding the question of the ‘development university’, largely during the following 
decades African governments, including Kenya, put in little effort to ensure the developmental 
role of these universities. Cloete et al. (2011) in their study noted, partly, this could be attributed 
to African governments, lacking coherent development models, with inculcation of what the 
exact role of the universities could be. Similarly, during the later period of the 1970s and 1980s, 
there were political and socio-economic struggles, often caused by cold wars and shifts in the 
agendas of the international funding agencies such as the World Bank (Sammoff & Carroll, 
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2004). Arguably, these problems had a negative influence on training of human resources and 
research projects needed to address the socio-economic problems of the country. Particularly, as 
mentioned above, reduced government funding negatively influenced academic remuneration as 
a result of cuts on staff costs.  
 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, there was a call from influential voices on the ‘revitalization’ 
of African higher education and linking the university to development (Sawyer, 2002; see 
chapter two for detailed discussion). For instance, Koffi Annan, then General Secretary of the 
United Nations, noted “the university must become a primary tool for Africa’s development in 
this new century’ (Bloom, Canning, & Chan, 2006, p. 2). This shift in the role of higher 
education institutions also played a great role in shaping university education in Kenya. 
Following the emphasis on the importance of knowledge production and application as key 
factors in economic development and for the country’s competitiveness in the global economy 
(Sorlin & Vessuri, 2007); the Kenyan Vision 2030 recognises the important role of higher 
education and training in attaining its developmental goals (GoK, 2008). Like other developing 
countries, Kenya has undertaken significant policy initiatives with regard to the higher education 
systems, aiming to attain its developmental goals by 2030. These policy initiatives include: 
improving quality, access and equity to higher education and training; recognising relevance of 
economic needs; making curriculum reforms to promote science technology and innovation 
training; strengthening the national science, technology and innovation competitiveness; 
promotion of research and enhancing funding and resource mobilization of higher education (See 
GoK, 2008; MHEST, 2008). According to the World Bank (2002), higher education can help 
developing countries, like Kenya, to meet the needs of the knowledge economy, on condition 
that the abovementioned key policy issues are addressed. 
 
Further, a number of these initiatives have manifested through a recent expansion of the higher 
education system. Currently, the country boasts 22 fully-fledged public universities from the 
original seven; 9 constituent colleges with an enrolment of 198, 000 students; 29 private 
universities; 17 chartered and 12 with Letters of Interim Authority, with enrolment of 37, 000 
students (CUE, 2012). Despite the above-stated reforms, Kenya continues to struggle with 
difficulties arising from inadequate responses to existing challenges. Among others, these 
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include transition rates from secondary education to higher education that remain as low as 70 
percent of the students who attain qualifications to join universities, but do not get admission; 
women are under-represented in university education, standing at 39 percent of the total student 
enrolment and most of them pursue programmes in Arts  (MHEST, 2010). According to the 
World Bank (2007), report, “if developing countries hoped to prosper in the knowledge economy 
… STI capacity building is an absolute necessity”, as STI is assumed to enable these countries to 
reap both economic and social benefits (p.1). Therefore, African universities have to increase 
production of the required human capital and technological innovations needed for the global 
economy. Incentives for academics are thought to be important to motivate and encourage 
academics to engage in research, publish and supervise postgraduate students. 
 
1.3 Problem Statement  
	  
As mentioned above, knowledge is increasingly perceived to be important for economic 
development. Kenya’s Vision 2030, which “aims at making Kenya a globally competitive and 
prosperous country by 2030”, identifies higher education and training as one of the key sectors 
that will drive Kenya into becoming a middle income country (Government of Kenya (GOK), 
2008, p.1). Vision 2030 places great emphasis on knowledge production, through research in 
science, technology and innovation, and global competitiveness.  Although, it has to be noted, 
the Kenyan government does not clearly indicate, in its developmental plan the roles of the 
universities in it attaining the goals of the Vision 2030.  
 
However, despite the high expectations of the role of higher education and training in economic 
growth and development, knowledge production remains a challenge in Kenya. According to the 
UNESCO science report of (2010), the African continent only accounts for 2.0 two percent of 
the world’s knowledge in terms of research publications and less than 0.1 percent of the world’s 
innovations. Whereas most African countries could not produce 100 publications in the fields of 
natural sciences, Kenya’s contribution comprised about 6.6% of all sub-Saharan African 
publications, third in position only after South Africa and Nigeria (UNESCO, 2010).  
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Similarly, Cloete et al., (2011), found that research output in terms of research publications and 
doctoral output in African Universities was very low. Permanent academics with doctorates in 
the eight African universities, including the University of Nairobi, where the study was located, 
were likely to publish only one research article in internationally peer-reviewed journals in 10 or 
more years.  
 
A study on higher education and differentiation in South Africa established a highly significant 
correlation of 0.82 between the proportions of academics of a university holding a doctoral 
degree as their highest qualification and the research publications produced at the University 
(CHET, 2010). Also, the doctoral enrolment and output was very low and was not commensurate 
with the sharp increase in Master’s enrolment. For instance, at the University of Nairobi, 
Master’s enrolments between 2001 and 2007 grew at an annual rate of 7.7% while the doctoral 
enrolments declined. The key assumption was that the Master’s graduates were to flow into the 
doctoral research programmes, which did not happen.  
 
Following the importance of knowledge in national development, Cloete et al., (2011), suggest 
that incentives for knowledge production in African universities can encourage academics to 
publish and supervise postgraduate students. According to Milne (2009), incentives can 
motivate, attract and retain world-class researchers in higher education institutions who are key 
players in the production of knowledge.  Similarly, focusing on the theoretical lenses that explain 
how incentives work, Bonner and Sprinkles (2002), noted that, incentives increase effort in 
employees hence increase results in performance. Consequently this study examined the 
incentives for publishing and supervision of both Master’s and Doctoral students within the 
context of a Kenyan public University – the University of Nairobi, and was guided by the 
question: what are the incentives and dis-incentives at UoN for academics that engage in 
research and supervise postgraduate students? The next section provides the primary aim and 
sub-questions that guided the study.  
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1.4 Aim of the Study   
	  
Following the research problem stated above, the study seeks to understand the link between 
incentives and knowledge production at the University of Nairobi. That is, the incentives linked 
to research and successful postgraduate student supervision.  
 
1.4.1 Research Question and Sub-questions:  
	  
Central Research Question: How do incentives and disincentives available at UoN influence 
knowledge production and productivity?  
 
In addressing the above central research question, the following associated sub-questions were 
formulated:  
1. How does UoN incentivize research and successful postgraduate supervision; and how do 
the incentives influence knowledge production and productivity?  
2. How do academics at UoN perceive the incentives available for research and successful 
postgraduate supervision? 
3. How do competing incentives available at UoN influence knowledge production and 
productivity? 
4. How have the remuneration regimes of academics in Kenya shifted overtime? 
 
1.5 Scope of the Study  
	  
This study focused on an empirical investigation of incentives and disincentives for academics to 
engage in knowledge production at the University of Nairobi. In a nutshell, this study focusing 
on the university policies and academic perceptions tried to unpack some of the components of a 
research environment that will encourage, attract and motivate academics to publish and 
supervise postgraduate students. This study also looked at academic salary structures and the 
implication for knowledge productivity.  
 
However, despite the above-stated focus, this study was delimited in several ways. This study 
mainly focused on an institution with a brief reference to the research council. The study limited 
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its area of research to one Kenyan public University, the University of Nairobi, with the focus on 
two colleges, the College of Humanities and Social Sciences and the College of Agricultural and 
Veterinary Medicine (see section3.3 for a detailed discussion). The perceptions of academics and 
policies in other Kenyan public universities, private universities and other higher education 
institutions have not been included in this research. Additionally, this study did not research the 
research council, even though Kenyan higher education institutions are under a research council 
that could be argued to promote research/knowledge production, the brief reference to the 
council is a result of insights revealed by academics. Since the study was confined to examining 
the incentives and dis-incentives for knowledge production, the study’s sample for the survey 
involved the academics that engage in research and supervise postgraduate students. Similarly, 
the academic administrators in charge of the faculties and schools were also interviewed to 
expound and clarify some policy issues, as well as the perceptions raised by the academics. 
Additionally, this study did not focus on the issue of status as an incentive amongst the 
academics. The study briefly looked at status in comparison to other civil servants and 
professions, but it did not focus on the rewards and status beyond promotion.  
 
1.6 Rationale and Significance of the Study 
	  
A review of the existing literature on knowledge production shows that higher education 
institutions play an important role in the creation of new knowledge, and that knowledge is a 
prerequisite for economic growth and development. As the position of knowledge in economic 
growth and development becomes more vital, so is the need for universities to attract, reward, 
motivate and retain academics to produce it. This study mitigates an important knowledge gap 
considering that, whereas there is significant literature on challenges facing African higher 
education, including low knowledge production, the literature does not offer much on how this 
(low knowledge production) is linked to incentives in the way this study does. This study 
contributes important insights to the link between incentives and knowledge production in 
African higher education. Also, of key concern to this study, among others, are the academic 
salary structures and their implications for attracting and motivating academics to engage in 
knowledge production. Therefore, this study offers insights on the remuneration structures of 
academics in the Kenyan context, and particularly at UoN.   
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The study is significant in that it has premised its argument on the assumption - if knowledge is 
important for economic growth and development (Castells, 2001; Cloete et al., 2011), then 
governments and higher education institution have to put in place incentives for academics to 
engage in research, publish and supervise postgraduate students.   
 
1.7 Structure of the Thesis  
	  
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter One introduces the research problem as it 
discusses: the background to the study, the problem statement, the research aim and research 
questions, the scope of the study, the rationale and significance, and the structure of the thesis. 
The second chapter provides a comprehensive review of the relevant literature on incentives in 
the university context, and offers a theoretical framework to guide the study. The third chapter 
provides a detailed description of the methodological approach, research design, research 
methods, procedures and methodological limitations applied in this study. Chapter Four focuses 
on presentation, analysis and discussion of the data collected. Chapter Five presents the 
conclusion to the study and provides limitations of the study and makes recommendations for 
further research.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
	  
Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
	  
 
2.0 Introduction  
	  
This chapter reviews the relevant literature on the question of incentives and knowledge 
production. It covers topics such as the distinctive role of higher education institutions in society 
and, especially in the context of the knowledge economy, knowledge production in the 
knowledge economy, the general understanding of incentives and dis-incentives in the university 
context. The chapter also discusses the theoretical framework of the study that is mainly 
informed by the principal-agent model.  
 
2.1 The Role of Higher Education Institutions in Society  
	  
This section broadly discusses the critical role of higher education in society, and specifically in 
the broad context of the knowledge economy. Departing from the understanding that higher 
education has an important role to play in economic development, this section illustrates how 
universities are expected to execute this role through research, innovations and developing 
human capital needed for the economy. The section discusses how the key role has been defined 
in the international trends, the African context and the Kenyan context. 
 
2.1.1 Higher Education Institutions in the Knowledge Economy  
	  
Following the transition to knowledge-based economies, both industrialized and economically 
developing countries have acknowledged that higher education, knowledge production and its 
exploitation play a predominant role in economic growth and development (Chen & Dahlman, 
2005). Generally, knowledge economies refer to “economies, which are directly based on 
production, distribution, and use of knowledge and information” for enhancement of their growth 
and development processes (OECD, 1996, p.7). In this dynamic economy, knowledge replaces 
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the traditional factors of production i.e., land, labour, capital and entrepreneurship, as the key 
factors in the realm of economic production (Drucker, 1993). The creation, dissemination and 
use of knowledge have become critical for economic productivity and the nation’s global 
competiveness (Chen & Dahlman, 2005). Essentially, economic productivity now relies heavily 
on the level of knowledge and information available in a country. Knowledge is claimed to be in 
different modes - tacit or codified - technical or societal.  The different forms of knowledge 
contribute to economic and social development as a driver of global competitiveness and 
productivity, enables production of employable skills, facilitates welfare and environment and 
ensures democratic institutions and good governance (see Oketch et al., 2014).   
 
Following the transformational shift to the knowledge economy phenomenon, education in 
general and higher education in particular, has a key role to play in the production of new 
knowledge and innovations as well as in terms of finding new ways of applying existing 
knowledge (Duderstadt, 2003). The knowledge economy requires high-level skilled human 
capital (Castells, 1994; Sorlin & Vessuri, 2007). Therefore, there is recognition of the fact that 
higher education has a central role to play in the production of graduates with skills, aptitudes, 
competencies and understandings that will ensure their contribution to economic development 
and meet the changing demands of the knowledge-based economy (Santiago et al., 2008). 
According to Dahlman, Yla-Anttila and Routti (2005), sufficient education as well as a trained 
workforce is a prerequisite for adoption of new technologies in production, as well as ensuring 
that technological development takes place.  
 
Furthermore, Davenport (2002, p. 2), argues that, “growth in the knowledge economy is founded 
on discovery and innovation, in which research has a central role”.  Hence, through its core 
functions of teaching and research, higher education institutions make their key contribution to 
the society through offering education to the young, preservation of cultural heritage, and 
provision of both basic and applied research that is vital to the society (Etzkowitz et al., 2000; 
World Bank 2002; Altbach & Peterson, 2007). Emphasizing the role of higher education 
institutions in knowledge production and innovation in the knowledge economy, Davenport 
(2002, pp. 49-50) claims that although “… technology transfer and industrial collaboration are 
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important, if universities ever lose the focus on basic, fundamental research, the knowledge 
economy as a whole will suffer”.   
 
As signaled earlier, recognizing the importance of knowledge and technological innovations, 
both developed and developing countries have linked higher education to their developmental 
and industrialization policies (Maasen & Cloete, 2006; Evoh, Mugimu & Chavula, 2013). 
Emerging economies such as Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan underwent several 
trends to transform their economies from being Agricultural intensive to manufacturing service 
sectors (Pillay, 2010). Among other things, these Asian countries invested in initiatives such as 
increased student enrolment in higher education relative to other levels of schooling. Further, the 
governments of these Asian countries utilized incentives and systems in expansion of higher 
education in vital areas such as science, technology and engineering. Additionally, research and 
development was aligned to the countries’ developmental goals and needs of the local industries 
(Tilak, 2003; Asian Development Bank, 2007; Pillay, 2010a; Salami & Soltanzaden, 2012). 
Similarly, in Europe, Finland moved from a depressed economy to one of the most competitive 
nations in the World at the end of 1990s, through embracing innovation, information and 
Technology and investment in higher education as the key factors of its developmental policy 
(Dahlman et al., 2005).  
 
From the experience of the above emerging countries in the knowledge economy, there is 
growing recognition of the reality that African countries can only enhance their economic growth 
and global competitiveness through investment and use of technological knowledge (Pillay, 
2010). However, despite awareness of the importance of knowledge, African countries have 
lagged behind in terms of knowledge production and promotion of innovations required for 
economic development and global competitiveness (Cloete et al., 2011; Evoh et al., 2013). It has 
also been argued, that this could be due to the fact that the continent has not been very attentive 
to the increased importance of knowledge in economic growth and development (see Sammoff & 
Carroll, 2004; Evoh et al., 2013). In the late 1980s and 1990s, following structural adjustment 
programmes by the World Bank, budget allocations to education, higher education in particular, 
research and development (R&D), subsidies for innovation and technological development, were 
either greatly reduced or eliminated from most African countries (World Bank, 1994). 
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Consequently, higher education institutions and other research institutions were expected to 
solicit their own funds, and were required to engage in more privatization activities in order to 
raise funds for the operations, followed by minimum government support (World Bank, 1994; 
Wangenge-Ouma, 2008).  These decisions affected production of human capital and innovations 
required for the economy.  
 
Recent analysis shows that, in many African countries, higher education lags behind the 
emerging economies, as well as other global regions, in terms of participation (World Bank, 
2002). Bloom et al., (2006) and Cloete et al., (2011), noted the participation in higher education 
in countries in Sub-Sahara Africa was mostly below 5 percent in comparison to developed 
countries, standing at a rate of over 50 percent. Looking at the gross enrolment rates in 2011, 
education access in Sub-Saharan Africa stood at 101.6 percent, 34.1 percent and 6.1 percent for 
primary, secondary and tertiary education respectively (Nsapato, 2012). Similarly, UNESCO 
(2011) illustrated the budget allocation of the countries’ GDP to education in Sub-Sahara African 
countries as follows: to primary education (2.3 percent), to secondary, (1.3percent), and to higher 
education only 1 percent. Arguably, the limited numbers in the participation of higher education 
negatively affects acquisition, adaptation, utilization, and production of technological knowledge 
that is vital for all countries’ competitiveness in the knowledge economy (World Bank, 2002; 
Bloom et al., 2006). Hence, the recent calls for a balanced investment in all levels of schooling 
including higher education. Notably, like many African countries, the emerging economies, such 
as South Korea, pursued structural adjustment programmes in the 1970s, and through higher 
education they achieved production of sufficient numbers of human resources, whose skills and 
entrepreneurship enhanced the country’s economy.  
 
In the knowledge economy, countries are required to increase their innovative technological 
knowledge and skills that will allow conversion of R&D investments into technological outputs 
(Castells, 2010; Cloete et al., 2011). The technological outputs and capabilities are said to 
include patent applications, increased share in technological exports, as well as through scientific 
articles published in international journals. However statistics show, Sub-Sahara African 
countries have the lowest performance in terms of technological exports, declining to 3.8 percent 
in 2006-2009 from 4.1 percent in 2000-2005, (Evoh et al., 2013; also see Cloete et al., 2011). 
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UNESCO (2010), reports that in 2002 Sub-Sahara African countries produced 0.9 percent of the 
total scientific papers, which rose to 1.1 in 2008. The increase in scientific output has grown 
more slowly relative to the international growth rate. While the nations’ innovative and research 
capacity in developed countries is over 69 per cent, in Sub-Sahara Africa it is only one per cent 
of the world share. The above statistics reflect how African countries, unlike their counterparts in 
the developed and emerging economies, are far below the norm in integrating STI, R&D, 
technological innovations and skills for the knowledge economy. Thus, Evoh et al., (2013, p. 
299), recommend, there is more that needs to be done by governments and higher education 
institutions in Africa, “in the field of STI, especially in developing human capacity and 
technological skills in order to enable conversion of the continent’s R&D investments and 
education capacity into competitive products and services”, particularly by transforming the 
higher education systems (see also Cloete et al., 2011). Great emphasis is placed on increased 
production of knowledge for the knowledge economy.  
 
2.1.2 Knowledge Production in the Context of the Knowledge Economy  
	  
Knowledge production is understood as the “creation of new and/or the use of the existing 
knowledge in a new and creative way for generation of new concepts and understandings” for 
the economy and society (Gibbons, Limoges, Nowotny, Schwartzman, Scott & Trow, 1994, p.5). 
Therefore, in the knowledge-based economy, where knowledge is increasingly becoming the 
driving force for economic growth and global competiveness, it requires inputs from higher 
education institutions through R&D, and investment in human capital. As signaled earlier, 
studies have shown a positive relationship between the levels of skills and the rate of innovation 
(Castells, 1994; Sorlin & Vessuri, 2007). Thus, Bloom et al., (2006) and Evoh et al., (2013) note 
that necessary support provided to universities, particularly those in Africa have the ability to 
foster innovations and economic growth by producing high-skilled labour required in the 
knowledge economy. According to Gibbons et al., (1994, p. 5), knowledge production in the 
knowledge economy needs to be “context driven, problem focused and interdisciplinary” in 
order to address the problems of the economy and society (Gibbons et al., 1994, p. 5). Thus 
society looks to higher education institutions for the creation of new knowledge and innovations 
and to find new uses of existing knowledge.  
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Additionally, there is an increasing call on universities, including those in Africa, to carry out 
research and disseminate the information to the society. Research conducted in higher education 
institutions will allow the much-required innovations in the private sector to happen, since 
universities play a central role in knowledge transfer (World Bank, 2002). According to 
Dahlman et al., (2005), excellent capabilities and skills are essential in technologically complex 
occupations and work places. Thus, the above authors further argue that even the individuals that 
do not engage in careers that require more advanced education in science and engineering, will 
need basic scientific and technological literacy as effective workers in the knowledge economy. 
However, as a result of the neo-liberalization policies, marketization drives universities to focus 
more on courses such as environmental science, ICT and computer science (Kiamba, 2004). To 
some extent, this impedes the production of technological and scientific skills needed for the 
knowledge-based economy.  
 
Notably, a workforce with higher education and technological skills allows firms to be fast 
imitators, followed with capacity to adopt, use and improve new technologies in order to remain 
competitive in the knowledge economy (Castells, 1994; Pillay, 2010). This will become a 
possibility in countries and firms that are able to produce capacities that can acquire existing 
technological knowledge, create new knowledge, disseminate and use the new knowledge in 
their societies and economies (World Bank, 2002; Santiago et al., 2008). Higher education and 
research institutions have now become a huge resource for businesses, industry and society as 
they carry out R&D for industries, create spin-offs for firms, engage in capital formation 
projects, entrepreneurial training, and as they encourage postgraduate students to convert their 
research into products and enterprises (Gibbons et al., 1994; Etzkowitz et al., 2000; Dahlman et 
al., 2005; Castells, 2010; World Bank, 2012).  
 
Based on the above discussions, several authors have argued that, technological learning and 
innovations require a supportive economic, industrial and S&T system (Stern et al., 2002; Asian 
Development Bank, 2007). Therefore, countries are required to develop and support their 
innovation systems. Also, in the use of technological innovations and research output for 
economic growth, collaborative research activities between the government, industry, and higher 
education institutions are emphasized, so as to provide solutions to the immediate needs of 
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society and industry (Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000). In addition, several authors have noted 
that not only would knowledge-based development occur with the presence of an educated and 
skilled labour force, but an information structure and an institutional regime will grow as well to 
provide incentives for production, dissemination and utilization of knowledge (Driouchi, El 
Mustapha, & Anders, 2006). Therefore, it is the responsibility of universities, including those in 
Africa, as both producers and consumers of knowledge to look into the challenges facing 
production of new knowledge both in terms of research output and human capital in the 
knowledge economy.  
 
The emergence of the knowledge economy has resulted in diversification of knowledge 
production and the places where knowledge is produced. According to Gibbons et al., (1994, 
p.5), knowledge is not only produced in the universities anymore. Other institutions and 
locations have developed as sites of producing knowledge, including government and corporate 
laboratories, consultancy firms, industries and other think tanks. Gibbons and the colleagues 
further argue, in the new mode of knowledge production, “the universities, in particular, will 
comprise only a part, perhaps only a small part, of the knowledge producing sector” (Gibbons et 
al., 1994, p. 5). Therefore, following the above diversification, Kubler and DeLuca (2006), claim 
higher education institutions compete with many other knowledge producing institutions. 
Development of “new knowledge institutions’” outside academia, “competition for workers with 
specialized knowledge has intensified” including academics (p.4). Thus, Kubler and Deluca 
(2006), suggest use of incentives for academics would attract, motivate and retain them to 
engage in knowledge production in the higher education institutions. Furthermore, collaborative 
partnerships with other institutions and organizations beyond the disciplinary, regional, national, 
and global boundaries (Gibbons et al., 1994; Castells, 2009) have intensified staff competition 
and increased mobility of academics. Kubler & Deluca (2006), argue that staff competition and 
“mobility strengthen the role of market forces” in recruiting, attracting, motivating and retaining 
academics in the universities. These market forces may involve use of incentives (p. 4).  
 
Moreover, as a result of the diversification process in the producers of knowledge, HEIs are 
required to find their niche research areas and increase production of useful knowledge. Hence 
universities have to ensure visibility of their graduate education and research activities globally, 
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as well as ensure provision of supporting infrastructures and resources that will attract and retain 
the best researchers, academics and academic leaders (Hazelkorn, 2008).  
 
The above discussion has presented broader debates on the distinctive role of higher 
education/universities in society, especially in the new context of the knowledge economy. The 
key argument in the preceding analysis is that universities have a crucial role to play in society, 
primarily through knowledge production. Therefore, universities have to find ways to encourage 
academics to increase the productivity levels of knowledge. The next section focuses on African 
universities and their changing roles since the 1960s.  
 
2.2 The Role of Higher Education Institutions in the African Context 
	  
This section discusses the role of higher education institutions in the African context over time. 
This analysis is presented across several periods of time to show the shifting emphasis of the role 
of higher education in Africa. The periodization is from the 1960s to date, given their distinctive 
socio-economic features that have had an influence on the role of universities in Africa.  
 
2.2.1 The Role of Universities in the 1960s  
	  
In the 1960s, the key purpose of the newly established universities in the young independent 
nations was to produce sufficient trained and skilled human resources for the civil service and 
the public professions and other practitioners required to replace the departing expatriates, and 
for economic growth and development in the region (Ashby, 1964; Yesufu, 1973; Court, 1991; 
Lulat, 2005). Apart from training the professionals, African Universities were hailed as agents of 
economic modernization, social transformation, preserving national heritage and nation building 
(Yesufu, 1973; Mosha, 1986; Sherman, 1990; Ajayi, Goma & Johnson, 1996; Sawyer, 2004). It 
is because of this critical role expected of the newly established African universities that they 
became known as the “development universities” (Yesufu, 1973; Cloete et al., 2011).  
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The important expectations of the role of the new African Universities in development provided 
an economic basis for financial investment in education by both government and external 
funders (Court, 1991; Wangenge-Ouma, 2008a; Pillay, 2010). Lulat (2003) clearly states that:  
 
The kinds of bilateral support received by higher education in countries throughout the 
independent Africa reflected the complexity of that sector. That is, almost every aspect of 
higher education was targeted for support, including assistance with building 
construction, provision of student scholarship for staff development, payment of partial 
or whole salaries of local and externally recruited staff, assistance in with logistical 
purchases (including library materials, computers and lab equipment), and assistance with 
the establishment of programmes of study. (Lulat, 2003, p. 26)  
 
From the above quotation, it can be deduced that the government offered incentives and 
organizational support for the academics to teach and carry out research. Also, during this 
period, there were staff development opportunities through scholarships to the academics and 
students to pursue PhDs abroad. There were also other benefits provided such as paid study leave 
(Mamdani, 2011).  
 
However, critics had a dim view of the performance of the African universities in the 1960s. 
They asserted that the contribution of the universities’ to meeting the needs of society in which 
they were established was inadequate (Court, 1991).  According to Ashby (1964) and Yesufu 
(1973), the universities were engraved in the western universities model as institutions with a 
purpose to train a small elite group and produce knowledge for its own sake. Notably, though 
universities claimed to engage in knowledge production, in practice there was limited research 
conducted that could have contributed sufficiently to socio-economic development (Wangenge-
Ouma & Fongwa, 2012). However, Ajayi et al., (1996, p.192), comment that with regard to the 
mission of African universities having to train sufficient human resources who were prepared to 
replace the departing colonial officials and professionals, the universities are recognized to have 
performed well as per the expectation. Ajayi and colleagues claim that during this period, the 
graduates of the national universities took charge of the science and technology infrastructure, 
hence being responsible for the research and development activities undertaken in the country.  
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2.2.2 Criticism on the Relevance of African Universities in the 1970s   
	  
In the 1970s, the relevance of the African University to development was increasingly being 
questioned (Court, 1980), after a notion that a different university was called for whose core 
activities were relevant to the needs of the African countries. Court (1980), notes the questioning 
was an attempt to transform African universities, seen as tools of change from the European 
universities mainly interested in continuity and conservation (p.334). Several issues were being 
criticized regarding the African University during this period, including the curriculum, the 
academic profession and its elitist nature (Yesufu, 1973; Court 1980; Ajayi, Goma & Johnson, 
1996). The above authors argue the universities were not making a contribution to the wellbeing 
of the countries’ population and socio-economic transformation. 
 
The emphasis on this pursuit was outlined in the report of a conference “creating the African 
University” organized by the African Association of Universities (AAU) in 1973 (Yesufu, 1973; 
Court 1980). In this conference, there was a strong call on the redefinition of the role of the 
African University.  
 
What seemed to be required, therefore, was a new working definition of a university, 
which would signify its commitment, not just to knowledge for its own sake, but to the 
pursuit of knowledge for the sake of, and for the amelioration of the conditions of the 
common man and woman in Africa. The African University must in the 1970s not only 
wear a different cloak, but must also be differently motivated. It must be made of a 
different and distinctive substance from the traditions of Western universities, and must 
evolve a different attitude and a different approach to its task. The truly African 
university must be one that draws its inspiration from its environment, not a transplanted 
tree, but growing from a seed that is planted and nurtured in the African soil. (Yesufu, 
1973, p. 40) 
 
Following the key role of universities in development, the above quotation signals key aspects 
that were highlighted for the African universities in the 1970s, including producing knowledge 
that would meet the needs of the society; Universities were to play a key role in fulfilling the 
needs of African societies and its local contexts, which were different from the needs of the 
societies where their mode of operation originated. Following the above analysis, it is clear that 
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through knowledge production, universities were required to make a prominent contribution to 
the socio-economic development. 
 
Despite the questioning of the relevance of the African university in the 1970s, as indicated 
earlier, in the 1960 these universities met their expectations by producing skilled manpower and 
research output required for the countries’ socio-economic modernization. However, Court 
(1980), argues that some of the expectations and experiences of the Universities in 1970s failed, 
and through cost analysis universities were criticized for utilizing government resources, with 
less return in comparison to other levels of schooling. Consequently, this was followed by a 
decade full of challenges discussed below.  
 
2.2.3 Re-assessment of the Role of Universities in the 1980s  
	  
Though the first two decades of higher education in Africa were followed with high 
expectations, concerns about and criticisms of the relevance of African universities to society in 
the 1980s seemed to portray a difficult moment for universities on the continent. This was as a 
result of several internal and external challenges imposed on higher education institutions during 
this period.   Several authors contend that during this period African countries were faced with, 
inter alia, increase in population, national economic crises, high illiteracy, disease and low 
agricultural production, repression and curtailed academic freedom, which had an effect on 
African universities (Atteh, 1996; Ajayi et al., 1996; Samoff & Carroll, 2004).  In relation to 
universities, these challenges meant decline in state support in provision of social services, 
including education, and reduction in resources available for African higher education during a 
period when knowledge was highly recognized for its role in socio-economic development 
(Samoff & Carroll, 2004). 
  
Additionally, following the above-mentioned social and economic crises, the International 
Monetary Fund and the World Bank drove the introduction of Structural Adjustments 
Programmes (SAPs) in African countries as conditions to reduce public expenditure on social 
services, including higher education (World Bank, 1988; Lulat, 2003). The World Bank called 
for privatization measures and implementation of user fees to raise funds to meet the public 
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demand for expansion of university education and improve educational opportunities (Court, 
1991; World Bank, 1994; Lulat, 2003). Further, given the claim, higher education had minimal 
or no rates of return on investment compared to the primary and secondary levels of schooling   
(Psacharopoulos & Woodhall, 1985), governments and other stakeholders reduced university 
funding in favour of primary education (World Bank, 1988; Sammoff & Carroll, 2003; Kiamba, 
2004). For instance, the shift in investment saw external funding decline from US$ 103 million 
annually as late as 1994, decreasing to an average of US$ 30.8 million from 1995 to 1999. Public 
spending per capita fell from US$ 6 800 in 1980, to US$ 1 200 in 2002, and by 2009 it averaged 
US$ 981 in 33 low-income Sub- Saharan Africa countries (World Bank 2009, p.  xxvii).  
 
Marginalization of higher education affected not only the core functions of teaching and research 
but also research infrastructure, incentives and remuneration of academics. According to Ajayi et 
al., (1996), and Hayward (2012), reduced government funding curtailed expenditure on staff 
development, postgraduate studies, books, and subscription to journals, equipment, teaching 
materials and academics’ salaries. Similarly, reduced funding resulted in a decline in seminars 
and lower volume of research. For instance, over the last 25 years the Sub-Saharan African 
publication in international journals declined by 31 percent (Evoh et al., 2013). This is in 
contrast, for example, to the case of India and China, which became competitive nations by 
investing in primary, secondary and University education simultaneously (Pillay, 2010a). 
Despite fiscal austerity, staff shortages, overcrowding, decline in the working conditions, and 
decrease in academic salaries in several universities, Hayward (2012), comments, there were 
academics in African Universities who were still dedicated to quality research and graduate 
training.  
 
However, the decline in research activities was alarming as this compromised Africa’s ability to 
take part in the global advances in science and technology, the capacity to adapt and use new 
knowledge and its requirement to develop indigenous graduate programmes in teaching and 
research that are key factors for Africa to develop its own scientific and intellectual capacity.  
 
From the above analysis, it is evident that the 1980s was a period of despondency in terms of 
development of the African universities and their role in knowledge production. During this 
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period research and scholarship were the main losers. However, there was a shift in the 1990s 
and early 2000s that continues to be seen in the universities today, as the World Bank and other 
influential voices called on restoration of higher education. A detailed discussion is provided in 
the next section.  
 
2.2.4 Revitalization of Higher Education in the 1990s and 2000s 
	  
Sawyer (2004), stresses that in the 1990s and the early 2000s some ‘influential voices’ such as 
the World Bank, the international development community and other commentators started 
calling for revitalization of higher education in African nations and its link to economic growth. 
Bloom et al., (2006), indicate that international institutions shifted their thinking on the higher 
education policies and increased presumptions that higher education in Sub-Saharan Africa is 
important for economic development and alleviation of poverty. Hence, they encouraged 
introduction of innovative policies to strengthen higher education systems. To expound, Bloom 
et al. (2006), state that:  
 
In (a) knowledge economy, tertiary education can help economies keep up or catch up 
with more technologically advanced societies. Higher education graduates are likely to be 
more aware of and better able to use new technologies. They are also more likely to 
develop new tools and skills themselves. Their knowledge can also improve the skills and 
understanding of non-graduate coworkers, while the greater confidence and know-how 
inculcated by advanced schooling may generate entrepreneurship, with positive effects on 
job creation. (Bloom et al., 2006, p. 15) 
 
From the excerpt above, it is clear there was a re-emphasis on the critical role of higher 
education in national development through production of human resources and research, which 
are the key elements required in the knowledge economy.  
 
The above views of Bloom and colleagues are also evident in the arguments made by numerous 
World Bank reports (World Bank, 2009). These reports emphasize, albeit belatedly, the 
importance of higher education in African countries, for them to be able to participate in the 
knowledge economy. Importantly, this emphasis on higher education entails investing in 
research and postgraduate training; offering attractive incentives to the academics such as good 
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remuneration. Also, African countries were encouraged to invest in education in mathematics, 
Science and engineering as these were important fields of expertise for improved economic 
growth. To reinforce the above views, the former UN Secretary, General Kofi Annan was one of 
the main “influential voices” that called on African Universities to respond to the demands of the 
‘knowledge economy’.  
 
The university must become a primary tool for Africa’s development in the new century. 
Universities can help develop African expertise; they can enhance the analysis of African 
problems; strengthening domestic institutions; service as a model environment for the 
practice of good governance, conflict resolution and respect for human right, and enable 
African academic to play and active part in the global community of scholars. (Bloom et 
al, 2006, p. 2)  
 
From the above quote, following the earlier signal on the contradictory positioning of higher 
education in Africa regarding development, it is evident there has been renewed 
acknowledgement that university education has a key role in economic growth and global 
competitiveness. Despite the above acknowledgement, higher education in Africa still faces key 
challenges, which could diminish the universities’ contribution to economic development. World 
Bank (2002), and Evoh et al., (2013), outline six main challenges: (a) lack of skills, demonstrated 
by low rate of enrolment in secondary and tertiary education, followed with less enrolment in 
STI, agriculture, and engineering (b) low scientific and engineering research output, (c) lack of 
research funding (d) lack of links with the industry and other stakeholders in the economy (e) 
lack of ICT infrastructures and Internet connections and, (f) curriculum and relevance gap. These 
challenges have resulted in production of limited human capital and insufficient scientific output 
required for the knowledge economy.  
 
Despite the shift towards the knowledge economy in the African context, Pillay (2010a) claims 
that it is far from clear that increased knowledge production and dissemination will result in 
competitiveness in the knowledge economy and socio-economic development. Further, another 
paradox is, as signaled earlier (see section 2.2.3) governments, particularly in developing 
countries tend to neglect investing in higher education as they pay more attention to primary 
education, in spite of the acclaimed role of universities in the knowledge economy (Maassen & 
Cloete, 2002). In the recent past governments have been continuously under pressure to cut down 
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their support of higher education. 
 
In summary, the role of higher education in the society has been underpinned by the historical 
mandate of the universities. From the above analysis, it’s evident that in the 1960s and 1970s, the 
emphasis on the relevance of the universities in production of knowledge required for the 
economy of the newly independent nations, foregrounded the idea of the “developmental” 
university. In the 1980s, the universities were seen as a burden following their smaller 
contribution to development than before. Lastly, since the 1990s and 2000s, the need for the 
universities to contribute to economic development by increasing research output and production 
of human capital has been revived.  
 
Having looked at the role of higher education in society, with a particular focus on the Sub-
Saharan African context, the next section delves into a detailed discussion of the notion of 
incentives. A general understanding of incentives as applied in different contexts and disciplines 
is provided, and later a discussion on the concept’s application in the higher education context.  
 
2.3 The Notion of Incentives  
	  
This section will first discuss the general understanding of incentives as applied in different 
contexts and disciplines, followed by an analysis of the concept’s application in the higher 
education context. In addition, different theoretical approaches to incentives are discussed, with 
particular emphasis on the principal-agent model that forms the main theoretical framework for 
this study. Lastly, different concepts from the theoretical constructs are operationalized and 
empirical indicators, which are later applied in the analysis of the data, are teased out.  
 
2.3.1 Conceptualizing and Discerning Incentives  
	  
The notion of incentives is conceptualized in various ways. The presence and emergence of 
several definitions argued by some authors could be as a result of the contextual nature of how 
the notion of ‘incentives’ is applied (Fenker, 1977; Adams & Hicks, 2000; Frey & Neckermann, 
2008; Milne, 2009). Thus, based on the above observation, Adams and Hicks (2000), expound 
 
 
 
 
	  	   30	  
that incentives infer different things to different people in different disciplines as they are guided 
by different theoretical approaches.  
 
According to Hendricks and Sousa (2008, p. 361-362), the notion of incentives has certain 
antecedents that are key to its conceptualization. Generally, Gneezy et al., (2003), see incentives 
as items that will spur the desired behaviour in the organization, encouraged by the principal. 
Hendricks and Sousa (2008), maintain the notion of incentives involves a simple analogy of the 
question, “what is in it for me?” (p. 361). Basically this argument refers to that which workers 
receive after working or successfully completing tasks delegated to them. Fenker (1977), claims 
that an incentive structure “represents an empirical framework of an organization which 
characterizes the relationship between specific behaviours of employees and the probabilities of 
receiving various incentives” (p.454). Frey and Neckermann (2008), and Milne (2007), claim 
incentives could be used in organizations in improving performance or particular desirable 
behaviour (publishing), which the employers believe is necessary for the excellence of the 
organization.  
 
Incentives in organizations are mainly categorized in two broad ways, i.e., on the basis of 
“whether the unit of analysis – and the recipient of the incentives – is the individual or the group 
(or the organization)” (Steers, 1984, p. 417). Meyer and Meyer (2009), contend that the effective 
way of motivating an employee is by attaching rewards to the individual’s efforts and ability. 
Meyer and Meyer (2009), identify several individual incentive plans to include: merit-based 
compensation plans, piece rate plans, bonus plans and commissions. These incentive approaches 
entail tying compensation directly to the performance of individual employees. This type of 
approach is advantageous to the employees since in this case the employers understand that an 
individual’s performance, effort and ambition are directly linked to the reward. Hence, individual 
workers view it as a fair mode of compensation unlike the group rewards.  
 
Despite the argument that individual incentives result in improved performance, several studies 
have revealed contrasting views, for instance, individual incentives may result in competition 
amongst employees, hence undesired results (Meyer and Meyer, 2009). Inasmuch as the 
economic theory claims competition leads to efficiency and quality output, competition among 
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employees may be problematic as it crowds out teamwork in the organization. Teamwork allows 
employees to work together and meet the goals of the organization. Steers (1984, p. 418), also 
mentions some examples to illustrate misgivings about the individual incentives. First, providing 
individual achievement incentives to sales people, for instance, guarantees that the staff will not 
work together to achieve the required performance, because of the competition. Heckscher and 
Donnellon (1994), argue competitive individual distribution of incentives “correlates not only 
with lower self-esteem among participants, but also with lower satisfaction ratings and 
performance” (p. 74).   
 
A study of performance-based rating systems in high technology firms, by Zenger (1992), cited 
in Heckscher and Donnellon (1994, p.74) found that the engineers who were likely to leave the 
firm were not just “the extremely low performers but also those moderately high-rated 
performers who might be disappointed at falling short of the highest ratings”. Similarly, Lazear 
(2000), reveals that without the quality control aspect competition created by provision of 
individual incentives based on piece rates results in increased output, although of poor quality 
(also see Steers, 1984, p. 418; Stilwell, 2003; Meyer & Meyer, 2009).  
 
Notably, when dealing with the above challenges of individual incentives, proponents of 
incentives advise organizations to opt for group or organizational incentive plans. Group 
incentives, involve a case where a group of employees, teams or a whole organization, get 
benefits of the improved performance, reduction of costs, or the increase in profits (Lavy, 2007; 
Meyer & Meyer, 2009). In addition, providing team incentives results in employees sharing the 
best methods and working together to achieve the desired productivity levels. This argument 
explains why some universities reward team efforts or acknowledge the organization on their 
research performance.   
 
In support of rewarding team efforts Steers (1984) contends that individual incentive plans might 
face resistance from academic unions as university academic staff unions prefer that staff be 
compensated on the basis of seniority or job satisfaction. Steers (1984) concludes that many 
work organizations are faced with inequity in the provision of incentives since, “often there is 
little in correlation between those who perform well and those who receive the greatest rewards’ 
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(p. 416). In contrast, Heckscher and Donnellon (1994) argue, “distribution of rewards based on 
hierarchy [positions] could act as a disincentive for most people to contribute their knowledge 
and ideas (p. 76). In support of rewarding individual performance Kanter (1987) argues that not 
rewarding performance encourage individuals to ‘look out for themselves’ even though it means 
improving on productivity. Hence, Kanter proposes, like the predictions of the principal-agent 
model, institutions should reward performance and motivate the employees (Kanter (1987). This 
dimension is similar to the predictions of the principal-agent model, as highlighted in the later 
sections (see sections 2.6.1.1 and 2.7)   
 
From the above account it is clear that incentives are conceptualized in several ways, which vary 
across disciplines and contexts. The emphasis is on selecting incentive plans that are suitable for 
specific organizations and workforce (Meyer & Meyer, 2009.)  A number of theories explain 
how incentives operate; different authors propose relevant guidelines for effective incentive 
programmes as are depicted in the next section.  There are several typologies of incentives given 
at different levels of analysis. These include: (a) individual incentives (b) group incentives and, 
(c) organizational incentives. The use of each of these incentives may result in different 
consequences regarding quantity as well as quality of the products.  
 
2.4 Incentives as Applied in the Higher Education Context  
	  
The concept of incentives is often seen as distasteful and unsuitable when applied to the 
academic profession in the university context (Fenker, 1977). Some authors argue in favour of 
commitment, academic ethos and self-selection as factors that influence the quality and quantity 
of academic work, rather than awarding extrinsic incentives (Ruegg, 1986). Similarly, Fenker 
(1977), claims that reducing the “complex motivations such as scholarly dedication or personal 
rewards” related to teaching and research, to a simple analogy of incentives is inappropriate and 
unproductive (p. 454). Hendricks and Sousa (2008) argue, in contrast, that the role of incentives 
in the higher education context requires attention since “pressures from outside and within the 
universities are said to have made university research less of a curiosity-driven activity and 
turned it more into ordinary work, with career opportunities and performance assessment 
attached to it” (p. 359). Hendricks and Sousa, further claim research in universities is not entirely 
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about producing knowledge, but it also involves pay “with reputation” involved (p. 359). Several 
empirical explanations/studies of incentives are discussed below (Fox, 1985; Blackburn & 
Lawrence, 1995; Fairweather & Rhoads, 1995; Tien & Blackburn, 1996; Chow and Harrison 
1998; Bucheit, Collins, & Collins 2001). 
  
2.4.1 Money as an Incentive  
	  
Proponents of incentives, such as economists, assume that, when there is an increase in the 
financial incentives as compensation for a task, the result would be increased productivity 
(Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000). This is based on the assumption of the economic theory that, 
“performance is positively related to effort; effort is unpleasant, and money is good” (Gneezy & 
Rustichini, 2000, p. 791). Similarly, Cloete and the colleagues suggest, African “governments 
and universities should explore incentive systems such as that in South Africa, where the 
government financially rewards institutions for PhD graduates and accredited publications” 
(Cloete et al., 2011, p. xx). The rationale for this argument is that, given an environment where 
academics are faced with very little research funding from the government, poor remuneration 
and several competing incentives, incentives for knowledge production would ensure academics 
focus on publishing and supervision of postgraduate students. More often than not attractive 
remuneration packages are offered to ensure performance at maximum efficacy in order to 
motivate, attract and retain the best talents within the institution (Kubler & De Luca, 2006).  
 
At present, institutions provide monetary incentives in two broad ways, namely, direct monetary 
compensation and indirect monetary compensation. The main acknowledged direct monetary 
compensation includes salary and commission.  Indirect monetary compensation is mainly 
referred to as employee benefits that may include housing allowance and paid (sabbatical) leave.  
Generally, money has been argued to have higher valence than no pay or than other non-
contingent incentives (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002, p. 308). Several scholars argue that the 
attractiveness of money is based on the several functions money serves in working contexts. 
These include: (i) money is a goal or incentive (ii) money is a source of satisfaction (iii) money 
is instrumental toward acquiring other desired outcomes, (iv) money has symbolic value due to 
its link to prestige, status and other factors (Vroom, 1964, also see Steers, 1984, p. 416; Zelizer, 
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1994). Hence, according to the expectancy theory, the overall motivation of an individual will be 
high when compensation is given on the basis of performance, because of the increased 
expectancy of the link between effort and outcome (monetary incentives) and increased valence 
of the rewards (Vroom, 1964). These notions of linking outcomes to tasks are also emphasized in 
the agency theory (principal-agent model) (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) as discussed below.  
 
An experimental study by Lazear (2000) showed that performance-based monetary rewards for 
employees manifested in increase in productivity of employees. Lazear’s (2000), view is that this 
could be as a result of either the average worker responding to the incentives; or, the ability of 
the firms to hire productive workers who are attracted to the organization because of rewards and 
which reduce quits amongst the productive workers.  
 
In spite of money being argued to have great motivational effect, research shows that the effect 
of monetary incentives varies considerably. In some situations, studies have shown a direct 
relationship between receiving monetary incentives and increase in effort and performance; 
however, there are times where such a relationship is not established (Steers, 1984). In another 
study, Gneezy and Rustichini (2000, p. 791), conducted a controlled laboratory experiment, 
comparing two major situations - the total absence of, and conversely, presence of monetary 
rewards. Gneezy and Rustichini’s hypothesis was based on an economic theory that monetary 
compensation would neither increase nor decrease the performance levels. From the above study 
it was established that “in the treatments in which money was offered, a larger amount yielded a 
higher performance”. Further the study also illustrated, “offering money did not always produce 
an improvement: subjects who were offered monetary incentives performed more poorly than 
those who were offered no compensation” (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000, p. 791). This affirms that 
use of monetary incentives can result in negative impact on performance (see also Pink, 2011). 
From the above study it can be seen that use of money in particular as incentive, or other 
incentives to enhance performance does not result in a linear relationship.   
 
Some theories have predictions that use of monetary incentives may result in decreased effort 
and performance. For instance, Deci and Ryan (1985), through their work on the cognitive 
evaluation theory argue that use of monetary incentives, when attention is on the external reward 
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attached to the task, may decrease intrinsic motivation, and hence may decrease the effort and 
task performance. Gneezy et al., (2011), agree that with the use of monetary incentives, the 
desired effort and performance initially increases, however, with time the performance begins to 
decrease. Furthermore, a study by Amabile (1996, p. 30), illustrates that unlike intrinsic 
incentives that are conducive for creativity, use of extrinsic rewards is detrimental to the agents’ 
creativity. Creativity is assumed to be the main ingredient of the knowledge production process.  
 
Despite the influence of monetary incentives on the performance or productivity levels of 
workers, proponents of incentives argue that incentives should be adequate and fair.   
 
If someone’s baseline rewards aren’t adequate, or equitable, her focus will be on the 
unfairness of her situation and the anxiety of her circumstance. You’ll get neither the 
predictability of extrinsic motivation nor the weirdness of intrinsic motivation. You’ll get 
very little motivation at all. But once we’re past that threshold, carrots and sticks can 
achieve precisely the opposite of their intended aims. (Pink, 2011, p. 35) 
 
Drawing from the above excerpt, Pink further emphasizes that the main reason why adequate and 
fair pay is essential is that it takes the focus off the issue of money and allows the agents to focus 
on the main task itself.  
 
From the above-mentioned opposing effects of monetary incentives, Meyer and Meyer (2009) 
argue that money should not be the main incentive. Even though most people appreciate money, 
it should be used together with other incentives such as promotion and provision of good 
working conditions. The authors further explain that, money has less storability value where it is 
spent and ‘memory’ of its value fades. Unlike other incentives, such as promotion, that have high 
storability value and can be remembered, hence a long-term influence on the long-term goals of 
the organization. Therefore, the next section discusses several other incentives provided to 
academics alongside money.  
 
2.4.2 Institutional Incentives in the University Context.  
	  
This section provides empirical studies on incentives in different higher education contexts. Few 
researchers in the Kenyan context have conducted empirical studies to explore the relationship 
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between academic incentives and knowledge production. Some studies of American, Asian and 
other academics are helpful in providing preliminary insights. Many previous studies on 
incentives that motivate academic research productivity have focused on the external, 
organizational factors that are linked to the academic working conditions (Massy & Wilger, 
1995; Smeby & Try, 2005; Bland et al., 2005; Hassan, Tymms & Ismael, 2008; Hendricks & 
Sousa, 2008; Tien, 2007). These are discussed in the subsequent paragraphs. 
  
Studies about incentives that motivate academics to be productive, established three main 
domains of characteristics including, the individual academic researcher, the environment that 
the researcher works in and the leadership of the institution (Bland & Ruffin, 1992; Bland et al., 
2006). Bland and the colleagues believe that, the above characteristics are integrated, and 
academics will be highly productive if all the stated motivational incentives are available. Bland 
and others provided a model of the different characteristics as illustrated in Figure 2.1. The 
figure illustrates the individual, environmental and the leadership factors that previous studies 
have demonstrated motivate academics, to research and publish, that is, resulting in high research 
productivity. However, Bland et al., (2002), emphasize that, to get optimal productivity requires 
that all the characteristics in the different components have to be present and accessible. 
  
Several studies on factors that encourage academics to publish and supervise postgraduates 
revealed that standard research training influences both an individual’s and departmental or 
institutional knowledge productivity. Smeby and Try’s (2005), analysis among Norwegian 
academics established that the proportion of doctoral degree holders in a department was an 
influential factor on the departmental total research publications.  Similarly, a research study 
among Kenyan academics indicated that, academics with doctoral training, compared with those 
without doctoral training, have a higher likelihood of engaging in research and publishing peer 
reviewed articles (Cloete et al., 2011; Migosi et al., 2012). Migosi et al., citing Hemming and 
Kay (2007), contend that doctoral training has an “indirect effect” on research output as it acts on 
“writing confidence” (p. 124). PhD training should also enable individuals to train other 
postgraduate students. For further information on individual, environmental and leadership 
factors that motivate academics see Figure 2.1. 
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Figure 2.1 Individual, environmental and the leadership factors that motivate academics  
Source: Extracted from Bland et al. (2006, p. 92). 
 
Studies by Tien and Blackburn (1996), and Bland et al., (2005), found significant differences in 
research productivity by rank/seniority. The studies showed that research productivity was 
highest among professors and associate professors, in comparison to the other academic ranks. In 
contrast, some studies have established that junior academic staff members were more highly 
productive in terms of publications than their senior counterparts (Tien, 2007c; Cloete et al., 
2011). To expound, Tien, (1994a), and Tien, (2007c), revealed that, after acquisition of 
promotion or tenure to the final career level or academic rank, academics tend to decrease their 
research productivity within three years of acquiring full professorship. The above observations 
are in tandem with the claims of Pink (2011), that “in environments where extrinsic rewards are 
most salient, many people work only to the point that triggers the award – and no further (…) 
meaningful achievement depends on lifting one’s sights and pushing toward the horizon” (p. 58). 
Despite the opposing findings above, a study by Tien (2007c), illustrated that promotion to 
higher academic ranks is linked to research publications. Hence, Bland et al., (2005), argue that, 
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since research publications are mainly considered for promotion, there is an expectation of high 
research productivity from academics of higher rank. 
  
Networking is vital for academics as they engage in production and dissemination of knowledge 
in the universities. Bland et al., (2005), describe networking as follows, when "members have a 
vibrant network of colleagues with whom they have frequent and substantive (not merely social) 
research communication, both impromptu and formal, in and outside of the institution” (p. 228). 
Bland and his colleagues further argue that networking with researchers may result in 
collaboration with other top researchers, therefore help the academic researchers to publish more 
easily than those academics that do not maintain professional or disciplinary networks.  
 
Basing their study on the life-cycle development model, Tien (2007c), used various sources of 
data, including faculty lifetime publication data and a longitudinal mail survey, to examine the 
lifetime productivity changes among Taiwanese academics. Tien used the National Science 
Council (NSC) Research Outcome Awards and stipend money as measures of the Taiwanese 
academic research performance.  The above measures differed with the traditional research 
publications counts, such as, books, articles, and citation. She argued, the NSC Research 
Outcome Award “serves as a quality indicator of research performance and has a spirit of 
performance” (Tien, 2007c, p. 15). The respondents to the longitudinal survey were full-time 
Taiwanese academics above the instructor level, working in three major fields and fourteen 
disciplines employed in nine institutions (Tien, 2007c). The study used the behavioural 
reinforcement theory as a theoretical framework, which argues that external incentives have an 
impact on human behaviour (Tien & Blackburn, 1996).  
 
The above study by Tien (2007c), established that during the early stages of the career, the 
proportion of academics that published remained low. As the time of the anticipated promotion 
approached, the proportion gradually increased. Conversely, there wa                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             
s a decline in research productivity after promotion. According to Walker (2002), differences 
exist in the priorities of academics across their career trajectory. The above findings are similar 
to the predictions of a ‘research productivity theory’, Life-Cycle theory. (Hu & Gill, 2000), argue 
that, generally the research productivity of academics increases sharply in the early stages of the 
 
 
 
 
	  	   39	  
career, reaches the peek around tenure review and later begins to decrease. Similarly, a survey 
conducted by Tien (2000b), found that academics who indicated to be highly motivated by 
promotion displayed higher research performance, compared to their colleagues who stated that 
they were not highly motivated by the prospect of promotion.  
 
Several authors argue that a strong link exists between research output and incentives offered in 
the universities (Braxton, Luckey & Holland, 2002). A few studies provide a comprehensive 
picture of the kind of relationship that exists between the incentives and research output. For 
instance, promotion will be effective as an incentive for research productivity depending on the 
individual’s value or need for promotion.  Tien (2000b) indicates that, academics that attach 
more importance to promotion would publish more than their counterparts who don’t value it. In 
another intervention, Tien’s study demonstrated that, expectation of receiving particular 
incentives had a different motivational effect on the research publication. For instance, 
regression analysis illustrated that, academics that were highly motivated by promotion and the 
fulfillment of curiosity, had the tendency to publish research articles, while academics that were 
motivated by a show of mastery in the discipline, had a tendency to publish books. Lastly, 
academics that considered financial rewards as the major incentive sought and received the 
National Science council Research Outcome Grant or Award (Tien, 2007c).  
 
Notably, research has established that academics respond to the promotion and tenure criteria, 
hence, these are important incentives that reinforce academic research behaviour and research 
productivity (Massy & Widgren, 1995; Tien, 2000b). Interviews conducted by Ruscio (1987), 
(cited in Tien, 2007c), showed that, when an academic respondent was asked to comment on 
research publication he stated that “Half to three quarters of what I read, if I asked myself why 
this was written, the answer normally is promotion”. Consequently, scholars emphasize that 
higher education institutions could have critical impact on academic research behaviour through 
manipulating the reward structure of promotion (Fox, 1992). Nevertheless, little of the research 
keenly examines the said criteria of promotion and tenure. 
 
In her study Tien (2007c), suggested that higher education institutions need to establish more 
flexible systems of sabbaticals that are important for revitalizing academics’ research energy. 
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Citing the example of several universities in Taiwan, the policy requires that professors apply for 
sabbatical leave after seven years in the senior positions, or apply for a period of six months, 
once every three years. In the context of the study, the University of Nairobi policy indicates that 
academics are entitled to apply for sabbatical leave only after seven years (UoN, 2006b). Based 
on the findings, the author proposes an aggressive policy that would allow professors to enjoy 
sabbaticals after three years of service after the promotion to full professorship. Additionally, 
Tien (2000b) suggests that an additional academic rank on the career level would enhance 
research performance particularly for the academic careers of those academics that are motivated 
by promotion.  
 
In the context of South Africa, Inglesi-Lotz and Pouris, (2011), investigated the influence of the 
National Research Foundation’s (NRF) rating system on the research productivity of the South 
African social science researchers in the period 1981 to 2006. Inglesi-Lotz and Pouris (2011), 
state that combined incentives are provided for highly rated academic researchers with 
international recognition and constant research productivity. For instance, A-rated researchers 
receive research funding of R100 000; B-rated researchers, R80 000 and the C-rank receive R40 
000 per annum whenever the ratings are maintained (Inglesi-Lotz & Pouris, 2011).  
 
Inglesi-Lotz & Pouris, (2011), indicate that several universities in South Africa are seen to have 
integrated the NRF rating system in their institutional promotion and remuneration policies to 
blend in as an added incentive for the academic researchers. Citing the University of Pretoria as 
an example, salary increases of R100 000 (Approx. US$13, 000) are offered to A-rated 
researchers for the period that the rating is maintained. On the other hand, the B-rated 
researchers, or equivalent, are rewarded annual performance awards. Basing the study on the 
behavioural reinforcement theory, scholars claim that linking the NRF rating system to the 
academic promotion and remuneration policies is intended to have motivational effect on the 
academics’ productivity (see Cooper, Heron, & Heward, 2007). 
 
In their empirical analysis and evaluation, Inglesi-Lotz and Pouris (2011) used scientometric 
information, experimental and quasi-experimental methods to examine the influence of the 
NRF’s evaluation and rating system on the publication of the social science researchers in South 
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Africa. The findings showed that monetary incentives influenced research quantity in the first 
five years after the implementation of the programme.  The analysis demonstrated an increase in 
the quantity of research output of social science researchers by an average of 24.5% in relation to 
the intended number of publications in the absence of the programme. The investigation on the 
quality of research revealed that the “relative impact” of the social science researchers’ 
publications significantly increased to 1.2 in 2002. The study concluded that evaluating and 
rating researchers revealed that incentives positively influenced research productivity; thus 
recommended incorporating incentives into the university policy (Inglesi-Lotz and Pouris, p. 
757), indicating that rewards such as monetary and promotion incentives can increase 
productivity. 
  
According to the study by Bland et al., (2006), there was general consensus that the kind of 
appointment influences the scope and type of research activities, research productivity and 
commitment to research in universities. The tenure-track appointments in higher education 
institutions are arguably believed to play an important role. Further, Bland and the colleagues 
contended that, tenure is vital to the health of the academic freedom by supporting academic 
interests. Tenure appointments warrant academic integrity, thus, providing the needed 
compensation for engaging in teaching, research and service activities of the university.  
 
Nevertheless, a survey study by Chen, Gupta and Hoshower (2006), in a business school 
established that the influence of extrinsic and intrinsic incentives varied between the tenured and 
non-tenured academics. The untenured academics tended to be influenced by extrinsic factors 
such as promotion, increase in pay and tenure. On the other hand, the tenured academics were 
influenced by intrinsic factors such as personal desires and interests and need for peer 
recognition (Chen, et al., 2006). Further, the regression results established a significant positive 
relationship between tenured appointments and research productivity. Chen and his colleagues 
argued that the positive correlations between tenure and research productivity could be explained 
by three main factors namely: the amount of time the tenured academics spent on research; their 
intrinsic motivation to contribute to their discipline, and the number of years of employment in 
academia (Chen et al., 2006, p. 185).  
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Some studies have focused on factors that motivate academics to be research active in particular 
disciplines (Chen et al., 2006).  Chen and colleagues used “Vroom’s expectancy theory” 
(Vroom, 1964), to establish key factors that motivate business academics to engage in research. 
The survey findings, based on feedback from 320 academics, at 10 business schools indicated 
that the academics who indicated high value ratings on both intrinsic and extrinsic rewards 
demonstrated higher levels of research productivity.  Primarily, the academic discipline has long 
been argued to be the source of “academic identities” with a distinctive culture that has allowed 
its members to develop strong “self-identities” (Becher, 1989; see also Henkel, 2010, p. 8).  
Clark (1983), argues, the academic discipline, “rather than the institution tends to become the 
dominant force in the working lives of academics” (p. 30). Thus, besides the rules in the 
institution, within the discipline there are specific guidelines that ascertain the research, teaching 
and service commitments that academics would value and recognize above others. Consequently, 
Hardre and Cox (2009), argue that “standards of values and rewards” have to be assessed at the 
institutional level, but also at the departmental and disciplinary level to provide a broad 
understanding of their influences (p. 387).  
 
From the preceding discussions, it can be seen that use of incentive items such as monetary 
rewards, promotion, tenure, good pay and paid sabbatical leave may enhance research 
productivity when used in university contexts. However, unexpected results may be attained in 
some instances. For instance, presence of monetary incentives may as well lead to poor 
productivity levels in relation to situations where other rewards are totally absent. Another key 
issue is that the use of incentives may result in the desired behaviour or effects in the short term, 
but at later stages result in undesired effects. Similarly, when incentives are removed agents 
might perform the tasks with less eagerness. From the above discussions, it has to be concluded 
that the link between incentives and research publications is still not very clear, though a number 
of studies have tried to elucidate the varied views. 
  
2.4.3 Allocation of Funds and Time Resources for Research 
	  
Several studies have shown that, time is an important input factor, and that time devoted to 
research is one of the best predictors of research productivity (Smeby & Try, 2005). 
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Additionally, Hemmings et al., (2007), contend that academics need sufficient time together with 
other benefits to be research productive. Sufficient time enables academics to plan and engage in 
research activities and supervise post-graduate students. Sufficient work time is when “members 
have significant periods of uninterrupted time to devote to scholarly activities” (Bland et al., 
2005, p. 228). 
 
An empirical study by Hassan, Tymms and Ismael (2008), showed that academics that devote 
most of their time to teaching and service related activities have minimum research output. 
Similarly, Ramsden (1994) conducted a survey with 890 academics in 18 Australian higher 
education institutions. Ramsden found that academics that were actively involved in research 
activities were five times more productive, than their less research active counterparts. Being 
actively involved in research entails spending more time on research projects hence the study 
justified the claims that sufficient time on research activities influences research productivity.  
 
Conversely, despite the importance of time on research output, in most previous studies on 
academic research productivity, time is stated as a constraint for the academics to engage in 
research activities. Studies illustrated that academics face difficulties in finding time to engage in 
publishing because of competing demands of the work time available (Smeby & Try, 2005; 
Hemming et al., 2007). From the analysis several studies indicated a negative relationship 
between academic research productivity and teaching load (Buchheit, Collins & Collins, 2001; 
Chen et al., 2006; Hardré et al, 2011). Buchheit et al., (2001), argue, that time as a limited 
resource may result in tension between teaching and research so that academics with heavy 
teaching loads are argued to be less productive in research. Despite the overwhelming time 
constraints Chen et al., (2006), and Hemming et al., (2007), suggest academics need to be 
effective time managers to find sufficient time to strike a balance between teaching, research, 
administration and service as the core activities in the university to ensure productivity. 
  
In relation to provision of funds and resources, Allison and Long (1990), conducted a study to 
find out the effects of 179 job changes on chemists, biologists, physicists and mathematicians 
and reported on their experiences in order to establish whether departmental factors in the 
institutions had an influence on academic productivity. The study showed that academics that 
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moved to research productive universities increased “their rate of publication and the rate of 
citation of the publications” between the five years before the move and the five years after the 
move. Conversely, the academics that moved downwardly indicated a decline in productivity. 
This study indicated clearly that the influence of the departmental factors on research 
productivity is more critical than the effect of the productivity to the department. This is because 
the environmental factors in the department have critical impact on engaging in research, 
publishing and producing graduates (Allison & Long, 1990, p. 469). The above study is 
consistent with observations of Bland et al., (2006, p. 26) who argue that individuals who come 
to productive environments produce more output compared to their previous performance before 
arriving. Therefore, resources provided to academics correlate to their research productivity.  
 
Despite the provision of stated incentives, what is fundamental in academics’ career is academic 
freedom. According to Mclnniss (2010), academic freedom is a common value transcending 
disciplines, institutions and higher education. Along with the mandates in the fields of study and 
personal autonomy, “this is for many, the major attraction of an academic career over more 
favourable salaries and conditions in other walks of life” (Mclnniss, 2010, p.152). The academic 
staff will engage in research activities because they have the autonomy granted to them. 
 
2.4.4 Developing a Research Culture  
	  
This section discusses the relationship between use of incentives and developing a research 
culture. Several studies on the development of a research culture focus on the “complex inter-
relationship between attitudes and behaviour, which is reinforced through the organizational 
culture” (Hazelkorn & Moynihan, 2010, p. 11).  According to William et al., (1993, p. 14; cited 
in, Pratt et al., 1999), “culture is the commonly held and relatively stable beliefs, attitudes, and 
values that exist within the organization” (p. 14). These beliefs influence their attitudes and 
behaviours in an organization since they are shared and widely accepted. To foster a new culture 
in an organization, Pratt et al., (1999, p. 46) argue that it is not “sufficient for a dean or 
department chair to try to change people’s attitudes towards research…rather, whole sets of 
beliefs must be changed”. Success in developing a research culture needs alignment and shared 
beliefs across the organization, relating to academic work, requirements for performance and 
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success, rewards on productivity, time resources for study, which allow provision of an 
environment that supports high research productivity.  
 
Several studies in the UK, New Zealand and Australia reveal how research cultures have been 
created successfully both at the macro, meso and micro levels using incentives and provision of 
resources. On a macro-level the UK focused on developing a research culture in education and 
social sciences (Munn, 2008). Munn (2008), and Christie and Menter (2009), documented such a 
change in the UK educational research that was highly criticized for its quality and quantity. In 
particular the, study revealed that research lacked the ability to address rigour, failed to produce 
aggregate findings and lacked theoretical coherence (Christie & Menter, 2009). To improve on 
the quality and quantity of educational research output, university funding bodies and the UK 
research council, the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC), increased research funding 
and provided pedagogical research resources in educational research within the Applied 
Educational Research Scheme (AERS) (Munn, 2008; Christie & Menter, 2009).  
 
 Munn (2008) found that an inclusive and collaborative approach was encouraged in research 
capacity building in the AERS networks. The collaborative research allowed the inexperienced 
researcher to learn various skills from the senior scholars, moving on across the stages of 
research from being an apprentice, to co-researcher and finally, to being the lead researcher. 
Additionally, participants received research training and mentoring, entailing formulation of the 
theoretically informed research questions; reviewing related literature; designing the research 
instruments; collecting data; analyzing data; reporting; publishing and disseminating findings 
(Christie & Menter, 2009, p. 346).  The above initiatives show that financial allocations and 
infrastructure were strong incentives to encourage the institution in improving on the quality.  
 
At departmental level, a study by Pratt et al., (1999, pp. 47-51), shows that a dominantly 
undergraduate teaching department in a university in New Zealand increased the research output 
and graduate students by use of incentives. These included creating research assistant positions; 
linking appointment and promotion criteria to research publications and producing graduate 
students; availing conference funding and research funding; providing other fringe benefits and 
awards for research output; offering ‘competitive incentives’ (payment on extra teaching of the 
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programmes) restricted to academics with high research output; providing research infrastructure 
and time resources.  
 
Pratt et al., (1999, p. 49) found that management used research productivity as a measure of 
performance, which included a number of doctoral students, a number of master’s students, a 
number of research projects and research publications. Similarly, a research director was 
appointed in the department to offer administrative support that included: encouraging and 
facilitating research; ensuring implementation and development of the research programme; 
proposing research initiatives; drawing departmental research annual plan; and offering advisory 
services (Pratt et al., 1999). 
 
A qualitative study by Grbich (1998), in a health context in an Australian university, 
demonstrated that a supportive research environment that includes:  providing research funding, 
research skills training by mentoring and collaborative research, provision of study leave and 
conference opportunities, and tenure, contributed to the fostering of a rich research culture. 
However, the author emphasized the importance of considering both individual characteristics 
and institutional research environment in ensuring knowledge productivity. Though universities 
are called upon to develop an active research culture, Hazelkorn (2008), emphasizes institutions 
have to find a balance when motivating, training and facilitating the research-active academics, 
so that the predominant teaching academics do not have the feeling of being marginalized.  
 
From the above analysis, it is clear that there is a link between culture and incentives. The 
reviews have illustrated a link between research culture and incentive systems, indicating that the 
two can complement each other. Largely, if organizations want to change culture, in this case 
research culture, they must change or re-consider their incentive regime.  This will ensure that 
the organization rewards the goals and interests it wants to meet.  
 
2.5 Summary of the Literature Review  
	  
The literature review above has provided a number of interesting insights that are useful for 
understanding the influence of incentives on research productivity. The key arguments gathered 
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from the reviewed literature are that the productivity of academics, in as far as knowledge 
production is concerned, is a function of various factors. These include money and other 
institution incentives, such as promotion, salary increase, adequate remuneration, other fringe 
benefits, research facilities and equipment, funds and time resources.  Other factors that seem to 
influence research productivity are individual characteristics, such as doctoral degree training 
and mentoring; and leadership factors. The studies reviewed show that optimal research 
productivity requires the simultaneous application of the various incentives. From the studies 
reviewed, the major incentive attached to research productivity is promotion, which comes with 
salary increase and increase in status.  The reviewed studies also showed contested findings, for 
example, on seniority Vis-a-Vis research productivity. Some studies have found that senior 
academics have a higher research productivity compared to their junior counterparts. Other 
studies contradicted this finding, claiming that junior academics out-publish professors.  
 
Similarly, several studies showed contested findings regarding the influence of money on 
research productivity. Various studies claimed that provision of money may lead to increase as 
well as decrease in productivity. In some studies, no significant results were reported following 
use of money. Several theoretical lenses have been utilized in the reviewed studies to explain that 
use of incentives leads to increase in effort hence resulting in increased performance. Some of 
the theories included present behavioural reinforcement theory, principal-agent theory, Vroom’s 
expectancy theory, Bandura’s SCT, goal-setting theory and self-determination theory. However, 
the main theory adopted in this study is the principal-agent theory, arguing that in an 
environment where academics have flexible contracts and are faced with several incentives, they 
will tend to make rational choices. A comprehensive discussion of the theoretical framework is 
provided below (see sections 2.6.1 & 2.6.1.1).  
 
2.6 Understanding the Link between Incentives and Knowledge Production: A Theoretical 
Framework 
	  
This section tries to describe a theoretical framework that the study utilises to explain how 
incentives work. My point of departure is to provide an overview of various theoretical 
approaches on incentives since they have important contributions to make to this study. The 
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latter discussion will be on the principal-agent model. Whereas the principal-agent model is my 
primary conceptual compass, the study also benefits from the arguments in the other theories that 
are discussed. These theories are all characterized by an attempt to steer behaviour in a certain 
direction, which is the fundamental premise of incentives. 
  
2.6.1 An Overview of Various Theoretical Approaches on Incentives  
	  
This section provides general theoretical explanations of how incentives work.  The hypothesis 
in regard to the effect of incentives on effort performance and/or productivity is that incentives 
result in increased effort, hence increase in performance, unlike in the case where incentives are 
absent (Bonner & Sprinkles, 2002). Thus, this section reflects on the several theories that 
disciplines such as economics, sociology and psychology have used in explaining how incentives 
work. Some core concepts of the theories have been adopted for this study.  The main theories 
established from the relevant literature reviewed include: the expectancy theory, agency theory 
(principal-agent model), goal-setting theory, self-determination theory and social-cognitive (self- 
efficacy) theory (Bonner & Sprinkle, 2002; Hendricks & Sousa, 2008).  
 
The first theory is the expectancy theory (see Vroom, 1964). It proposes that individuals believe 
there is a link between the effort they put in performing a task, the performance achieved from 
the effort and the desired rewards or outcomes received from the effort and performance. The 
core concept focuses on the individuals and organisation desired or expected outcomes of the 
tasks performed. The predictions of Vroom’s expectancy theory claim that individuals are 
motivated when they believe that (i) certain effort will result in acceptable performance 
(“expectancy”) (ii) certain performance will lead to desired outcomes (“instrumentality”) (iii) the 
value of the rewards is highly attractive (“valence”) (Lunenburg, 2011, p. 2). Therefore, the 
motivational effects built on the above notions impel individuals to make choices on the level of 
effort they put forth on tasks that will result in the desired outcomes. The desired outcomes could 
be financial incentives. Generally, as discussed earlier money as an incentive is said to have 
higher valence than most of the other incentives. In addition, the importance of linking expected 
outcomes to tasks is also emphasized by several theories such as the goal-setting theory and the 
social-cognitive theory as are discussed in the succeeding sections.  
 
 
 
 
	  	   49	  
Secondly, the Goal-setting theory (Locke & Latham, 1990) assumes that higher performance is 
as a result of achieving specific goals. The underlying concept is that task performance involves 
goals that have to be embraced by individuals. Bonner and Sprinkle (2002, p. 308) argue that in 
the goal-setting concepts, it is not precisely how incentives affect effort. However, Locke and 
Latham (1990), identify ways in which incentives can influence performance and effort through 
goal-setting, including: (i) incentives make people set goals they would not have set (ii) 
incentives make people set more challenging goals that might lead to more effort (iii) incentives 
may lead to goal commitment unlike the case where there are no performance-based incentives 
or no incentives. Drawn from the above is that there are roles to be played by the actors in task 
performance, these include setting specific goals and outlining the performance rules. Despite 
goal-setting and its importance, Pink (2011) argues, goals that people design for themselves, and 
if they are committed to attain them, they are usually more achievable than goals imposed by 
organizations. In situations where goals are imposed upon agents - such as research output levels, 
graduate output levels – can sometimes lead to “unethical behaviour”- implying,  “the problem 
with making an extrinsic reward the [only destination that matters is that some people [agents] 
will choose the quickest route there, even if it means taking the low road” (Pink, 2011, pp. 50 & 
51). These observations relate to the earlier observation by Lazear (2000), that incentives might 
increase desired output but negatively affect the quality.  
 
The third theory is the social-cognitive (self-efficacy) theory (SCT) or Bandura’s SCT (Bandura, 
1991) based on the key premise that individuals are likely to engage in certain work behaviours 
when they believe they have the ability to execute the desired behaviours effectively. The SCT 
theory features the concept of “self-efficacy” that relates to the expected outcomes that are in 
having the ability to perform a particular task (Bandura, 1991). Importantly, the core concept 
focuses on the skills and competencies of individuals in relation to the task and performance 
recognition, and the chance of achieving success. 
 
The fourth theory is the Deci and Ryan’s (1985) self-determination theory that provides a 
distinction of the popular aspect in motivation of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. The above 
notions are related to what Herzberg (1968, pp. 46-57) refers to as “motivators and hygienic 
factors” in the two factor theory. Intrinsic motivation works through a situation where 
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individuals perform certain tasks for inbuilt satisfaction. Individuals are intrinsically motivated to 
engage in certain behaviours because it is personally rewarding, essentially performing an 
activity for the sake of its own objectives. On the other hand, extrinsic motivation is based on the 
indirect need of satisfaction, for instance through monetary compensation or recognition. 
Hendricks and Sousa, (2008), observe that from the above motivation the individual actors of the 
tasks set their performance rules as is the case in goal setting theory.  
 
In discussing incentives, several authors have suggested, the broad work context variables 
combined with the commonly used monetary incentives will affect effort hence increase 
performance (Bonner & Sprinkles, 2002; Hendricks & Sousa, 2008). In explaining academic 
incentives and academic research behaviour such as publishing, and supervising postgraduate 
students, Tien and Blackburn (1996) provide a theoretical framework based on the tenets of the 
behavioural reinforcement theory to explore that relationship. Based on the tenets of the 
behavioural adjustment theory, Tien and Blackburn (1996) argue that external rewards have 
motivational effects on individual academic behaviour. Hence, based on the themes of the 
behavioural reinforcement theory, incentives such as promotion, monetary rewards and other 
non-monetary incentives such as research facilities and equipment can be argued to be schedules 
of reinforcement that are offered to individuals over time. However, Tien (2007c) argues that the 
desired behaviour such as publishing, and supervising postgraduate students, whenever it is 
achieved, is not always reinforced by use of scheduled reinforcements.  
 
 As aforementioned, monetary incentives are part of the environmental factors, together with 
time resources, the assigned goals performance appraisals and others that are discussed further. 
Because this study focuses on “performance-contingent incentives”, the environmental factors 
are examined.  
 
2.6.1.1 The principal-agent (model) Theory  
 
The use of incentives for academics to increase research productivity in higher education can be 
explained by the predictions of the principal-agent model. The principal-agent model was first 
formulated in the economics literature in the early 1970s (Ross, 1973; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
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Eisenhardt, 1989). The principal- agent model focuses on the principal with the mission and 
organizational resources to delegate tasks to an agent who has the specialized skills to help him 
achieve certain goals (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Sappington, 1991; Laffort & Martimort, 2002). 
Dominant to this theory is the “conflict of interests” between the principal and the agent(s). The 
“agency problems” may rise because each individual actor in the principal-agent relationship acts 
in his/her own “self-interest” (Laffort & Martimort, 2002, p. 2). For example, the principal is 
interested in achieving the goals of the organization, which may include income for a firm 
(Baker, 1992), and research productivity for higher education institutions (Heinrich & Marschke, 
2010). The fundamental assumption of the principal-agent model is that, “individuals are rational 
and self-interested utility maximizers prone to opportunism” (Shapiro, 2005, p, 266). In this case, 
agents will be motivated primarily by ‘self-interest’, to increase their wealth and leisure (Bonner 
& Sprinkles, 2002; Shapiro, 2005). Notable, increase in leisure is seen as exertion of less effort 
in performing the tasks. Mainly, the conflict of interest that exists between the principal and the 
agent defines the principal-agent problem, seen to be a key aspect of the principal-agent model 
(Laffort & Martimort, 2002; Shapiro, 2005).  
 
The principal agent model predicts that, based on the notion of conflicting goals and expectations 
in a principal-agent relationship, the individual agents will shirk (i.e. put no effort) into a task, if 
it makes no contribution to their economic value or well-being (Sappington, 1991). The 
principal-agent model dictates that the principal will try to reduce the shirking by: (i) monitoring 
the actions of the agents, (ii) the principal(s) will offer the agents incentives in an effort to align 
the agent’s interests with the principal(s)’ objectives. A case that Sappington refers to as 
“incentive alignment”; where the principal(s) compensate(s) the agent(s), not on the basis of 
agreeing to perform the tasks for them or the time they put in performing the tasks, but rather it is 
performance-based (Shapiro, 2005, p. 265). Hence, emphasis on the incentive that is contingent 
to performance is to be offered to the agents. According to the Principal-Agent theory 
performance related pay is more desirable than plain fixed pay, since it offers incentives and 
attracts workers whose productivity is higher than average, thus they believe they can earn more 
within a performance related scheme. Thus, as observed by some authors and articulated by the 
predictions of this theory, incentives play a vital role in motivation and alignment to 
performance, given that individuals make rational choices to increase their wealth. Furthermore, 
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the higher sum of monetary compensation causes higher effort (if impossible to shirk) (See 
Bonner & Sprinkles, 2002).  
 
Essentially, the principal-agent model suggests that incentives influence the utility of various 
outcomes, and effort has an effect on the possibility of attaining the outcomes. These notions are 
similar to the predictions of the expectancy theory as earlier discussed, that individuals will 
improve their effort to increase their effort if they expect outcomes (incentives).  Bonner and 
Sprinkles (2002), emphasize, “incentives, such as monetary [rewards], increase an individual’s 
desire to increase performance and concomitant pay” (p. 308). Bonner and Sprinkles further 
observe that, the individuals’ desire make them put more effort into the task because more effort 
is likely to result in increase in performance, and the increase in performance could result to 
more of the desired incentives. The above influence turns out to be a rotational process. 
However, the findings in the preceding analysis show contradictory outcomes from use of 
monetary incentives. As observed earlier, the influence of money is not as linear and predictable 
as suggested by Bonner and others.  
 
The principal-agent model (agency theory) provides a good structure for explaining incentives 
and contracts in the economics literature, political science, business schools, management 
literature and the law literature (Ross, 1973; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shapiro, 2005). 
Therefore this theory can be used in the higher education context, based on the fundamental 
assumptions of the theory as discussed earlier. This theory has mainly been used in higher 
education governance/funding studies. These studies, among others, include resource allocation 
based on performance (Massy, 2004), and regulation of higher education through funding in 
South Africa (Ntshoe & De Villiers, 2004).   Given the context of higher education, several 
limitations have been identified in the application of this theory in this context. 
  
2.6.1.2 Limitations of the Principal-agent Model  
 
One of the main limitations of the principal-agent theory is that it does not consider the 
possibility of multiple principals. Ntshoe and De Villiers (2004), observe that, in higher 
education “the identity of the principal is indistinguishable” (p. 19). Who is the principal? Is it 
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the ministry of higher education? Is it the Council on Higher Education?  The principal-agent 
theory assumes a single relationship. Hence, Shapiro (2005), argues that theories will be 
interesting if they allow “collections or teams of principals (agents) to compete or disagree over 
interests and goals” (p. 267). Similarly, in higher education institutions, Frey and Neckermann 
(2008, p. 3) maintain that, “there is more than one single clear-cut principal-agent relationship 
relevant for setting incentives”. For instance, a “close principal-agent relationship”, can exist 
between a university (principal) and academics (agents) as the employees. Also, a less close 
relationship can exist between other principals such as universities, the commission(s) of 
University Education, foundations, research councils, professional societies, staff unions and the 
scholars in their respective disciplines (p.3). In the Kenyan context, where the CUE, the 
university, the faculty deans and HODs are principal(s) conflicting interests exist among these 
principals. For example, the CUE may indicate the need for research and training graduates; 
while on the other end HODs question how knowledge will be produced given the challenges 
academics are facing with such heavy teaching loads, poor pay and limited research funding. 
Thus, Shapiro’s key question “how do agents understand and reconcile duties delegated to them 
when they are receiving mixed messages and conflicting instructions, as well as incentives from 
multiple principals?” (p. 267).  
 
One has to take note of the fact that actors in the relationship are not just the principals and the 
agents; often they are both at the same time. For instance, in the universities, the academics can 
be agents to the Commission of University Education but can also be principals to the research 
assistants who they wish would help them with research projects.  
 
Ntshoe and De Villiers (2004) summarize the limitations of the principal- agent relationship as: 
employees’ “performance cannot be measured or monitored accurately; there are not enough 
resources available for incentives that would change behaviour; and a moral hazard exists” since 
employees can still be remunerated even when they shirk their efforts (p. 19).  
 
Importantly, I will be aware of the above-mentioned weaknesses as I apply the theory to this 
study. Similarly, some of the aspects discussed in the other theories will help mitigate these 
limitations. For instance, from the goal-setting theory, following multiple principals and agents 
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in a principal-agent relationship, the CUE, the university or ministry of higher education have the 
authority to design the goals to the agents if they provide funding. Similarly, the agents also 
design their own goals with the expectation of rewards from the outcome.  
  
2.7 Operationalizing the Theoretical Framework  
	  
In this section I operationalize the principal-agent theory as applied in this study. That is, I 
identify empirical concepts that I eventually utilize in the study. Some key concepts from the 
other theories are also used in this study. From the key concepts, a hypothetical model is also 
developed (see Appendix 9).  
 
2.7.1 Measuring of Knowledge Production  
	  
In principal-agent relationships, the principal has to design the goals that the agents have to 
embrace, to design the individual outcomes that are expected of the agents and define them.  In 
the context of this study, academics have to engage in research, publish and supervise graduate 
students. In this study, indicators that are of central focus in terms of knowledge production 
include research publications in internationally reviewed journals, Master’s and PhD students. 
The success of the research policy at the University of Nairobi is determined by the changes in 
the levels of knowledge productivity of academics (UoN, 2011).  
 
2.7.2 Developing a Reward System 
 
According to the principal-agent theory, if the principal has a clear mission and objectives, then 
the reward incentives have to be linked to the tasks performed and to the performance of the 
individuals. The achievement of the mission ultimately depends on both the principal and the 
agents in the organization. The key ingredients to effective alignment of the two parties’ basic 
goals and expectations are providing incentives such as reward incentives for the productivity of 
the individuals. According to Cameron and Pierce (1997), aligning rewards such as pay, 
promotion, bonuses, salary increases, fringe benefits, recognition, and other organizational 
rewards to the objectives of the institutions will encourage high levels of productivity. When 
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principals attach rewards to the tasks to be performed by the agents, they support the 
achievement of the long-term objectives and goals of the organisation.  
 
Bland et al., (2002), suggest that measures of a reward system both monetary and non-monetary 
that are attached to knowledge productivity should be systematic, consistent, adequate and fair 
(pp. 233-235). The explicit measure of the reward systems includes promotion, remuneration, 
paid sabbatical leave, bonuses and allowances and public acknowledgement.  
 
2.7.3 Allocation of Funds and Resources  
 
In the UK, following the beginning of mass higher education and faced with reduced budget 
allocations from the state, the University Grants Committee resorted to new ways to fund and 
allocate resources for research (Herbst, 2007). According to Herbst  (2007, p. 74, citing Adams, 
2002), in the late 1980s performance funding and Research Assessment Exercise (RAE), were 
“designed to drive core funding” by rewarding high achievers in a system with a spread of 
performance, so academics worked even harder to achieve excellence because higher grades 
[research productivity] led to better resourcing. Herbst commented that during this period, there 
was improvement in research performance in the UK, drawn on the lines of efficiency, i.e., 
“doing more with less” (Massy & Wilger, 1995, p. 9).  Research output improved with the 
predictions that it might be as a result of “improved research and office infrastructures [that] are 
responsible for an increased output” (Herbst, 2007, p.  75). Generally, research funding focused 
on: (i) “funding research that will reflect the quality and volume of research at institutions [by 
academics] in different research fields or subject matters”, (ii) “funding the supervision of 
postgraduate research students”, and (iii) “supplementing the departments [academics] which 
achieved the highest rating in the RAE” (Herbst, 2007, p. 192). Explicitly, the indicator here is 
performance funding, based on productivity in terms of research and graduate output. 
  
2.7.4 Time Resources  
 
Generally higher education institutions in Africa are faced with scarce resources for research 
(Cloete et al., 2011). One of the important resources is time. However, Kyvik (2009), discussing 
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allocation of time resources for research argues that institutions that aim at improving research 
productivity have to develop a research strategy that will define allocation of these time 
resources among academic staff members and ensure implementation of the strategy (Kyvik, 
2009, p. 111). Conducting a study among Norwegian University Colleges, Kyvik argues it is 
often not clear which criteria have been used in the distribution of time resources among 
teaching staff and research staff, even in cases where criteria are explicitly given in formal 
strategy documents. Thus, Kyvik contends that allocation of time resources for research among 
individual academic staff is largely a function of different allocation principles, allocation 
criteria and allocation procedure and a compromise that can only be clearly defined in 
accordance with the historical and social context of each institution. Kyvik suggests an allocation 
that satisfies strategic reasons as well as practical and fairness principles because of the 
likelihood of these principles being used as a criterion based on only one of these considerations 
(see Kyvik, 2009, pp. 111-120).  
 
Kyvik (2009) reports on examples of dilemmas institutions could be faced with in allocating 
resources. For instance, an institution with low research productivity would want to allocate 
more time to research, which would consequently lead to reduced resources for teaching. Thus, 
the institutions have to consider if the allocation of more resources to research than to teaching   
is appropriate in the light of the mission of the universities (also see Kyvik & Lepori, 2009, p. 
18).  The empirical constructs on time allocation in this study include staff-student ratio, 
availability of sabbaticals and travel allowance to conferences.  
 
2.7.5 The Institutional Set up  
 
Notably, “Institutional morphology” or institutional set-up is a concept premised on the works of 
Pierre Bourdieu (Bourdieu, 1984; 1988). Herbst (2007) shows that, previous investigations 
focused on the links of the “institutional morphology” and research productivity, while, 
operationalizing its indicators such as student-staff ratios or staff-faculty ratios. Looking at the 
“morphological set up” of institutions and research productivity, Herbst (2007, pp. 35-36), 
discusses some of the indicators that can be looked at. They include student-staff ratios and staff 
to faculty ratios; class sizes; dominance of seminars, and workshops; teaching load of academic 
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staff; time attached to administrative duties; dropout rates of students; graduation rates and 
developed advising and mentorship programmes (also see Cloete et al., 2011). Notably, some of 
these indicators, particularly student-staff ratios, dominance of seminars and workshops and 
teaching load of academics are discussed in this study. 
 
2.7.6 Mission and Policies  
 
There are several factors that motivate academics, not just the money, as proposed by the 
principal–agent model. The behavioural theory could compliment these since it argues that 
academics react to external factors. The use of incentives could also result in efficiency as the 
academics focus their efforts on knowledge production as the tasks valued by the higher 
education institutions. Similarly, Tien and Blackburn (1996) claim that desirable behaviour, such 
as publishing and supervising, could be reinforced by use of incentives such as promotion. The 
authors emphasize that environment determines human behaviour.  
 
In the above discussion, various indicators for the key concepts from the main theory of the 
study, the principal-agent model and the other theories are described. In summary, these 
indicators include, specific goals attached to the tasks such as research and graduate output; 
measures of a reward system such as promotion; remuneration; paid sabbatical leave; public 
acknowledgement; performance funding, that is, funds or allowances attached research 
publications and graduate output; empirical constructs of time resources such as staff-student 
ratios and availability of sabbatical leave. These indicators are to be utilized in the analysis.	  
 
2.8 Conclusion to Chapter Two  
 
In this chapter, the researcher focused on literature pertaining use of incentives in higher 
education institutions. Departing from the understanding that higher education institutions have 
an important role in development, the review starts off by looking at the distinctive role of higher 
education institutions in society and particularly in the knowledge economy context. From this 
section it emerged that higher education institutions through their core functions of teaching and 
research, have a crucial role in production of knowledge in terms of research output, 
technological innovation and human capital that is key for the knowledge economy. With the 
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increasing demand on universities to contribute to economic development through knowledge 
production, this chapter illustrated that incentives can steer academics to increase productivity in 
knowledge production. The chapter later conceptualized and discerned the notion of incentives 
and also provided information on the different approaches of incentives and how they apply in 
the higher education context. The researcher outlined a comprehensive debate on the use of 
monetary incentives in work environments, as well as a discussion on other research-related 
incentives. From this discussion, it has been argued that higher sums of monetary incentives 
trigger higher effort, hence high productivity. Similarly, the latter discussion shows that the 
research-related incentives may shape the research behaviour of the academics consequently 
improving the research culture of the universities. The reviewed literature led to a discussion of 
the theoretical framework for the study, based on an overview of several theories that explain 
how incentives work, as well as the main theory applied in the study, the principal-agent model.  
From researching this chapter several knowledge gaps have emerged, regarding application of 
incentives in higher education context. These include among other (i) the exact link between 
incentives and knowledge production in the universities (ii) the explanation as to why academics 
will increase productivity before receiving a reward, and later reduce their productivity after 
having received the incentive (iii) explanation of how the multiple-principal relationship in the 
university works in relation to provision of incentives (iv) there are a number of important 
questions such as what is the purpose of incentives for academics in the universities to be 
discussed (v) largely, apart from the challenges of knowledge production in African Universities, 
little attention is paid to the use of incentives to enhance the productivity levels.  
 
In the context of the above-mentioned gaps, this study focuses on the incentives available for 
academics to engage in research, publish and supervise postgraduate students. The succeeding 
section discusses the methodological approaches utilized in this study.  
 
 
 
 
 
	  	   59	  
CHAPTER THREE 
	  
Research Design and Methodology 
	  
3.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter provides a discussion of data sources and analyses used in this study. Also, a 
description of the research approach and the research process is provided. The chapter focuses 
mainly on the following issues: (i) research approach (ii) sampling approaches (iii) methods of 
data collection (iv) the research process (v) addressing issues of rigour (vi) data analysis, and 
(vii) ethical considerations.  
 
3.2 Research Approach  
 
This study mainly utilizes the qualitative research approach but also incorporates some elements 
of the quantitative approach as it seeks to explore the link between incentives and knowledge 
production at the University of Nairobi.  Qualitative research is argued to be important in 
highlighting individual narrations, ideas and concepts with some detail (Merriam, 2002; 
Silverman, 2013). This study focuses on discussion and how academics share their ideas and 
experiences on incentives as the central research question for the study is: “How do the 
incentives and dis-incentives available at UoN influence knowledge production and 
productivity?”  
 
The qualitative approach is deemed suitable to provide answers to the central question being 
asked in this study. Creswell (2008) maintains, the “how” and “what” questions are apt for 
qualitative research, thus the choice of the qualitative approach has been rendered significant by 
the exploratory nature of the above-stated research question. Similarly, Miles and Huberman 
(1994) notes, starting the research question with “how” or “what” conveys an open and emerging 
design, which is one of the stances qualitative research. The research question addresses the 
research problem that seeks to explore incentives and dis-incentives for academics to research, 
publish and supervise postgraduate students. Inasmuch as the above question can be answered 
entirely through quantitative approaches that mainly entail statistical data analysis, a detailed 
description and accounting with adequate details and precision has been much more appropriate 
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for understanding the above question. Barbie and Mouton (2001) claim, the primary goal of 
qualitative approach is to describe and understand rather than explain the behaviour of the 
respondents. The approach would therefore use qualitative methods of accessing the participants 
such as purposive sampling, qualitative methods of data collection and analysis. The qualitative 
approach is suited to this study as the information needed is based on the opinions, perceptions 
and experiences of individual academics on the question of incentives available for knowledge 
production. Silverman (2013) proposes the use of qualitative approach arguing that, it captures 
the feelings and actions of the research participants in great depth and understands the social 
world from the participants’ own perspectives, context and beliefs. Finally, the qualitative 
approach meets the requirements for this research, since the main aim of the study is to explore 
and provide an in-depth understanding of incentives and dis-incentives of knowledge production 
in the context of UoN.  
 
3.3 Case study and Sub-unit Selection  
 
The purpose of this study and the contextual nature in the application of incentives linked to 
knowledge production in higher education allowed the selection and choice of a single case 
study. Stake (2000), argues that the main criterion for selection of a case is that it should be able 
to provide an “opportunity to learn”. For the researcher the main trigger of the choice should be 
to choose a case from which they think he/she “can learn the most” (p. 451). Thus, this study 
focuses on Stake’s key criterion for selection of a case study. To ensure this, it was vital to look 
at the arguments of Yin (2009) argues, who maintains that to achieve greater understanding of 
the critical phenomena being studied relies on “choosing the case well”.  Furthermore, case 
selection is not only important in showing where the study was conducted, but also largely to be 
able to provide “thick” descriptions, test theories and also develop a theory.  
 
The case study was the method of choice for the research approach following the exploratory 
nature of the central question being asked. Yin (2009) argues that, the ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions 
are very distinctive of a case study; hence participants could also answer the question being 
asked in this study. In this case the exploratory question in the study is, “how do the incentives 
and dis-incentives available at UoN influence knowledge production and productivity?”  As 
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signaled above, the main aim here is ‘what can be learnt’ about incentives and dis-incentives for 
knowledge production. One of the main knowledge gaps that emerged in the current research 
regarding application of incentives in higher education context is the exact link between 
incentives and knowledge production in the universities, in particular the University of Nairobi. 
The lack of research data in answering the research question is a justifiable rationale for 
conducting these exploratory studies, hence the choice of this case study.  
 
According to the Commission of University Education, there are 22 public universities in Kenya.  
The University of Nairobi was purposefully selected as the site of this study. Purposeful 
selection is a common strategy in qualitative research. Patton (2002), argues, purposeful 
selection  “leads to selecting information rich cases . . . those from which one can learn a great 
deal about issues of central importance to the purpose of the research . . .” (p.46). UoN was 
selected based on the following reasons. The university claims that through its core functions of 
teaching, research and consultancy, it has to produce knowledge and high-level manpower that is 
a key for economic growth and development of the nation. Therefore, based on the above claims 
we could expect, given an environment where academics are faced with several competing 
incentives to choose from, that UoN should provide incentives for academics to focus their 
energies on knowledge production. Consequently, UoN provides the ideal site for a study on 
incentives and knowledge production in Kenya. Secondly, UoN is the oldest institution of higher 
education in Kenya, and for a long time it has been responding to the needs of the nation through 
knowledge production. Therefore, it is best suited to provide a trend analysis for this study on 
how academics have received incentives, particularly with regard to the remuneration aspect. 
  
In collecting suitable data to address the research question being posed, a number of units and 
participants (see table 3.1) were selected to participate in providing the information needed for 
the case study. This study mainly selected permanent academic staff members at UoN. Given 
that research and supervision of graduate students are de facto responsibilities of academics, the 
researcher assumed that academics selected would provide information that would address the 
question of incentives and knowledge production. The selection of the units within the case study 
was based on the productivity levels of each unit in terms of research publications, Master’s and 
PhD graduates. The table below (See table 3.1) provides information on the sub-units selected 
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and the individual academics drawn from each unit.  
Table 3.1 
Number of Selected Units and Participants within the Units  
Unit and sub-unit (College, Faculty, School, Institute) Participants (Academics) 
(I) College of Humanities and social sciences  
− Faculty of Arts  
a) Political Science and Public Administration  
b) Literature  
c) Sociology and Social Work  
d) Geography and Environmental Studies 
 
21 
− School of Economics 6 
− School of Business 4 
− Institute of Development Studies  2 
(II) College of Agriculture and Veterinary Medicine  
− Faculty of Agriculture  
a) Agricultural Economics  
b) Food Science Nutrition and Technology  
c) Land Resource Management and Technology 
(LARMAT) 
 
12 
− Faculty of Veterinary Medicine  
a) Clinical Studies 
b) Public Health and Pharmacology   
 
10 
 
Total of Participants selected 55 academics 
	  
As signaled earlier, table 3.1 illustrates figures of participants that were selected from each unit. 
From the selected colleges of social sciences and Agriculture, the researcher focused mainly on 
the faculties and/or schools of Arts, Economics, Business, Institute of Development Studies, 
Agriculture and Veterinary Medicine consecutively. Some of the faculties mentioned above had 
various departments under them, hence the researcher selected a few based on the selection 
criterion as will be discussed below (see sub-section 3.3.1).  
3.3.1 Participants’ Selection within the Case and Individual Units  
 
The participants in the study were selected by purposeful and snowball sampling strategies. First, 
in some departments, the Head of Department identified academics that supervise Master’s and 
 
 
 
 
	  	   63	  
PhD students, as well as engage in research. Hatch (2002, p.98), states that “snowball or chain 
samples are created when one informant identifies the next as someone who would be good to 
interview”. For instance, in the College of Agriculture and Veterinary Medicine (CAV), the head 
of department identified ten potential participants.  At this stage, the key criterion for selection 
was based on the availability of academics that had doctoral degrees, and were involved in 
supervision of Master’s and PhD students, and conducted research. After the potential 
participants were identified, the researcher booked appointments with the academics through the 
respective departments or in person to be able to interview them. Importantly, the academic rank, 
academic qualifications (doctoral degree holders), and research output were the key factors 
considered in selecting interview participants. These factors were considered in order to 
accommodate a diversity of academics’ experiences and opinions. The other selection criterion 
was based on the number of years the academics had worked at the university. This was 
important to capture the changes that may have occurred over time, particularly the shifts in the 
remuneration regimes in the Kenyan universities. Given the above criterion, of the 55 
participants selected only 9 professors (17 percent) met the selection criteria, since they had 
worked at the university for at least over 20 years. In examining the remuneration regimes in 
Kenya, participants who had worked at UoN for longer periods, were able to provide information 
on historical aspects and their effect on the incentives. These aspects included the influence of 
the policies that have resulted because of increase in participation rates, privatization and 
marketization - the current challenges in the universities. The participants mentioned how the 
different changes influenced knowledge production and incentives, particularly remuneration 
over a period of time.  
 
Another selection criterion was the participants’ administrative positions at the university. 
Individuals in administrative positions were identified through the two colleges in the study. 
These participants were mainly selected as they were well positioned to expound on the issues of 
incentives, knowledge production and issues of research funding. The administrators form part of 
the university policy design committees; they sit on the appointment and promotion review 
committees; are part of the dean committee research funds committee at the institution levels, 
therefore, they have the ability to share information on the above issues. Similarly, the 
administrators engage in supervision and research as a result they also highlighted their 
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experiences as academics. The different perspectives gained from the academics and the 
administrators such as the deans and the directors elicited the institutional level policies, 
procedures, programmes and revealed the structural restraints.  
 
3.4 Data Collection Tools   
 
This section discusses the different techniques used in this study to collect data. In line with the 
purpose of this research, and in order to achieve the main aim of this study, data was collected 
using both primary and secondary data sources.  Many proponents of case study research design 
argue that the main strength of a case study research project is the use of several data collection 
tools to gather evidence (Stake, 2005; Yin, 2009). This is an important strategy since it allows 
the different sources of data to act as complements and to reinforce one another to obtain a 
complete picture of the case being studied. Similarly, the combination of the different sources of 
data can be used for triangulation purposes in the study. Triangulation is argued to have various 
advantages in the data collection process. Triangulation reduces the possibility of 
misinterpretation, allows clarification of meaning by outlining ways the problems are being 
viewed and verifies the repeatability of an observation and interpretation. Therefore, in this study 
primary data was collected using two instruments: (i) a structured interview schedule that was 
administered involving the heads of the faculties, schools and institute, (ii) a structured 
questionnaire (see Appendix 3) for the academic staff members in the selected colleges. The 
secondary sources included document reviews and use of archival records. The secondary data 
was used to contribute towards completing the background information needed to   
constructively build the research project and build on the outcomes of the study. A detailed 
discussion on the different sources of data follows below.  
 
3.4.1 Primary Sources of Data 
 
This section discusses the primary sources utilized in this study to collect data. These techniques 
include (i) structured interviews; (ii) observations and research journal 
 
(i) Structured interviews	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A structured interview guide was used to obtain information that cannot be obtained from 
mission statements, strategic plans, policy documents, and other on-line documents. The 
basic purpose of using structured interviews was to allow the researcher to examine the 
level of understanding participants had of incentives for knowledge production at much 
greater depth than when using the postal questionnaires for instance. Moreover, use of 
structured questionnaires allows minimization of interview effects and bias since the 
same question is asked to each participant in the same manner and subsequently the same 
information will be obtained from all people covering the same material. This makes it 
easy to replicate the discussion. Also, structured questionnaires make processing data 
analysis easier because it is possible to trace each participant’s response to the same 
question rather fast and arrange questions and answers that are similar in categories 
(Patton, 1990, p. 285).  
 
The first group of interviewees consisted of individual academics that were engaged in 
research and postgraduate student supervision. The reason for interviewing the academics 
was to get in-depth information on the incentives and dis-incentives for knowledge 
production at UoN. Thus, the interviews sought information on, among other things, 
incentives available at the institutional and national level, research support and resources, 
trends of the remuneration regimes and perceptions of academics on the incentives.  
 
Also interviewed were the deans of faculties and the directors of the schools in the two 
selected colleges namely the Dean of the Faculty of Arts, the Dean of the Faculty of 
Agriculture, the Director of the School of Business and the Director of the School of 
Economics. The deans and directors were purposefully selected since they often form 
part of the committees that formulate and implement policies at the university. Therefore, 
the aim of interviewing these academic administrators was to give them an opportunity to 
expound information on what was raised by the individual academics, particularly on 
research funding, teaching load, different incentives available and in general on policies 
on research and supervision. This helped ascertain the importance attached to research 
and training by the university, and how the university acknowledges the academics for 
their contribution in knowledge production through the general policy and practice 
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rewards. 
  
The researcher also had conversations with the heads of departments from the selected units. The 
conversations were based on discussions about ways in which the department rewards research 
and supervision.  However, the Heads of department (HODs) mostly referred the researcher to 
the deans and directors claiming that, based on the institutional structures of the UoN, the heads 
of the faculties and schools were better placed to provide appropriate information. As signaled 
earlier, most of this information was gathered from the interviews with the deans and directors as 
well as institutional documents.  
 
The information collected at the interviews was tape-recorded and transcribed.  Similarly, 
comments about the observations were embedded in the transcribed texts during the review of 
the data. The researcher wrote down informal conversations as soon as possible and when 
possible to the extent that the participants felt comfortable with the note taking.   
 
(ii) Observations and research journal  
The researcher made several observations and visits to the campuses at UoN, before 
administering the structured interviews.  During this period, academics were engaged in a 
staff industrial action. Coincidentally, I visited the campuses during their rallies at the 
University. Hence, through their chants, I got a chance to take note of their key concerns 
and grievances against the government. The concerns included: poor working conditions 
and the need for a salary increase. Thus, even before the study, I had an idea that 
academics were not satisfied with the state of remuneration as the basic incentive at the 
University. The interpretation of the observations, probed the need for deeper 
understanding of the aspect of remuneration of academics at UoN. Similarly, it searched 
for a deeper examination of the previous collective bargaining agreements regarding 
academic staff salaries. This information helped to reveal trends in the salaries of 
academics. These observations were made as an ongoing activity during the study.  
 
Furthermore, the researcher employed journal entries to document research experience 
and interpret different highlights in the study. It was important to record some intuitions, 
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interpretations and side notes immediately after the interviews. Hatch (2002), argues that   
“research journals provide a record of the affective experience of doing a study”. These 
entries provided a place where researchers can openly reflect on what was happening 
during the research experience and how they feel about it (pp. 87-88).  
 
The study also incorporated informal conversations via email and phone calls to the contact 
person(s) at UoN, which were also important data sources. Similarly, this information formed the 
background to the study, and this was conducted before the researcher travelled to the University 
of Nairobi for data collection in the summer of 2012. The data gathered from all the sources was 
used as evidence to support the statistical information, as well as the themes that emerged from 
the interviews and the responses to the open-ended questions. 
 
3.4.2 Secondary Sources  
 
This section discusses the secondary sources that were used in this study. These resources 
include (i) document reviews and archival records. 
 
(i) Document reviews  
Document analysis has been argued to be “a systematic procedure for reviewing or 
evaluating documents” (Bowen, 2009, p.28). According to several scholars document 
reviews enable the researcher to gain understanding, develop empirical knowledge, and 
discover information, insights and meanings about the research purpose (Merriam, 1998). 
Also, documents enable the researcher to capture information that cannot be obtained by 
interviewing and tape- recording (Stake, 2005). Additionally, Bowen, 2009, support the 
combination of documents and other methods such as interviews to ensure sufficient data 
collection and detailed description and reporting events with sufficient details and 
precision. This procedure allows judgment and transferability. The use of documents in 
the study was intended to collect information on incentives both at the institutional and 
national level that are attached to research and supervision. The documents were 
collected to provide information on trends in the remuneration regime, the importance 
attached to research and supervision, and incentives for academic research support in 
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terms of resources and infrastructure. The documents were used to provide important 
background information for the study that was clarified by the interviews with the 
academics and academic administrators. 
  
The documents that provided information on the incentives for knowledge production were 
analysed. Table 3.2 shows the different documents and the particular information obtained from 
the documents.  
 
Table 3.2 
 List of Policy Documents Reviewed   
Document Reviewed  Information Gathered  
The UoN Research policy, June 2008.  
 
Key mission of university in relation to 
research; Policies linked to incentives for 
research at UoN.  
The report on training, promotion and 
establishment, May 2006 
 
The basis, policies, criteria, practice and 
procedures on appointments, promotion and 
training at UoN.  
 
Documents on the Collective Bargaining 
Agreement (CBA) between the Inter Public 
University Councils Consultative Forum 
(IPUCCF) of Federation of Kenya Employers 
(FKE) and the Universities Academic Staff 
Union (UASU), for 2008-2010; June 18, 2009; 
Salary tables, for 2008 -2013, Council 
Chamber 16 Nov 2012 
Determination of pay in the public universities; 
the current levels of academic salaries and 
allowances (house). 
Memorandum of Agreement between UoN, 
UASU, UoN chapter in the matters of Basic 
Salaries and House Allowance for the 
Academic Staff of UoN.  
 
Determination of other allowances such as 
transport, entertainment and practice on 
determination of pay within UoN.  
KIPPRA report 2013- Report on Wage 
differential in the public-private sector 
 
Remuneration of different professionals, 
including academics, in the civil service, as 
well as the private sector.  
Note: The review from the documents gathered information focusing on incentives at UoN   
 
Similarly, the researcher reviewed publicly available government documents; databases and 
archival records on remuneration of the academics over time, since (1980s – 2013). The archival 
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records identified the historical trends of academic salaries in relation to the country’s real GDP 
over the years. The next section discusses the data collection process.  
 
3.5 Data Collection Process   
 
The research process which entailed document reviews structured interviews and observations 
was undertaken between October 2012 and January 2013. However, before commencement of 
the study, permission was obtained from both the participants on the case study and the 
government of the country, Kenya where the case was situated. The initial stages involved an 
ethical clearance from the Senate research Committee at the University of the Western Cape 
(UWC) for approval of the research proposal. Thereafter, the researcher obtained a research 
permit to conduct research in Kenya through the National Council of Science Technology and 
Innovation (NCSTI). Approval of the research permit in Kenya required an affiliation letter 
attached from the University of Nairobi. The research permit was submitted to the office of the 
Deputy Vice Chancellor (Research, Production and Extension) for permission to collect data at 
UoN. Together with the research permit were the letter from the supervisor and a copy of the 
research proposal clearly indicating the aims and research questions, the data required, 
participants, units to be selected and ethical considerations (see Appendices 4 and 5). After a few 
weeks UoN granted research permission to start the process, (see Appendix 6 for the 
authorization letter). The contact person at UoN even before the research process began 
continuously helped in terms of identifying the different locations where data was to be gathered 
and the key informants.    
 
As signaled earlier, the research process entailed document reviews, structured interviews and 
observations. The documents to be reviewed were requested from the University research, 
production and Extension offices and the Human Resource and management offices. Thereafter, 
the structured interview guides were piloted before being administered to the academics and the 
academic administrators. Details of the pilot study are provided in section 3.6.  The revised 
version of the interview guides was administered to sixty participants distributed as follows:  35 
participants from the College of Humanities and Social Sciences (CHSS) and 25 participants 
from the College of Agriculture and Veterinary Medicine (CAV). One of the key characteristics 
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of structured interviews demands the researcher’s presence at each of the structured interview 
sessions. Being present for the interviews presented the researcher with several advantages. The 
researcher was able to attain a high response rate in the midst of the tight schedules of 
academics. Additionally, the researcher was able to take notes of the remarks made by the 
participants and taped the responses, since all the participants consented to use the taped 
interview process. Tape recordings allowed the researcher to gather reliable and detailed data. 
Similarly, the participants were asked to expound on some of their claims. This was important as 
it provided an in-depth understanding of the research problem from the participants’ 
perspectives. The interview sessions were conducted in the participants’ offices depending on 
their availability for the interviews. See Appendices 7 and 8 for the interview guide for the 
academics and academic administrators respectively. 
 
The data collection process was delayed for a month following a one-month closure of the 
Kenyan public universities (September, 2012 to October, 2012) caused by lecturers’ strike, 
protesting against poor salaries.  The research process resumed after the re-opening of 
universities and lasted for two months though I had to contend with disruptions resulting from 
preparations of the University’s 48th graduation ceremony and exams. This was followed by the 
closure of the university for the Christmas holidays (December, 2012 to January, 2013). I 
resumed data collection after the Christmas break, which was completed within two months. 
January, 2013 and February 2013). During this data collection phase I also faced a number of 
interruptions caused by the institutional quality audits for re-accreditation of UoN.  Most of the 
academic administrators took part in the audit process, making it difficult to meet them for 
interviews.  
 
3.6 Addressing Rigour  
 
Morse, Barrett, Olsen and Spiers (2008, p. 13), describe rigour as researchers’ initiative to adopt 
“verification strategies and self-correcting” mechanisms, at every stage of the research process to 
ensure reliability and validity in the analysis of data, particularly qualitative data.  Further, Bell 
(2006) claims, the procedures selected for data collection should be examined so as to assess to 
what extent they will be reliable and valid. Bell describes reliability as the “the extent to which a 
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test or procedure produces similar results under constant conditions on all occasions” (Bell, 
2006, p. 117). While Babbie & Mouton (2001), ascribe validity as a research design truly 
measuring what it was intended to measure or whether the evidence collected can bear the 
interpretations attached to it.  In this study, the reliability of the collected data was ensured by 
use of multiple sources of data, (mainly triangulating the data collection tools). This involved a 
thorough review and evaluation of the institutional documents pertaining research and incentives 
at UoN. Thereafter, the researcher conducted structured interviews with selected academics and 
Faculty Deans or School Directors. The interviews with the academics and academic 
administrators were important as they were key players in complementing the information 
collected from the documents, thus ensuring reliability of the information collected on incentives 
for knowledge production.  
 
The issue of validity was ensured in the study through a pilot study of the structured interview 
guides with eight participants, two weeks prior to the main study. The eight respondents were 
selected from the Department of Literature at the CHSS and the Department of Plant Science at 
CAV. The responses by six participants in the pilot study were included in the main analysis of 
the study.  Creswell (2008), argues, that apart from ensuring validity, conducting a pilot study 
helps in the wording of the questions, the research design procedures and also checks on the 
validity and reliability of the research instrument. Since I was present for the interviews I was 
able to determine the duration of completing the interview guide, which was between 30-45 
minutes.  The issues raised in the pilot study included wording of some questions.  For example, 
the pre-pilot formulation of that question was: “On average how many classes do you teach per 
semester?” The post-pilot formulation of the question was stated as: “On average how many 
classes do you teach per semester in the following; (a) Module I; (b) Module II; (c) Module III. 
“The different programmes available at UoN mainly motivated this procedure. See Appendix 8 
for the guiding questions.  Another issue raised pertained long complex questions and 
ambiguities in the guide.  A pre-piloted question was stated as: “In your opinion what measures 
need to be put in place to support scholars like yourself to engage in research and publish?” After 
rectification of the ambiguities in the guide the post-pilot formulation of the question was stated 
as: “In your opinion what resources or institutional support need to be put in place to support 
academics to engage in research and publish” (see Appendix 3).  
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3.7 Data Analysis 
 
This section discusses the process and procedures of both qualitative and quantitative approaches 
to data analysis in this study. Neuman (1997) describes data analysis as a search for patterns in 
data or a body of existing knowledge. Furthermore, Babbie and Mouton (2001), argue that the 
main aim of data analysis is to understand various “constitutive elements” of the data collected 
through an assessment of relationship between concepts, constructs or variables. Mainly, this 
process enables the researcher to see whether any patterns or trends exist that can be identified or 
isolated, or establish themes in the data.  
 
3.7.1 Qualitative Data Analysis 
 
Qualitative analysis entails working with data that is mainly in the form of texts, written words 
or symbols that describe or represent people, actions and events in the social world (Taylor-
Powell & Renner, 2003). The same authors acknowledge that the text data may be drawn from 
brief responses to open-ended questions on a survey or structured interviews, transcripts from 
interviews or focus groups, notes from a log or diary, field notes or the text of published reports 
or policy documents. In this study, prior to the data analysis process, the tape recorded data was 
transcribed into texts. The following major steps were utilized in analysing the data  (a) a close 
reading of the data (b) coding the data by identifying themes or patterns, (c), categorizing the 
data, (d) identifying patterns and connections within and between the patterns and, (e) 
interpretation, where the information is brought together. The discussion below shows how these 
procedures were accomplished in this study. This process was followed by analysing the data, 
which involved an iterative process (see Miles & Huberman, 1994; Taylor-Powell & Renner, 
2003). 
(a) A close reading of the data: After transcription of the data the researcher read 
and re-read through the texts, to ensure understanding fragments of the data in 
context. Also reading the texts allowed the researcher to note any initial 
impressions arising from the data. Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 58) suggests 
that transcripts be read “for regularly occuring phrases, and with an eye to 
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surprising or countertuitive material”. For instance in this study, initial reading 
started to signal that participants has a lot to say about incentives, such as 
‘incentives being available, but not being sufficient’. Since the structured 
interview guides mostly consited open-ended questions, the researcher focused 
the analysis using the question or topic approach, by looking at how individual 
participants responded to each question or topic. Taylor-Powell & Renner 
(2003) argues that organizing the data by question or topic to look at all 
participants and their answers allows the researcher identify consistencies and 
differences.  
(b) Coding of the Data: After close reading of the data the researcher proceeded to 
code the data. Miles and Huberman (1994) noted that coding entails assigning 
unique labels to texts that consists of reference to particular categories of 
information. Therefore, the  researcher  began to pick out ideas, recurrent 
concepts, interactions, terminologies or phrases used by the participants. 
Words, phrases and concepts that resulted to the same meaning were organized 
and given codes. Miles and Huberman (1994) argue that coding helps the 
researcher organize, manage, interpret and retrieve meaningful segments of 
data. In this study, coding was a continuous process from the formulation of the 
research question, review of the relevant literture, development of the 
theoretical framework and the data collection proces.  
(c) Category formation: In this study, following Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 
58) categories were formulated from central research question and paying 
attention to the emergent categories in the data. In this case, the researcher 
started with a list of themes or categories formulated in advance; then followed 
reading through the texts to find the themes or issues that recur in the data. 
Some of the pre-set categories included ‘monetary incentives’, non-monetary 
incentives, ‘organizational support’ ‘competing incentives’. While some 
emergent sub-categories included ‘status. Examples showing codes, themes 
and categories that were identified to sort responses to the questions: What are 
the incentives and rewards attached on research publications? 
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Question  Codes/Labels  Themes  Categories  
1. What are the incentives 
and rewards attached on 
research?  
Standard of 
Promotion 
(Pro), 
Nominated 
for 
particular 
tasks  
(Rec) 
Earn research 
money (M) 
Research 
publications 
result to 
incentives 
and rewards  
Monetary 
and non-
monetary 
incentives  
attached on 
research 
publications  
 
(d) Identifying relationships, patterns, connections and possible explanations 
within and between the categories: As the data was organized into categories, 
possible patterns and connections both within and between the categories 
started to emerge. The above categories were correlated to form common 
themes. Largely, the researcher was interested in summarizing the information 
pertaining to the themes, or capturing the similarities and differences in 
participants responses within a category, in order to provide answers to the 
research questions. According to Miles and Huberman (1994, pp. 51-54), 
summaries reduce data and convert it to easily retrievable form. Therefore, 
following Miles and Huberman (1994) the summaries include evidence in the 
form of quatations from the data, which may be weighted based on the 
number of occurrences across the responses and patterns  of repetition among 
the respondents when adressing a particular topic. The themes and 
connections developed are keys to explaining the findings.  
(e) Interpretation of the anaysed data was essential, that is, attaching meaning and 
significance to the analysis. The data analysed was presented through 
diagrams, texts and quatations.  
 
The next section discusses how the quantitative data collected was analysed.  
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3.7.2 Quantitative Data Analysis  
 
The quantitative data was summarized by means of descriptive statistics, which included 
frequency distribution, measures of central tendency (were used to describe the data collected.  
After measurement of the relevant variables on the questionnaire, the data collected was coded 
into numerical format to ease analysis as this allows the frequency distribution to be selected. 
Data was entered in a statistical format. Lastly the data was cleaned to check and correct errors 
(Durrheim, 1999).  The collected data was analyzed using the statistical software programme 
Advanced Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS).  Descriptive statistics were used to 
analyze the data. Frequencies were mainly used to describe the data from the academics in 
relation to incentives and knowledge production. Durrheim (1999), indicates that, descriptive 
analysis aims for a description of the data by investigating how the scores are distributed on each 
variable. Further, the descriptive statistics determine whether the scores on different variables are 
related to each other. The analysis was done in reference to the main research question, aimed at, 
understanding the link between incentives and knowledge production. Data analysed 
quantitatively from time to time is expounded on through the interview information. 
 
3.8 Research Ethics  
 
Ethical guidelines were given attention in this study since human subjects were involved in the 
study. According to Denscombe (2010), it has become increasingly common for researchers who 
need to gain formal approval from a research ethics committee before they embark on research. 
Importantly, the research ethics committees are keen on research involving human subjects to 
ensure that “no badly designed or harmful research” is granted permission to proceed before the 
relevant issues are considered (Bell, 2006, p. 46). Following the above, the study was approved 
by the University of the Western Cape’s Senate Research Committee. In Kenya, which is the 
context of the study, the university offered an affiliation letter approving the study to be 
conducted within its premises; thereafter, the National Council for Science and Technology used 
the same letter to approve the study by offering a research permit (see Appendix 5). Participants 
were provided with written consent for participation by signing after review of the information 
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sheet. Before conducting the structured interviews, consent forms (see Appendices 2 and 3) 
clarifying the research problem and the aims of the study were presented to the selected 
participants for review. In the letter, the information to be collected from the participants and the 
way in which the participants were to participate were clearly indicated.  
 
With the exception of the University units such as faculties and schools, voluntary participation, 
anonymity and confidentiality of the participants selected for this study, were highlighted on the 
information sheet; and this was to be ensured during and after the study as well as in the research 
report (Denscombe, 2010). The researcher obtained a signed written consent form from the 
Research, Production and Extension office that allowed me to collect data from the selected 
colleges. While this study was keen to consider the ethics guidelines pertaining to the 
participant’s confidentiality (Merriam, 1998; Denscombe, 2010), it was impossible to conceal the 
name of the university.  The researcher ensured that the information and data collected were used 
for the intended purpose. This study has been under supervision of academics in higher 
education that ensured the stated ethical guidelines and procedures were addressed.  
 
3.9 Conclusion to Chapter Three  
 
This chapter presented the research approach and discussed in detail the qualitative nature 
adopted for the present study. The chapter provided methodological issues and procedures 
utilized in this study including: the case study section, participant selection, data collection 
methods, the research process, and issues of rigour and data analysis. Following the contextual 
nature of the application of incentives for research in higher education, it is claimed that the 
policies, procedures and practices can be well understood and described within the context of the 
university chosen. Use of multiple sources in collecting evidence, ensured validity and reliability 
requirements were met in this study. Looking at the data collection process, the main challenges 
encountered were linked to the accessibility of the data of academic salaries over the periods 
from the 1960s to date. This has made the analysis a challenge as the initial intentions could not 
be met in order to conduct a trend analysis. Ethical considerations for this study were also 
discussed in detail. This study was conducted after all the ethical requirements were met at the 
two universities, UWC and UoN, and in the country of the study.  
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The next section presents and analyses the data related to the main research question. The 
analysis starts by macro-contextualizing the study to allow understanding of the key debates and 
arguments that will be made in the analysis, followed by an analysis of the shifts in the 
remuneration regime of academics, the current levels, and finally a discussion of the different 
policies and practices linking incentives for knowledge production at UoN.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
	  
Data Presentation and Analysis 
	  
4.1 Introduction  
 
As indicated in Chapter One, the main aim of this study is to explore the link between incentives 
and knowledge production at the University Of Nairobi (UoN).  This chapter presents and 
analyzes the collected data in an attempt to respond to the central research question. This chapter 
consists of three main sections. Section one provides brief contextual information on the key 
features of higher education in Kenya, as well as the knowledge production context in Kenyan 
higher education institutions. Section two analyses the trends in the remuneration regimes of 
academic salaries in Kenyan public universities over time. Section three examines the incentives 
linked to research and successful postgraduate supervision at UoN, as indicated in the policies; 
and how they influence knowledge production. It also discusses the perceptions of academics on 
the available incentives. Section three further provides an analysis of the existence of the 
‘competing incentives’, which requires mutually exclusive responses and how they impact the 
engendering of research culture. Inasmuch as the focus of this study was on knowledge 
producing incentives, the competing incentives detract academics from knowledge production, 
hence the need for a detailed analysis.   
 
4.2 Context of the study: Key Features of Higher Education in Kenya   
 
This section places the study in context to allow understanding of the key debates and arguments 
conducted in the study. Higher education in Kenya has witnessed a number of important 
developments since 1970 when the country’s oldest university, UoN (the site of the case study), 
became a fully-fledged university. Currently, the country has 22 public universities and 36 
private Universities. Similarly, total student enrolment has increased significantly. In 2012, the 
total student enrolment in public universities stood at 240,551, a significant increase from 571 
students in 1963 (Nganga, 2013).    
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Kenya’s public universities are centrally governed and receive part of their funding from the 
government. Although over the years Kenya’s public universities have reduced salaries, basic 
salaries are determined at the national level, with the academic unions mobilizing the lower and 
upper limits of the salaries through the collective bargaining agreement. (The shifts in the 
remuneration regime of academics since the 1960s to date are analysed in section 4.3).  Key 
features in higher education such as funding are discussed in particular, also how changes have 
impacted academic salaries. Kenya’s higher education has been faced with declining state 
funding over the years. Wangenge-Ouma (2008b), states that during the period of 1996 to 2000, 
government funding to Kenya’s university education was about 0.94 percent of the GDP and 
declined to 0.74 percent during the period of 2000 to 2005.  The decline in state funding has been 
demonstrated by the Kenya government’s inability to meet the public universities’ financial 
requirements (Wangenge-Ouma, 2010). The decline in the State financial allocation to the 
universities, has also negatively affected the expenditure on the academics’ salaries.  
 
Following the decline in State funding of public higher education, module II programmes are the 
mainstream of university funding strategy (Kiamba, 2004; Wangenge-Ouma, 2012). Kenyan 
public universities were encouraged to adopt privatization in their effort of generating income for 
university operations. This has resulted in introduction of ‘Module II’ students who pay their full 
tuition fees at ‘market rates’ (Kiamba, 2005). For example, at UoN, Module II students pay 
about Kshs, 173, 000 (approximately $2000) on average per annum, relative to the government 
sponsored students (Module I) who pay a highly subsidized tuition fee of Kshs, 16, 000 (Approx. 
$185); hence higher rates of return on parallel programmes (See UoN website; also see 
Wangenge-Ouma, 2008). The UoN was the first institution to introduce the academic 
programmes for Module II students. Currently all Kenyan public universities have established 
‘Module II’ programmes and there are campuses all over the country (Wangenge-Ouma, 2012). 
Monies generated from these programmes are utilized differently; some of the income is 
allocated to remuneration of the academics that teach on these programmes, as well as to 
research funding. Academics who teach on the Module II programmes receive additional 
payments over and above their regular salaries (Wangenge-Ouma, 2012). The universities have 
agreed with the academics to offer them additional payment over and above their regular 
salaries, a percentage of the fees paid by students on Module II programmes. The additional 
 
 
 
 
	  	   80	  
payment percentage varies across the public universities as follows:  At the University of Nairobi 
- 30 percent, at Jomo Kenyatta University of Science and Technology - 35 percent, and at  
Kenyatta University  -20 percent.   
 
In the above section, the key features of higher education such as expansion of the higher 
education system, increase in the student enrolment, governance and funding have been 
introduced. The Kenyan government’ in ability to fund Higher Education institutions adequately   
has had a detrimental influence on academic remuneration. The next section discusses the shifts 
in the remuneration regime of academics over the years.  
 
4.3 The Shifts in the Remuneration Regimes of Academics  
 
This section provides an analysis of the trends in the remuneration regime of academics in the 
Kenyan public universities over time. The analysis is presented across several time periods to 
show the shifts in the remuneration of academics in the Kenyan public universities. Essentially, 
pay satisfaction is reported as an important incentive for motivating, attracting and retaining 
productive academics at the university. Inasmuch as the reviewed literature shows that good 
working conditions and infrastructure influence knowledge production, more often than not, 
attractive remuneration packages are offered to attract, retain and enhance performance of the 
best talents in the universities (Kubler & De Luca, 2006). Thus, the need to get a clear sense of 
the remuneration of academics is essential. Also, there is the issue of context, as it is argued 
financial remuneration is a ‘social thing’, hence when the remuneration regimes shift, they 
change within particular conditions, as it will be discussed later (see section 4.3.1). Therefore, it 
is important to look at how the remuneration regimes have shifted over time in the Kenyan 
context, with particular reference to UoN. This discussion is located in three distinct periods, 
namely, the 1960s to the 1970s, the 1980s to the 1990s and the 2000s to date. The assumption for 
the above periodization is that the global demands and local socio-economic and political 
conditions in Kenya, during this period could be argued to have influenced the remuneration of 
academics.  
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4.3.1 1960-1970s: The Period of Competitive Remuneration in the Universities  
 
Academics in the Kenyan public universities earned ‘competitive' salaries like their counterparts 
in the civil service during that decade. This period immediately after independence was 
characterized with ‘hope and optimism’, accompanied with increasing budget allocations for 
higher education, responding to the demand for education and the thought of increased rates of 
returns on investments in human capital (Wangenge-Ouma, 2012). As discussed in Chapters One 
and Two, during this period universities had vital need of social and economic development as 
one of the new independent nations. Wangenge-Ouma (2008a) argues that this major role of 
universities provided a milieu for large-scale funding of higher education by the State. In this 
phase, university education was highly subsidized, as the State generously funded universities to 
cover tuition and student living allowance, research infrastructure, educational facilities and the 
staff costs such as salaries (Mwiria et al., 2007; Pillay, 2010b). This is an era characterized by 
competitive remuneration in the universities, where the salaries were not initially performance 
driven. Salaries were allocated on the basis of the key role of the academics during this period. 
These salaries were competitive relative to those of other civil servants, following the relevance 
placed on university education for development.  Also, during this decade between 1960 and 
1979, the value of inflation averaged 3 percent with minimum values of -0.17 at 1969, with fixed 
exchange rates (Durevall & Ndung'u, 2001). Therefore, the low values of inflation implied high 
purchasing power for the academics. This period contrasts sharply with the next periods, though, 
inflation was not a policy problem during the 60s period.  
 
This period was regularly reminisced about, particularly by the senior academics that had worked 
at the UoN for over 30 years, as a ‘golden past’. From the interview data with the academics, 
general claims emerged that in the 1960s and the 1970s academics were offered a good salary 
that was commensurate with their work and earned them status in relation to their counterparts in 
the civil service. A professor who had worked at the University for over 30 years noted that:   
 
This University [UoN] in the 1960s -1970s … was considered to be one of the best employers, 
then, because of the benefits that were associated with it on top of the salaries, which by those 
times, the rates of inflation t were low … the benefits were things like housing and medical cover 
which were then the best in the country...That changed when I think it was becoming expensive 
for the university and government …also looking at the financial crises of the mid- 1970s to 1980 
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it was no longer possible for the University to provide these allowances … So earlier on in the 
1970s and the early 1980s the terms were better and that could have been an incentive to come 
and work at the University. (Personal Interview, November 2012)  
 
Another senior academic added:  
 
During Kenyatta’s time [1963-1978] a professor used to earn more than a Permanent Secretary 
(PS) and that is when a professor used to enjoy being a professor … being a professor that time 
was worth it. (Personal Interview, November 2012)  
 
From the above extract, it can be seen that the respondent reflected on a ‘golden past’ claiming a 
good paycheck like other civil servants such as the PS. The general perception is that, soon after 
independence, the salary of a professor was higher than that of a judge, Member of Parliament or 
Permanent Secretary, but now the Member of Parliament or Permanent Secretary earns more 
than ten times what a professor earns (See table 4.1 for clarifications). However, the evidence 
collected is in contrast to the claims displayed in Table 4.1, as it shows that in 1963 the pay ratio 
of the average monthly basic salary of the permanent secretaries versus the university professor 
was 1.2:1, which increased to 2.1:1 in 1973. The pay ratio has varied over time, averaging 1.3:1, 
with the permanent secretary earning more across these periods. Therefore, the above perception 
is misplaced. Though, the perception of good pay could be linked to high purchasing power 
during this period, which can largely be attributed to the low inflation rates during the era of the 
1960s.  
 
Table 4.1: 
 The Average Basic Salaries of Academics and Permanent Secretaries  
Years  Professor  Permanent 
secretary  
 Paid ratio 
 Kshs. US$ Kshs US$  
1963 2, 250 35 3, 625 42 1.2:1 
1973 3, 050 40 6, 600 88 2.1:1 
1980 10, 500 140 12, 600 168 1.2:1 
1990 18, 788 250 24, 725 329 1.3:1 
2004 53, 550 714 96,000 1, 280 1.7:1 
2014 162, 064 2, 187 200, 000 2, 667 1.2:1 
Note: Source: UASU salary table, government statistical extracts and SRC 2010. 
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From the table above (Table 4.1), it is clear that there are not much significant difference 
between   the paid ratios of the average monthly basic salaries of the PS and the Professor over 
the years, from 1963 to 2014. The claims of the permanent secretaries receiving high salaries is 
the result of a slate of allowances (house, transport, car purchases and entertainment), and other 
entitlements that are offered to the permanent secretaries in comparison to the professors. 
Therefore, the current wage gap between the monthly gross salaries of professors and permanent 
secretaries stands at 7:1. Hence, the regular claims of poor pay in the universities compared to 
salaries of other civil servants.  
 
Unlike the 1960s, a period described with hope and optimism, the mid 1970s were followed by 
declines, which later became pronounced in the 1980s. In the 1970s, problems such as the first 
oil shocks and the balance of payment problems led to an increase in the rate of inflation, 
followed by the economic crisis of the mid 1970s (Durevall & Ndung'u, 2001). The above 
conditions resulted in a decline in government funding to higher education. For instance, within 
higher education the public recurrent expenditure per University student declined from $6461 in 
1975 to $2365 in 1983 (Mutula, 2002). The decline in funding led to a decline in allocations to 
university operations, including allocations to cover the remuneration of academics. Several 
authors commented, contrary to the political and financial support that higher education received 
immediately after independence, the late 1970s to the 1980s period was characterized by 
stagnation or a decline in the staff salaries in many African states, including Kenya (Ajayi et al, 
1996; Ngome, 2003). The increase in inflation rates during this period implied that the 
purchasing power of academics was eroded.  Later on in the 1970s, an increase in the rate of 
inflation caused the decline in large scale funding to universities, which resulted in the decline in 
remuneration of academics. The signaled declines are discussed further in the next sections. 
 
The next section provides a discussion on the remuneration regimes within the 1980s to the 
1990s period together with the prevailing conditions in this period that influenced remuneration. 
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4.3.2 1980s to 1990s: The period of Declining Academic Remuneration in the Universities   
 
As signaled earlier, during this era, declines were largely experienced in several components of 
higher education, which resulted in the decline of academic salaries. Contrary to the 1960s, 
during the early 1980s, the economic conditions in Kenya made it unfavorable for the State to 
continue providing large scale funding for higher education (Wangenge-Ouma, 2010). For 
instance, in the period between 1980 and 1985, the country experienced low economic growth 
rates, at an average GDP of about 2.5 percent per year, with several years recording negative 
economic growth rates. Despite the slow economic growth, in the first half of the 1980s, the 
average inflation rates were fairly stable, though the economy experienced large fluctuations 
between the different quarters. Thus, the fluctuations could have resulted in a decline in the 
purchasing power of the academics’ income. In addition, the structural adjustment programmes 
imposed by the World Bank from 1986 to 1989, followed this period. The programme started 
operating in 1988 and was more pronounced in the 1990s. Structural adjustment programmes 
mainly entailed emphasis on a significant decline in the government expenditure on several 
social services, including higher education, and privatization of the government owned industries 
(Wangenge-Ouma, 2008a). This saw diversion of more resources to primary education following 
claims of high social rates of return at this level and intensified cost-recovery measures at the 
university level (Psacharopoulos & Woodhall, 1985). Wangenge-Ouma (2008a) states that, the 
public expenditure per student was seen to be 30 percent more at the university level relative to 
the primary level in the early 1980s to the early 1990s. However, the above de-emphasis on 
higher education meant decline of the university education.  
 
From the above discussions, it can be concluded that slow economic growth, increase in inflation 
rates, devaluation of exchange rates, large external debts, and increased growth in the higher 
education sector, were the main factors that led to the decline in state funding (Durevall & 
Ndung'u, 2001; Wangenge-Ouma, 2008b). Arguably, decline in state funding meant, among 
other things, decline in academic remuneration. Therefore, contrary to the 1960s-1970s, where 
academics relied on their competitive salaries, in the 1980s academics were faced with declining 
remuneration. In addition, the increase in the inflation rates also meant decline in or stagnated 
purchasing power. 
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All through the 1980s period the academic salaries were constant. Therefore, as much as salaries 
remained constant in nominal terms, the rise in the values of inflation meant that academics had 
a decline in purchasing power. To reinforce the above observation, a senior professor in the 
faculty of Agriculture, who had worked at the university for over 20 years, claimed: 
  
But now, things have turned around. Moi’s time [1978-2002] was impossible, nothing was 
coming or moving, and there was much fighting to get salaries in the University to be increased. 
We were getting to be so poor. I don’t think I want to criticize Moi’s time only with nothing good 
in the University; even civil service salaries were so poor until the later part of Moi’s regime 
(late 1990s) they increased the salaries of the permanent secretary (PS) and the PS started 
earning more than the professor. And education was not of much consequence as far as I am 
concerned. That time when he increased the salary of the PS, again for the professor there was a 
minimal raise, very little, or poor salaries. (Lightly edited Personal Interview, November 2012)  
 
The above extracts show that the respondents reflected on how difficult it was for both university 
professors, and staff in the civil service at large to get salary increases in the 1980s. As a result, 
what followed were mainly constant or declining academic salaries. Although it’s not explicitly 
spelt out by the participants in the interviews data, the above-mentioned conditions, slow 
economic growth, increase in inflation rates, devaluation of currency, ‘introduction’ of structural 
adjustments programmes could be argued to have had an influence on the decline or stagnation 
in the academic salaries.  
 
Furthermore, in the 1990s, Kenya had its worst economic performance since independence. The 
economy was characterized by stagnated growth in the GDP and the country witnessed very high 
inflation rates. Durevall and Ndung'u (2001) indicate, that inflation averaged over 30 percent per 
annum during 1992, and later reached a maximum of 45.98 percent in 1993. The government’s 
deficit budget was over 10 percent of the GDP. Faced with these adverse economic conditions, 
the Kenyan government found it difficult to continue with the huge funding of higher education. 
Also, the bilateral and multilateral institutions suspended donor funding to Kenya, including that 
for higher education.  Thus, these combined problems negatively impacted the block grants of 
remuneration in the university, as well as other benefits and allowances to the academics. The 
very high inflation rates also signaled the eroded purchasing power of the academics during that 
period. 
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These conditions justify the claims of the respondents in this study who indicated that during this 
period, the salaries were too low to allow them high standards of living. As a result they were 
forced to ‘moonlight’ in order to supplement their income. However, as discussed below, apart 
from the low salaries there have been several reasons why academics ‘moonlighted’, including 
growth in the higher education system, presence of private institutions, nature of the academic 
work where academics are claimed to have a lot of time on their hands and flexible contracts 
(Altbach et al., 2009). 
  
Following the decline in the universities’ support, Kiamba (2004) and Pillay (2010b), reveal that 
the Kenyan government urged public universities to generate income from market sources to 
supplement the limited public funds. Similarly, the private sector was encouraged to participate 
in the development of higher education.  The above discussion shows a period dominant with 
declining state funding, high inflation rates and stagnated or declined economic growth, as well 
as the introduction and influence of the structural adjustment programmes. The next section 
provides a discussion on how the policies on income generation and increased privatization in 
the Kenyan higher education system, impacted the academic salaries.  
 
4.3.3 2000s to date: The Period of Multiple Incentives in the Universities  
 
From the above sections, it has become evident that prior to 2000, universities were encouraged 
by the government to find alternative innovative ways to expand enrolment while generating 
income to supplement the declining State funding. In an attempt to generate income, the major 
way initiated by the Kenyan public universities was to implement “dual track tuition fee 
programmes” (Wangenge-Ouma, 2010, p. 105). These programmes introduced an element of 
private-public university students demonstrated by admission of the privately sponsored 
students, that is, full tuition fee-paying students enrolled on ‘parallel programmes’, alongside the 
government’s highly subsidized students. The parallel programme students pay high tuition fees 
They have to pay their full tuition fee of about $US 2000 per annum in comparison to the 
government sponsored students (Module I) who pay a highly subsidized tuition fee of about $US 
400 (Munene, 2013). The University of Nairobi was the first to institute the parallel programmes 
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in 1998 (Kiamba, 2004). Currently all Kenya’s public universities have introduced parallel 
programmes. Kiamba (2004) argues the introduction of the parallel programmes was mainly 
instigated by the financial problems UoN was experiencing, with the decline in state funding of 
higher education. Apart from the financial needs, Wangenge-Ouma (2012) argues that parallel 
programmes were encouraged to meet the increased demands for higher education. 
  
Although universities implemented parallel programmes with a major aim of generating revenue 
for their operation costs, evidence collected shows that these programmes have impacted 
academic salaries. The university gives incentives for teaching on the full fee paying stream by 
providing additional payment, whereby over and above their regular salaries, academics who 
teach on these programmes are remunerated a percentage of the fees paid by the private students. 
The percentages paid to the academics, as indicated by Wangenge-Ouma and based on the data 
collected in this study, comprise 30% for the University of Nairobi and 35% for Jomo Kenyatta 
University of Science and Technology (See Wangenge-Ouma, 2012; Personal Interview, 
November 2012). The university mainly determines the payment on the parallel programmes. 
However, there is a challenge in the implementation of extra pay for teaching on parallel 
programmes. Payment is not consistent and systematic in the different universities, nor among 
the different colleges/faculties/schools/departments at the UoN.  
 
In respect of the extra payment received from teaching on the parallel programmes, one of the 
participants pointed out how the parallel programmes at UoN tend to be attractive to the 
academics, their influence on academic salaries and academics’ preferences. One senior 
academic commented as follows: 
  
There are some academics that may opt to teach and not do any research. And then there is an 
attraction there because when I teach I am assured of that money.  When I decide not to teach 
and I go out looking for either research money or consultancy it’s risky, because I am not sure 
(…) since this money from extra teaching is assured the academics will want to teach. There is 
also the argument of making money, how you make the money and what you get from the money. 
For example, if you try and teach in the department of sociology you will make some money 
because the classes are large [payments are dependent on number of students]. Module II pays 
well and sociology attracts many students (…) So I might just say I want to teach, the University 
would want these academics to teach to make money. (Personal Interview, Transcript, November 
2012)  
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From the above extract, we can see how parallel programmes in the university have influenced 
the salaries of academics, since they get additional income from teaching. Academics are more 
attracted by the money they earn from extra teaching than in engaging in academic research or 
even doing consultancies.  
 
As signaled earlier, apart from ‘parallel’ programmes, this period saw an increase in the number 
of private universities in the country. With one private University in 1979, currently Kenya has 
29 private Universities. Most of these private Universities do not have their own staff; 
consequently, they appoint the academic staff from the public universities who teach in these 
universities (see Mwiria et al., 2007). Evidence collected in this study shows that academics 
receive extra payment for teaching in the private universities, which also affects their income.  
 
From the above analysis, it is evident that the university award incentives to those teaching on 
the full fee paying stream by providing additional payments over and above regular salaries, to 
academics that teach on these programmes. There is also extra payment for teaching in the 
private higher education institutions. In addition, academics at the University of Nairobi seem to 
respond more favorably to the incentive awarded for extra teaching. This is because of three 
reasons: (a) the size of these incentives is claimed to be greater than that for research (b) the 
incentive for extra teaching is more accessible, than that for research, and (c) the unfavorable 
social-economic condition of an academic in Kenya, which reinforces the attraction to the greater 
magnitude and availability of the incentives (personal interview, November 2012). However, the 
incentive to teach is claimed to have negative effects on research and successful supervision of 
postgraduate students.  
 
In conclusion, the above section discusses the shifts in the remuneration regime of academics. 
During the period of 1960s and 1970s, we see a period thought of as a period of “hope and 
optimism” when academics earned competitive salaries which were not performance driven. This 
is also exhibited as a period of economic prosperity and low values of inflation that saw large 
scale funding of higher education, and hence high percentage of government expenditure on the 
wages and salaries of academics. Contrary to the 1960s to the mid- 1970s, the period of 1980 to 
the 1990s, reflected decline in the remuneration of academics. Similarly, during this period, there 
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was decline in state funding to higher education, introduction of the structural adjustment 
programmes and decline in the economic growth rate. The above factors are argued to have also 
contributed to the decline in the percentage of government expenditure on the wages and salaries 
of academics, which resulted in decline or stagnation of remuneration during this period. Also, in 
the 1980s, there were high inflation rates, which meant that with the decline or stagnation of the 
academics’ salaries, the purchasing power of academics also stagnated or declined. After the 
period linked with decline in the academic salaries, what follows is the period from the 
beginning of the 21st century to date that is seen to be an era of multiple incentives for the 
academics. During this current period, over and above their salaries, academics earn additional 
payments for teaching on the parallel programmes; mainly, a percentage of the fees paid by the 
private students. Academics also earn extra pay when they teach in the private universities as 
part-time lecturers. This period is considered to be an era with high growth rate in the private 
universities.  
 
The next section provides a detailed discussion on the current remuneration levels of academics 
in Kenyan public universities. The determinations of salaries are discussed in general, as well as 
the compensation of the academics.   
 
4.4 Current Remuneration Levels of Academics in Kenyan Public Universities  
 
This section discusses the current levels of salaries and remuneration of academics at UoN. The 
sections above have outlined the shifts in the remuneration regime of academics over the years, 
since 1960s to date. This section outlines the current salary levels of academics and shows some 
policy issues linked to the salaries both at the national and institutional levels. While interview 
respondents over-emphasize the provision of research resources in the university, they are of the 
view that good pay and remuneration are a key incentive to attract, motivate and retain talented 
academics in the universities.   
 
As shown in the literature review chapter, a few studies have attempted to examine how 
academics are compensated around the world. Altbach, Reisberg and Pacheco are of the view 
that, “salaries … are central to the well- being of the academic profession and its contribution to 
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the university” (Altbach, Reisberg & Pacheco, 2012, p. 2). Also, consistent with the predictions 
of the principal-agent model, employees who receive good compensation for their performance, 
effort, capabilities and contribution to the institution’s outputs, tend to be effective and efficient 
in their productivity and are committed to their jobs in comparison to their counterparts who are 
underpaid (Benabou & Tirole, 2003; also see Hearn, 1999; Lazear, 2000; Chant, 2005). In 
addition, as mentioned in Chapter Two, the Kenyan government recognises that good pay and 
other incentives would attract the researchers who were affected by the ‘brain-drain” both to the 
private sector and to other countries. This section covers the following: (a) how are academics’ 
salaries determined? (b) What constitutes the total paycheck and other allowances of academics 
at UoN? (c) How do academic salaries and other benefits compare with other selected 
professionals in the public sector?  
 
Altbach (2012) emphasizes, academics need not be remunerated according to the highest 
international standards, but the local levels should be sufficient to allow academics have a 
middle-class lifestyle. Nonetheless, previous studies revealed that in the developing and middle-
income countries academic salaries are inadequate to provide a decent living, with the exception 
of South Africa, which is reported to have higher entry-level to top-level salaries. The possibility 
exists that academic salaries may increase over 100 percent in the course of the career of the 
academic. In case salaries are insufficient, Altbach, Reisberg and Pacheco argue that, “the “best 
and brightest” will not be attracted to academe”, and academics may be forced to supplement 
their inadequate income from alternative sources, hence “diverting their attention and attention 
from their academic work” (Altbach et al., 2012, p. 2; also see Pacheco & Rumbley, 2008; 
Altbach, 2012). The salary level and “fringe benefits” provided to academics at UoN are 
discussed below.  
 
4.4.1 Determination of Pay  
 
The review of the relevant documents shows that, in Kenya, the basic salaries are centrally 
determined, through a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). The CBA is between the 
Universities Academic Staff Union (UASU) – representing academics - and the Inter Public 
University Council of University Councils Consultative Forum (IPUCCF) of the Federation of 
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Kenya Employers (FKE), acting on behalf of the universities as the employers with direct 
intervention of the government (UASU constitution 2006; UASU, 2012). The UASU Chapter in 
the university negotiates with other role players about other allowances and benefits such as 
commuter allowances, medical allowance, package allowance, last expense, hardship, etc. The 
negotiations are done with individual university Councils who are the employers (UASU 
constitution, 2006; also see Lagat et al., 2014). From the above, it is evident that the staff unions 
play a key role in setting the lower and upper limits of the academic salaries. As signaled earlier, 
robust academic unions agitated for better pay and improved working conditions in the last 
decade; thus leading to an increase in the academic salaries (Personal Interview, November 
2012). Based on the interview data, participants commented that in 2003 there was a very steep 
increase in the academic salaries. However, there was no available data to validate these claims.  
Similarly, the negotiated 33 percent basic salary and 17 percent housing allowance increase in 
2014 between IPUCCF representing the public universities and the unions – UASU (representing 
the academics) and the Kenya University Staff Union (KUSU) (representing the professional 
staff) illustrates that the unions protect their members against the effects of inflation (Oduor & 
Otieno, 2014; Munene, 2014). Following this agreement, a full professor at the top level earns a 
consolidated monthly pay of about US$ 3, 300 and the tutorial fellow and the assistant lecturers 
at the entry level make around US$ 1,757 (see Oduor & Otieno, 2014). Despite the 33 percent 
salary increase, the rise is happening at a low base. Given an average inflation rate varying 
between 12-13 percent, it reduces the effect of the salary increase, thus the purchasing power of 
the academics may just stagnate. Therefore, as signaled earlier these salaries may barely be 
enough for academic staff to afford a middle-class lifestyle. However, during this period we can 
see that there will still be positive net growth. 
 
Furthermore, even with the salary increase, the interview data revealed that the interviewed 
participants believed the academic salaries lag behind their counterparts in the civil service, 
particularly the judiciary and the legislature holding the same working experience and academic 
qualifications. As one respondent emphasized:  
 
University lecturers are poorly paid and remunerated. (Personal Interview, November 2012)    
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As indicated in the above section, immediately after independence the paid ratio of a university 
professor, a member of parliament, a permanent secretary and a judge stood at 1.2:1. This could 
imply that the pay and benefits were almost the same. Currently, the permanent secretary at the 
top level earns US$ 12, 200; a member of parliament takes home US$ 9, 800, while the judges 
make US$ 7, 000 per month (KIPPRA, 2013).  
 
In interviews with academics their views were that the high inequalities in the salaries in the civil 
service have resulted in 
  
“(L)ow morale” in the universities, which has affected the key mission of the universities, that is, 
research and training and the overall contribution to economic development. Consequently, the 
large salary differences have resulted in increased industrial strife as the academics agitate for 
higher pay, illustrated by high number of strikes between 2011 and 2014. (Lightly edited 
Personal Interview, November2012) 
 
Increasingly, large gaps in the salaries have seen more academics move out of the university into 
the public service or the private sector. From the interviews with the academics, it is evident that 
in 2012, a massive number of professors at the law faculty moved to the judiciary to become 
judges and commissioners (Personal Interview, November 2012; also see Magoha 2012). Thus, a 
situation termed “disturbing” followed the efforts of the university to enhance the knowledge 
production levels.  
 
From the above analysis, it has been revealed that the basic salaries are centrally determined, 
with the academic unions playing a vital role in setting the minimum and maximum limits of the 
academic salaries through the collective bargaining agreement.  The academic unions have 
University Chapters, which ensure that other allowances such as transport are determined. The 
next section discusses the link of salaries to performance.  
 
4.4.2 Performance-based Pay 
 
Inasmuch as the academic unions have made efforts to try and get spurts in the academic 
salaries, evidence from the data shows that government does not recognize performance-based 
pay systems in the Kenyan universities. Following the strong emphasis on Collective Bargaining 
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Agreements in determination of academic salaries, lecturers and professors in the same grades 
earn the same salaries, in spite of the differing levels of productivity or performance in the 
university. In Kenyan public universities, the distribution of academic salaries is mainly done on 
the basis of longevity in rank, administrative position, and seniority (see Table 4.2). Steers 
(1984), argues that individual incentive plans face resistance from academic unions, as the 
unions prefer compensation of their members to be on the basis of seniority or job satisfaction. 
Further, Steers notes, “often there is little in correlation between those who perform well and 
those who receive the greatest rewards” (1984, p. 416). In a nutshell, performance-based pay is 
not viable in the Kenyan public universities. Hence, Kanter (1987) warns that, distribution of 
rewards based on hierarchy or seniority could act as dis-incentives, which encourage employees 
to ‘look out for themselves’ albeit improving on the productivity.  
 
 In the absence of a performance-based compensation system in the Kenyan public universities, a 
professor who is productive, in terms of research publications or postgraduate students output, 
earns similar amounts as his/her less productive colleagues. According to the principal-agent 
model performance related pay is more desirable than plain fixed pay, as it offers incentives and 
attracts employees whose productivity is above average, thus they believe they can be paid more 
within a performance related scheme. Based on the indications above, this contradicts the 
practice in Kenyan public universities, which may turn out to be a dis-incentive. Relevant 
evidence supports the notion that longevity in the academic rank is the main determinant of the 
academic salaries. The major ranks considered for incentives are entry level (assistant 
lecturer/tutorial fellow and lecturer), medium level (senior lecturer and associate professor) and 
top level (full professors).  
 
For the basic salaries, salary differentiation within the same academic ranks exists, based on the 
12 different pay scales attached to the position, which denote seniority (see Appendix 5). For 
example, full professors, at salary scale 12 with high seniority earned a monthly basic pay of 
approximately US$ 2, 490 in 2013/2014; while full professors at salary scale 1, with lower 
seniority earned approximately US$ 1, 745). Seniority is based on the number of years one has 
been in a position.  Table 4.2 shows the salaries of the different ranks from the entry level –
tutorial fellow to the highest position at the professorial level.  
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Table 4.2  
Academic Average Monthly Basic Salaries from 2013/2014 in Kenyan Public Universities  
(exchange rate as at January 2014) 
Grade  SALARY SCALES IN US$ PER MONTH  
Minimum Medium Maximum  
Professor (15) 1,700 2,031  2,490 
Associate Professor (14)  1,446 1,700 2,034 
Senior lecturer (13) 1,109 1,396 1,591 
Lecturer (12) 982 1,170 1, 398 
Assistant lecturer/Tutorial fellow (11) 745   900 1,174 
Note: Source: UASU salary tables for 2014 
 
The professors, led by the academic union –UASU- have continuously pushed for a salary 
increase, which might put them at the same level or higher than their counterparts in the region. 
For instance, on average, the monthly salary of a professor and allowances in a public university 
is equivalent to US$ 3,200 in Tanzania; US$ 4,900 in Rwanda compared to the average salary of 
US$ 2, 200 in Kenya (Kisero, 2012). This finding reinforces the above argument that salaries of 
academics have increased over time, though at a low base, as an initiative of UASU.  
 
Additionally, there has been a series of academic strikes over the government failure to 
implement the 2012 CBA, which would have resulted in setting a professor’s base monthly 
salary approximately between US$ 3,840 and US$ 5,760. Though, part of the 2012 CBA has 
been realized, academics continuously threaten to strike, claiming the university management 
misappropriated the funds meant for them and discriminative payments of the allowances in the 
local CBAs (UASU, 2012). There are continuous claims that the university management diverted 
part of the funds meant for payment of the academic salary increases towards debt offsetting and 
maintenance of facilities, hence resulting in the increase in latest number of academic strikes 
(Kiplang’at, 2014; also see Munene, 2014). The mentioned industrial strife often paralyses 
learning in the universities and other tasks of academics, including research and supervision of 
students, which may also affect the completion rates of graduate students.  
 
Inasmuch as there is an increase in the academic salaries data from the interviews suggested that 
academics “receive poor pay, which is not commensurate with their efforts and academic 
qualifications” (Personal Interview, November 2012). According to respondents, “salaries have 
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been the least of the incentives as they are extremely low”. This information supports the claims 
of Altbach (2012) that academic salary levels in most countries have not kept up with inflation. 
Over the decades, this has forced many academics to look for other sources to supplement their 
income, so as to maintain appropriate standards of living. To reiterate, Altbach et al., (2012) 
claim “in many countries salaries are too low to support a middle-class lifestyle locally” (p.2).  
 
In conclusion, this section shows that academic remuneration is not based on salary, but rather 
mainly on academic rank and seniority. The academic unions resist the individual incentives, 
giving preference to seniority, which may turn to be a dis-incentive to more productive 
academics. However, it has to be noted that the spurts in the academic salaries over time have 
occurred as the result of efforts of the academic unions. The next section provides an analysis of 
the incentives linked to research at the University of Nairobi.  
 
 4.5 Incentives Linked to Knowledge Production at the University of Nairobi  
 
This section provides an analysis of the incentives linked to research and successful postgraduate 
supervision at UoN; and how they influence knowledge production. The subsequent analysis will 
present various elements that have been derived from the theoretical framework – the principal-
agent model, which enables understanding of the notion of incentives. The following factors 
include some of the key elements that are discussed in this section: Time resources, promotion 
opportunities, financial allowances, non-monetary rewards, benefits and allowances, research 
funding and research infrastructure and lastly, workload allocation. Looking at these items, the 
section provides a description of how UoN rewards research and successful postgraduate 
supervision; and whether and how these notions are articulated in the relevant policy documents.  
 
4.5.1 Promotion Opportunities  
 
UoN policy shows that the university attempts to develop a research reward for academics. From 
the reviewed documents, under the human resource management policy areas, it is evident that, 
the university considers including research and supervision in the job description of academic 
staff, and ensures that each member of academic staff is evaluated and rewarded for his/her 
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research output and successful postgraduate supervision. Arguably, the university recognizes that 
use of rewards will attract, motivate and encourage academics to research, publish and supervise 
postgraduate students. Therefore, the University emphasizes the need to develop a research 
incentives budget that will be used to reward staff who publish papers in internationally 
recognized journals. The documents reviewed show some of the incentives mainly attached to 
research and supervision to include promotion opportunities.  
 
Among the policy items discussed above, promotion appears to be one of the incentive 
opportunities attached to research and successful postgraduate student supervision at UoN.  
Apart from the policy documents, participants were interviewed to provide their views on 
incentives at UoN. A review of the promotion policy document of UoN and the interview 
responses show that promotion largely dependent upon the academic’s research productivity and 
“wide experience in postgraduate student supervision”, which is evaluated regularly (UoN, 
2006a; personal interview, November 2012).  This finding resonates with the results of the 
research of Bland et al., (2005), which established that research output is a key determinant of 
promotion. Documents show that, other key criteria emphasized on for promotion may include: 
“seniority”, that is longevity in the academic ranks, “possession of advanced degrees”, 
particularly PhD, in the relevant fields, and, teaching experience. From the documents, UoN has 
five ranks for academic appointment, that is, tutorial fellow/assistant lecturer, lecturer, senior 
lecturer, associate professor, and professor, the tutorial fellow level being the entry level (UoN, 
2006a, pp. 58-59). Often, the different academic levels have different salary steps discussed 
further below. 
  
The document analysis shows that, there are claims that the university “has clear criteria for 
promoting staff”, that is, it is basically based on particular job qualifications (UoN, 2006a, p.8). 
Other than part-time lecturers, UoN has the rest of its academics working on a full-time basis. 
The permanent/tenure track based academics generally begins at this level. For promotion to a 
professorial position, PhD training is a key requirement. Teaching is also an important criterion, 
which may involve, teaching at undergraduate and postgraduate levels, research training and 
mentoring. Similarly, emphasis is on postgraduate student supervision, where the candidates 
need to have successfully supervised to completion a minimum of 3 PhDs and 5 Master’s 
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students. Research publishing is also a key factor, since the academic has to have produced a 
minimum of six publications in refereed journals; or three publications in refereed journals and 
three chapters in scholarly books since the previous promotion. Lastly, evidence of scholarly 
activities or contribution, such as innovations, is rewarded at the university (UoN, 2006a, pp. 58-
59;). Nevertheless, looking at the different requirements in the policy document, the academics 
interviewed stated that much emphasis during promotion is on peer-reviewed articles in 
internationally recognized journals (Personal Interview, November 2012). The emphasis on 
evidence of research productivity and graduate supervision at the different levels is consistent 
with the findings of previous studies in different contexts (Tien, 2007; Bayissa & Zewdie, 2011; 
Inglesi-Lotz & Pouris, 2011; Altbach et al., 2012). 
  
Significantly, respondents reported that co-authorship with postgraduate students is strongly 
emphasized for promotion. To reinforce the above requirement, an academic staff member in the 
Faculty of Arts recalled that:  
 
I would say that one of the challenges that I had during the interviews is that I had not published 
any publications with my students.  So the committee highly regards co-authorships and we are 
being encouraged to do that. (Personal Interview, November 2012)  
 
Despite, the emphasis on co-authorship as a criterion for promotion, survey data shows that, only 
5 .1 percent of the respondents had co-authored with the Master’s or PhD student they had 
supervised to completion.  
 
The emphasis on publications and successful supervision of Master’s and doctoral students for 
promotion purposes seems to have encouraged academics at UoN to pay more attention to these 
outputs. This is evidenced in the interview excerpts below: 
 
In the recent past I have put effort to engage in research to publish now that I know it's a 
requirement for promotion. (Personal Interview, November 2012)  
There are those academics that are just satisfied by that position, one who says that I must 
become a professor and they do whatever they are required to earn the professorship. (Personal 
Interview, November 2012) 
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A dean in one of the faculties expressed his view as follows:  
 
Just to mention, since when promotion was attached to student supervision recently, just three 
years ago, it has led to academics scrambling for students in my department and be available for 
consultations on the research projects. (Personal interview, November 2012) 
 
A consistent trend emerges when viewing outcomes of studies examining research behaviour and 
the expected incentive such as promotion. Ruscio (1987), states more than half of the 
respondents would undertake research and publish entirely for promotion. The above can be 
linked to the predictions of “Vroom’s expectancy theory” (Vroom, 1964), that individuals are 
motivated when they believe that certain effort or performance will result in desired rewards 
(Lunenburg, 2011, p. 2). Therefore, as discussed in Chapter Two, universities can influence 
research behaviour through manipulating the reward structure of promotion (Fox, 1992).  
 
Furthermore, as promotion is heavily dependent upon research productivity, academics face 
problems in publishing and research funding. To reinforce the above issue one dean’s view was:   
 
The research funding is a major problem, but it’s also a dilemma because, in our promotion we 
are required to have published, if you look at the criteria for promotion, the Kagiko rules, its 
specifies clearly what is expected of you to move to the next level. You must have supervised you 
must have published and yet the research funds are a major problem. (Personal Interview, 
November 2012)  
 
From the above statements, it can be seen that universities have to support academics to publish 
and advance their careers through making research funds available. Generally, academics in 
African Universities, including Kenya, are faced with difficulties in publishing research works 
(Zeleza & Olukoshi, 2004). Reduced government funding, increase in student enrolment and 
increased student strikes have influenced research and graduate productivity negatively (Zeleza 
& Olukoshi, 2004; Tefferra & Altbach, 2004; Kiberenge, 2012).  
 
Inasmuch as promotions are considered to be an important driver for performance, about half of 
the participants interviewed felt that the promotion system was not transparent, consistent and 
fair, and that it takes too long for one to be promoted despite having achieved high performance 
rating and met the promotion criteria. A senior academic in the Faculty of Veterinary Medicine 
complained thus: 
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I have gone through promotion [processes] twice since I had my PhD and I had a lot of pushing 
even after meeting the required criteria and the same applied to my colleagues in this 
department. (Personal interview, November 2012)  
 
Literature suggests ensuring employees do not complain to have taken long to attain their career 
advancement promotion procedures for different levels need to be fair, objective and clear 
(Bland et al., 2002).  
 
To conclude on the promotion opportunities at UoN, note must be taken that, based on the above 
analysis, there is compelling evidence that an incentive opportunity is reliant to a great extent on 
research productivity. Notwithstanding the weaknesses mentioned in connection with promotion 
opportunities at the university it was important to highlight the key requirements needed for 
promotion to the next academic rank. The next section discusses the monetary and non-monetary 
incentives attached to research and successful postgraduate student supervision.   
 
4.5.2 Financial Allowances for Publications and Successful Supervision  
 
Inasmuch as the review of policy documents shows that the university will set aside a budget of 
incentives for research and supervision, it is not explicit in the documents if financial allowances 
are directly attached to publications and successful supervision of postgraduate students. 
However, from the interview data, discussed below, it can be concluded that in some instances 
financial allowances are attached to research publications and supervision.  
 
The incentives literature reviewed in Chapter Two established that, among other things, the use 
of financial rewards has, in some circumstances resulted in an increase in productivity (Lazear, 
2000).  Similarly, the principal-agent model predicts that, since workers are utility maximizers 
they will be highly motivated by the availability of financial rewards.  
 
Generally, respondents interviewed believed that supervision at the University is seen as a de 
facto responsibility of academics; therefore no rewards need to be attached to it. To support this 
claim, a senior lecturer at the Faculty of Agriculture noted: 
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Supervision at the University of Nairobi is treated as a normal responsibility. (Personal 
Interview, November 2012) 
 
However, further scrutiny of the interview data from the administrators and academics shows 
that apart from the promotion opportunities attached to supervision, financial allowances were 
attached to successful supervision of Master’s and PhD students, particularly students in Module 
II programmes, where the students are ‘tuition fee paying students. One of the deans interviewed 
stated that:  
 
The staff are rewarded when they are supervising module II students who are tuition fee paying.  
This faculty has not developed a PhD programme that is self-sponsored we are still on the old 
programme [module I], but for the Masters we have developed parallel programmes. Various 
departments have developed Master’s programmes that are self-sponsored, where students pay 
for supervision and the lecturer gets 30% of the total of the supervision fees. (Personal Interview, 
November 2012)  
 
This type of rewarding of successful supervision of students in Module II programmes did not 
seem to be a university-wide practice, but one that was specific to particular Faculties and 
departments. This shows that some departments have more students on Module II programmes; 
as a result more income can be generated to support supervision. The provision of financial 
rewards for successful supervision of postgraduate students was also practiced in cases where 
student funding (by external sources) provided for a financial allowance for supervision. A 
lecturer in the School of Economics stated that: 
  
(…) depending on who is funding the students there is some supervision allowance. (Personal 
Interview 2012) 
 
Examples cited in the data where this kind of reward was given were the School of Economics 
and the Faculty of Agriculture (particularly the Department of Agricultural Economics). The 
respondents from these two entities mentioned that they received “supervision allowances” for 
the students who were on collaborative Master’s programmes, mainly funded by the African 
Economic Research Consortium (AERC). Considering that this reward does not apply in all 
cases of successful postgraduate supervision, it is not unlikely that it may have a negative effect 
on non-beneficiaries, since it may turn out to be a dis-incentive. The reviewed literature 
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illustrates that for a reward structure to be attractive it has to be fair and systematically applied in 
the institution (Bland et al., (2005).  
 
Besides the interviews, academics expressed the view that where there was a monetary reward 
attached to postgraduate student supervision, the amounts were minimal and therefore did not 
have a useful impact on productivity levels. Respondents generally regarded the amount as a 
“token”. A lecturer in the Faculty of Arts expressed his dissatisfaction as follows:  
 
The amount is too low to motivate anybody; it is miserable and has an insignificant impact. 
(Personal Interview, November 2012.   
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, monetary incentives for employees can be a dis-incentive and 
strictly result in decline in performance if they are not sufficient enough (Gneezy & Rustichini, 
2000).  
 
Following multiple principals in the university context, the National Commission for Science, 
Technology and Innovation (NACSTI, previously, National Science Council of Technology) has 
established a financial reward, ranging from $US 50 to $US 200 for academic researchers who 
publish their research in peer-reviewed internationally recognized journals. This reward is only 
attached to full peer-reviewed journal articles; while other scholarly publications such as books, 
book chapters, editorials, comments and editors’ notes are not recognized. Essentially, the 
monetary reward has been put in place to encourage researchers, including academics, to 
contribute to knowledge production that is important for making Kenya a globally competitive 
and prosperous nation as envisaged by Vision 2030.  Generally, from the data collected, the 
NCSTI was strongly commended for their recent strong support of research at UoN.  
 
The above analysis shows that there are financial allowances linked to research publication and 
postgraduate supervision at UoN. Nonetheless, the financial allowances are said to be 
insufficient and the supervision allowance on module II is not widely applied across the 
departments. The next sub-section discusses the non-monetary rewards attached to knowledge 
production.  
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4.5.3 Recognition for Successful Supervision and Publications  
 
The other incentives linked to research include non-monetary rewards such as recognition. 
Recognition may entail (a) recognition through “an outstanding researcher” award at a 
departmental level (b) recognition through appointment to the professor Emeritus position (c) 
pronouncement of names in public, such as during graduation ceremonies. These are discussed 
further below.  
 
From the interviews with the academics, respondents indicated that the university recognized 
their performance in research publication outputs and successful supervision through, inter alia, 
public acknowledgement.  A lecturer in the School of Business noted that recognition is through 
“pronouncement of the names of the supervisors and particularly of PhD graduates by the Vice 
Chancellor during the graduation ceremonies”. (Personal Interview, November 2012. Similarly, 
one dean indicated that in the Faculty of Agriculture “the people [academics] who have the 
largest grants are acknowledged by the Vice Chancellor during his speeches”. Further, one 
respondent stated, “your name is known from the works you have done”. Therefore, following 
the recognition in public, their scholarly works similarly earn them recognition amongst their 
peers and students as well, which also comes with improved status and respect.  A professor in 
the Faculty of Agriculture acknowledged this enhanced status following the public recognition of 
his research productivity thus:  “there are changes in the way the students see me as a professor. 
For instance, you see students and my colleagues being more receptive with my suggestions and 
criticisms than when I was a lecturer”. (Personal Interview, November 2012)  
 
The academics noted that, through their research works, they have been nominated for particular 
tasks in the university, other governmental departments or in NGOs. These tasks may include 
heading committees or boards or other leadership tasks. Some respondents indicated that, they 
had been recognized for their outstanding research works, by being offered presidential awards.  
Following the above discussion, it is clear that the UoN offers non-monetary incentives for 
research. The next section discusses the benefits and allowances for academics.  
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4.5.4 Benefits and Allowances Available for Academics  
 
Analyzed data shows that benefits and other allowances are also attached to research at UoN. 
The UoN research policy proposes the provision of opportunities to increase the human capital 
needed to conduct research and supervise postgraduate students in the university and in the 
country (UoN, 2008, p. 7). It recognises the critical role played by research and human capital in 
accelerating economic development in the country. According to the research policy, the 
university recognises that the above objective will be attained through opportunities and support 
for post-graduate and post-doctoral training programmes for both staff members and 
postgraduate students. Therefore, the policy documents reviewed showed that these efforts will 
be met through provision of benefits to academics, such as: (i) paid leave (ii) developmental 
conference, workshops and seminars (iii) provisions of study leave and sabbatical leave to 
conduct research at leading national/international institutions. These benefits are discussed below 
in detail, followed by the academic perceptions.  
 
The theoretical framework of this study argues that benefits and allowances for good 
performance in teaching and research are key to the long-term objectives of the organization 
(Cameron and Pierce, 1997). Further, Jongbloed (2012), contends that academic compensation 
should be measured broadly to include the allowances and fringe benefits that academics receive 
above their basic salary. This study reveals that academics receive allowances and other benefits. 
However, only a few of the academics interviewed reported they received such bonuses. This 
finding is concurrent with the findings of Altbach, (2012), that provision of allowances and 
benefits to academics vary from country to country, and they are limited to a few individuals.   
 
As mentioned above the documents reviewed show that allowances provided to academics 
include: housing allowances, transport allowance, and medical benefits. Except for the benefits 
stated above, allowances such as housing and transport allowances are entitled to each and every 
academic. Housing allowances, like academic basic salaries, are centrally determined through 
collective bargaining agreement. Like basic salaries housing allowances are awarded on the basis 
of the different academic ranks, status and seniority in the university. Evidence collected 
revealed that housing allowances entail provision for residence, housing subsidies and lower 
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interest rates on mortgages (Personal Interview, November 2012). The amounts attached to the 
allowances, particularly medical allowances are not systematically applied in the Kenyan 
universities, and even within UoN it varies from one college to the other. As it was signaled 
earlier, the differences in the allowances can be explained by income generated from the 
colleges, especially from Module II programmes. For instance, the college of Humanities and 
Social Sciences, was claimed to be the second or third richest in the university, following the 
large student enrolments on module II programmes. A senior academic who had been at the 
university for over 30 year noted:  
 
These days if you were looking for such an allowances (service) they would assist but now it 
intensely varies on a college-to-college basis. It varies; also on how rich your college is. Some 
colleges are richer than others, that is, its pegged on Module II revenues…those colleges that are 
not richer have their disadvantage because in Module II the emphasis is on the number of 
students. (Personal interview, November 2012)  
 
The above respondent reported how income generation in the universities influenced, both 
allowances and benefits to the academics in the university.  
The table below shows the housing allowance provided for the different academic ranks at the 
university, as per the 2012/2013 UASU salary tables.  
 
Table 4.3 
 House Allowances of Academics as per the Academic Ranks in 2013/2014 
Academic Rank  Amount (Kshs.)  Amount (US$) 
Professor  70, 889 833 
Associate Professor  63, 800 750 
Senior Lecturer  56, 711 667 
Lecturer  53, 167 625 
Tutorial Fellow 49, 623 583 
Note: Source: UASU salary tables  
 
Particularly, in the Kenyan context, allowances and other fringe benefits are seen to successfully 
attract, retain and motivate the individuals with higher educational qualifications in the public 
sector including the public universities (KIPPRA, 2013, p. 73). 
 
According to the interview data, academics believed that, in the 1960-1980s era, academics 
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could access many and high amounts of allowances and fringe benefits, which were unavailable 
to employees in other professions. Also, they enjoyed a high social status, with a substantial 
middle-class lifestyle, entailing houses in the “leafy suburbs of Nairobi and medical treatment 
abroad”. To emphasize a senior academic in the School of Economics, who had worked at the 
University for over 30 years, explained:   
 
In the early years of 1980s and 1990s, UoN, was considered to be one of the best employers then 
because of the fringe benefits that were associated with it above the salaries those times. 
(Personal Interview, November 2012)  
 
However, despite the shifts in the allowances over time, academics claimed, the medical 
allowances “have remained amongst the best in the country as they provide 100 percent cover 
and there are no limits”. Document reviews show that, UoN “runs a non-contributory medical 
scheme for members of staff and their immediate families” (UoN, 2006b, p. 19).  
 
The findings above resonate with the arguments in Chapter Two, that, in the early 1960s and 
1970s, most governments in developing countries including the Kenyan government, were set to 
fully fund higher education, thus providing good wages and benefits to the academics, largely in 
support of the creation of human resources (Banya & Elu, 2001). Currently, reduced government 
funding has also negatively affected the amounts allocated to remuneration, allowances and 
benefits (see Wangenge-Ouma, 2008b). Currently, respondents were of the view that the ‘terms 
of service’ offered to the university academics would be unattractive to the young academics. 
Androushchak and Yudkevich (2012, p. 4) refer to this situation as having an “adverse selection 
effect” where the young academics opt for non-academic careers out of the university or seek for 
jobs in other universities abroad. Although, the allowances are argued not to be on par with the 
inflation rates, they account for the highest percentage of the gross salary.  
 
Additionally, as shown in the policy reviews above, following the aim to increase human 
resources and research capacity, the university recognises the need to support academics, 
especially those on staff development to conduct research and publish their findings. This 
support, that denotes incentives for academics include: (i) paid study or research leave 
commonly known as “sabbatical leave”. (ii) Grants for travel both within Kenya and overseas for 
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conferences. A number of the interviewed academics seemed to be satisfied with the sabbatical 
leave policies. From the document reviews, academics are liable to go on sabbatical leave after 
every seven years. However, the benefits of the study leave vary according to the duration of the 
intended studies (UoN, 2006; Personal Interview, November 2012). The above findings resonate 
with observation by Tien, (2007), who contended that policies for several universities in Taiwan, 
require professors to apply for sabbatical leave after seven years or for a period of six months, 
every three years. 
 
 Some participants noted that, although they had not been on sabbatical leave, they had 
confidence of accessing leave again in case they lodged their applications. However, it was 
important to note that, following the sampling bias in this study, most of the respondents in this 
study were senior academics that qualified for sabbatical leave. Consequently, about 59 percent 
of the participants indicated to be satisfied with the availability of sabbatical leave. The 
proportion of academics seemed to be satisfied with the policy on sabbatical leave was high 
compared to findings by Bennett et al., (2013), in an Australian context that revealed only 32 
percent of the academics in the survey sample indicated they could access sabbatical leave. 
Bennett and colleagues thought their results were surprising following the high numbers of 
tenure-track staff in the sample.  
 
However, responses from the structured interviews showed that, in the recent past, a small 
number of academics had taken sabbatical leave. To explain the above observation, one of the 
respondents felt that some of the reasons that have hindered academics to go on sabbatical 
included (i) perpetual overload of teaching and administrative work and understaffing in the 
university (ii) reduced numbers of collaborative links with other universities or research bodies 
(iii) reduced funding of research especially the research visits (Personal Interview, November, 
2012).  
 
From the policies linked to incentives at UoN, it is clear that support to attend conferences is one 
of the incentives for academics at UoN. The university recognises the need to support both 
academics and students through conferences, workshops and seminars. Therefore, the university 
acknowledges the need to ‘organize, co-ordinate and support regional or international 
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conferences within given intervals’ (UoN, 2008). Given the above policy items, respondents 
were asked to rate the availability of conference funds. Like, research funding, availability of 
conference funds were very poorly rated in its availability, with over 91 percent of the 
participants. In general, travel funds to conferences were seen as inadequate in the university. 
Despite the policy items indicating support for conferences, participants’ perceptions showed 
that, the university lacked “appropriate procedures in place to facilitate attendance/participation 
in conferences”. Further, the written responses, to some extent showed unavailability of the 
travel funds in the university. One of the senior lecturers noted that,  
 
              I have been to US conferences on my own … most of the time the university will not give you the 
resources” despite the claims of a vault for conference funds. (Personal Interview, November 
2012)  
 
The evidence collected from the structured interviews revealed that, among other factors, decline 
in funding to the universities, could as well as have decreased the allocations made to the 
conference vault, thus prioritizing other university operations (see Mutula, 2002; World Bank, 
2010).  
 
Lastly, apart from the renowned allowances and benefits, academics at UoN can access 
retirement benefits. Retirement benefits are eligible to senior academics that are mainly on 
permanent and pensionable terms of service (UoN, 2006b). Unfortunately, views of respondents’ 
were never collected in regard to the retirement benefit.  
 
From the above section, it can be seen that academics are eligible to several benefits and 
allowances at the university, including, housing and medical allowances, paid study/sabbatical 
leave, travel funds to conferences and retirement, to mention but a few. However, despite the 
variety of the benefits, the major perceptions of the academics were about the inadequacy and 
inconsistency in availability of these funds. The next section provides a discussion on the 
allocation of funds and resources for research and postgraduate supervision. 
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4.5.5 Provision of Research Funds and Research Infrastructure  
 
This section discusses the ways in which the university, through the university grants committee, 
has resorted to funding and allocating resources for research. Therefore, it provides a discussion 
on the availability of research infrastructure and facilities at the university, as well as the internal 
research-funding scheme, and if any, other sources of funds for research.  
 
4.5.5.1 Availability of Research Infrastructure  
 
In terms of support of research, the policy documents reviewed showed that the university 
recognises to improve staff qualifications, and to ensure participation in research and increase the 
enrolment of Master’s and PhD students, necessarily requires strengthening of the university’s 
research infrastructure. Some of the infrastructure and facilities singled out in particular in the 
university policies, that needed to be provided and strengthened included: Website, ICT 
(computers, networks, communications, research software), Library, Laboratories and laboratory 
equipment, Houses (animal-, green- etc.), Vehicles, Research farms. These efforts may also 
include academics recommending and submitting requests for relevant research journals and 
books through their departments/faculty/ college (UoN, 2008).  
 
Looking at the above policies linked to incentives for knowledge production, research 
infrastructure and facilities are seen as a key support factor for research and postgraduate 
supervision. The question of provision of facilities and resources to enhance research 
productivity continues to dominate the literature (Blackburn & Tien, 1996; Tien, 2007). 
According to the literature reviewed, availability of state-of-the-art equipment would result in 
academics engaging in cutting edge research, present papers at international conferences, publish 
refereed articles in international journals, gain research patents, and look for research grants and 
supervise students (Hazelkorn, 2008). Also, Jongbloed (2012, p.6), agrees there is need to 
balance good pay, “with a package of non-financial rewards—such as facilities for personal 
development and a reasonable degree of independence in carrying out teaching and research 
tasks” for countries/universities to attract and retain talented people. Similarly, according to the 
theoretical framework of this study, the principal-agent model predicts that in order for the 
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Universities to accomplish their mission of knowledge production, there should be research 
resources provided to the academics to support them in the research   tasks (Sappington, 1991). 
Notably, several previous studies tend to indicate that there is correlation between research 
facilities and resources and knowledge production (Blackburn & Tien, 1996; Bland et al., 2006; 
Jongbloed, 2012).  
 
Respondents were asked to express their perceptions on the availability of these resources for 
research and postgraduate student supervision at UoN. The general impression based on the data 
was that there are facilities and resources available to support research and postgraduate 
supervision. The majority of the participants rated the availability of some resources for research 
highly. The participants were satisfied with the existing library resources, with Internet 
connectivity and with the paid sabbatical leave/leave study. The satisfaction with library 
resources was particularly interesting because “the University has introduced some electronic 
books and journals and nowadays they ask academics to recommend some of the books they 
need” (Personal Interview November, 2012). However academics highlighted some of the issues 
that limit the resources provided at the university. Many of the respondents described the 
available resources and facilities for research as inadequate, obsolete and poorly maintained. 
Some of the resources said to be available but proved to have several insufficiencies included 
equipment, infrastructure and limited office space, travel assistance to conferences, start-up 
research funds. At closer scrutiny the data revealed that respondents in the college of Agriculture 
and Veterinary medicine mostly raised the complaint about lack of research infrastructure and 
facilities. Altbach and Boyer (1994), explain that pure science oriented departments might need 
equipment and laboratories more than their counterparts in the humanities and social sciences. 
The complaint about lack of office space was apparent more in the college of humanities and 
social sciences, where academics mostly share offices or have no offices at all. According to 
Bland et al., (2002), ample office space is important for academics to prepare their research and 
consult with the students. In the structured interviews, participants stated that administrative 
support was inadequate, as well as inadequate numbers of research and teaching assistants. 
Generally, a substantial portion of the respondents in the sample thought they received a poor 
level of administrative support. Following the above insufficiencies raised in relation to research 
infrastructure at UoN, it can be agreed that such situations manifest in other African Universities 
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as well (see Ajayi et al. 1996). It has been argued that, inadequate funding has limited most 
African universities to invest in research infrastructure, research facilities and equipment, hence 
negatively impacting the research output. Therefore, this aspect could also explain the minimal 
contribution of Sub- Sahara African universities to the international research output (see Cloete 
et al., 2011).  
 
Following inadequate research infrastructure and facilities, academics make their own 
arrangements to purchase the facilities using the monies from their research grants or the 
consultancies. As expounded by a senior academic staff at the faculty of Veterinary Medicine –  
 
The University has never bought anything. All that we do is that we buy the equipment and 
facilities mainly from the research grants, or money from consultancy, we call it income 
generation. The grant comes through the University and you buy all this equipment through the 
University system, and not that the University as an institution purchases the equipment. For 
instance I have bought equipment from a research grant so that is how it works. For our 
postgraduate students the equipment was donated by NORAD in the 1970s, the University has not 
bought any since then. (Personal Interview, November 2012)  
 
In the above quotation, the influence of donor funding and other income generating efforts on 
research referred to earlier research grants. The respondent reported that equipment was bought   
through provision of research infrastructure and research facilities.  
 
Furthermore, participants were asked to express their views on how the necessary resources 
impacted their research and supervision, and the excerpt below illustrates their aggregate view: 
 
In terms of e-journals we have good links in the department […] I can easily access the articles 
on my computer since the university subscribes to the articles so, on that I actually give the 
university credit. Our library is fairly stocked; the process of restocking is there where we are 
asked of the books that we as a department/academics see that need to buy those of us who do 
that have helped the library stock what we need and the students are able to access e-journals, I 
think we are not doing badly. (Personal Interview, Transcript, November 2012. 
 
Notwithstanding the above-mentioned observations on the positive research support by the UoN, 
it was also mentioned that dis-incentives existed that discouraged academics from engaging in 
research and publishing. Some of these dis-incentives are discussed in the sections below. The 
next section provides a discussion on funding of research and PhD training.  
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4.5.5.2 Availability of Research Funding  
 
From the reviews of the policies, research funding was found to be one of the incentives linked 
to research and postgraduate supervision at UoN. Globally, universities have established research 
funds to support research and postgraduate training. UoN, like other universities, recognises the 
need to establish a university research fund to promote research activities, thus, it has also 
established and manages a ‘dean’s committee research grant’. In part, the UoN’s research policy 
takes note of establishing a university research fund, “to financially support research on a 
competitive basis by the provision of short and long-term fellowships and competitive grants for 
research (UoN, 2008, p. 7). The main purpose of the research grant is to support research and 
capacity building in priority areas in relation to the National Development targets –mainly the 
Vision 2030- and the University of Nairobi Strategic Plan. The university intends to reinforce a 
vibrant research culture through the funds. 
 
According to one dean who was interviewed, the university invests between Kshs. 500-800 
million per annum for research purposes. The way this research grant works is as follows:  the 
research grant funds projects to a maximum of Ksh.250, 000 (Approx. US$ 2941) per year for a 
maximum period of three (3) years. The structured interviews and documents showed that some 
of the individuals eligible to get the grants include: (i) employees of UoN, in particular early 
career researchers/junior researchers (ii) UoN academics on staff development undertaking 
postgraduate studies at the university, and (iii) fulltime postgraduate students registered at UoN, 
if their applications are lodged by their supervisor. As noted earlier, the research grant is 
allocated through a competitive process and funding for continuing projects is subject to the 
satisfactory progress of the project and regular financial reporting. In relation to the allocation of 
the fund, project funds are disbursed annually in two installments of 60 percent and later 40 
percent on satisfactory progress. Some of the items that the grants can cater for include: (i) 
consumables/expendable supplies of equipment (ii) documentation (iii) local travel for field trips 
and conferences (iv) extra personnel such as research assistants, and (v) other costs. 
 
As was indicated in the literature review chapter, there is strong correlation between the 
availability of research funding, research productivity and publishing (Bland et al., 2006). 
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Participants were asked to give their views on the sources of research funding in the university, 
and varied responses were received. Despite the policy initiatives signaling the efforts by the 
university to provide funding for research, one of the participants felt that the funds available 
were too negligible and had little or no significance especially for the senior academics. One of 
the deans noted that:  
 
The dean’s committee research fund is meant to support the junior academic staff on staff 
development. The amount is usually very small, It’s just a token fund, where the academics are 
given Kshs. 250, 000 in a year and when they progress on well with their research projects they 
are allocated the remaining amounts…These amounts might not interest the senior researchers 
because we are talking of an amount so little, just for junior scholars like people who are doing 
their PhD on staff development and they are academic staff here, those are funded. So it’s for the 
junior academics and the amount is just a token. (Personal Interview, November 2012)  
 
In the respondent’s view research funding at the university is prioritized for the junior academics 
while, senior researchers are required to write proposals and acquire research grants from donors, 
at times from consultancies. With the above respondent acknowledging limited funding offered 
for research, such observations seem to manifest not only at UoN, but also in other Sub-Sahara 
African countries. For instance, the World Bank (2008b) notes that funding for research has 
decreased in the recent past following shifts in priorities to basic education, health and 
infrastructure development. The World Bank (2010) concludes that the soaring student 
enrolment and decline in the expenditures per student, also contribute to the limited funding, 
with higher allocations being made to teaching instead of research and undergraduate study 
instead of postgraduate training. Inasmuch as the university does and is expected to generate 
income and fund research, the money from module II programmes is said not to be sufficient to 
pay the academics, run the university operations and fund research (Personal Interview, 
November 2012).   
 
Furthermore, according to one respondent, the funds lacked consistency in its allocation, since it 
took long for consequent disbursements of installments. A dean in one of the Faculties 
commented: 
 
The research fund is a token and those ones with substantive appointments who get that fund 
maybe got those funds in past but recently very few. I haven’t even seen since I assumed this 
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office [three years ago] any of our substantive staff get that [fund]. (Personal interview, 
November 2012)   
 
In the structured interviews it was reported that, for the researchers who receive funding from the 
university, variance exists across the colleges/faculties/schools and departments. As signaled 
earlier the above differences can be explained by variances in the income generated on Module II 
programmes in the different colleges. A senior academic also pointed out that funding for 
research comes from other external sources such as the government, particularly, the National 
Commission for Science, Technology and Innovation (NCSTI). To explain the above views, one 
of the deans expounded:  
 
But apart from funding from the university, which is minimal, lecturers also access funds from 
outside. The NCST also gives research grants, so our lecturers also have access to government 
funding. Lecturers also write proposals to various donors and get funding. Some lecturers are 
even innovative; they can do library research and publish. It also depends with the profession, for 
example if you are in literature you need to be more creative to come up with a book or with some 
publishable document. And if you are in sociology you might do library research although many 
reputable journals may not accept an article based on secondary data. (Personal Interview, 
November 2012)  
 
From the above extract it can be seen that sources of funding of research at UoN, like in other 
universities, are varied. Apart from the government and university as key sources of funding for 
research, donors are also acknowledged for their role in funding. However, despite the 
recognition by the government to fund research, particularly social research, it is argued that in 
the recent past the government had not released up to 1 percent of its GDP to research, compared 
to its counterpart in the developed countries at 10 percent. This explains why most of the 
discoveries are from the developed countries. 
 
The sources of funding also vary within and between the colleges at UoN. The responses from 
the structured interviews showed that academics in the faculties of Agriculture and Veterinary 
Medicine were the main recipients (about 58 percent) of research funds from the government 
bodies such as the NCST. This differs with the academics in Faculty of Arts, School of 
Economics and the School of Business of whom at least 40 percent did not receive research 
funding from the government. The research themes/focus areas of the different research projects 
could explain the variance in the funding of research in the Faculties. According to the 
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university’s research policy, reference is made to conducting “research in areas where new 
developments promise to offer and address the salient problems constraining development 
initiatives in Kenya and Africa” and to “major priority areas within the university research 
framework [and] global agenda” (UoN, 2008, p. 5). Therefore, as shown in the above extract, 
academics in the Faculty of Arts, for instance have to be ‘creative’ and find ways of conducting 
research and publish. Additionally, it has been revealed that the main sources of research funding 
to the university are from external donors. From the statistical data, the majority of the 
academics, around 67 percent, reported they received funding for research from foundations such 
as the Ford Foundation, Rockefeller foundation and the Carnegie Corporation. The majority of 
academics receiving such funds came from the humanities and social sciences. Some academics 
(21 percent) stated that they obtained funding for their research from ‘other’ sources such as 
business firms, industries, and other international organizations, such as the European Union. 
The collected data revealed that the challenge that academics faced with donors/external funding 
is that, donors often have their own interests, thus the academics might not come up with 
publishable data with negative results that affect the research output in the university. 
 
Furthermore, academics viewed the fellowship and scholarship for research available to them 
ambivalently, with over half of the participants (58 percent) not satisfied with its availability. 
Academics felt that, inasmuch as the university provides some funds for PhD training, the 
amount of money is too small to be of great significance to the research projects. As signaled in 
the literature review, and according to the World Bank (2010) poor funding reduces the incentive 
to attract and retain academics in the universities who are required to research and supervise 
postgraduate students so as to produce knowledge for national development. Another key aspect 
raised by academics funded on staff development, was that they were faced with limited time to 
conduct and complete their research projects in time.  
 
The above analysis shows that the UoN has made attempts to establish research funding for 
academics. This funding involves a competitive internal research-funding scheme provided 
mainly for the junior scholars and the academics doing PhDs in the university. The issues on 
time resources in terms of policy and academic perceptions are discussed in the next section.   
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4.5.6 Allocation of Time Resources for Research and Supervision 
 
Looking at the policies linked to incentives for research and student supervision, time resources 
are indicated as one of the key incentives at UoN. The documents reviewed showed that the 
university advocates a “balanced work load” for the academics (UoN, 2008, p.15). In order to 
achieve the mission and vision of the university, the university expects its academic staff to 
“balance their time resources between activities that contribute towards each mission area of the 
university” (UoN, 2008, p. 15). To achieve this aim, the university suggested that a “capacity 
matrix” would guide academics to allocate their time appropriately. The allocations of time 
resources for the different activities that contribute to the mission areas of the university were 
outlined as follows: Teaching and learning (25 percent); Research (30 percent); Research and 
development (20 percent); Consultancy (10 percent); Administration (10 percent); and Extension 
(5 percent). From the above allocation, it can be seen that the percentage of time allocated to 
research is considerably higher, relative to the other activities. The above allocations of time may 
be ‘tailored’ for different departments, since some departments are argued to have little or no 
research and development function (see UoN, 2008). The capacity matrix for time allocations to 
some extent relates to the research and teaching load allocated to academic researchers in the 
university.  
 
According to the university policy above, it is evident that the university envisages there will be 
a balance in the time allocations between the different functions of the university that are 
teaching, research, service and consultancy, in order to attain the mission of the university. 
However, from the analysis of the interview data, the views of the participants were not in line 
with the above policy items. The interviewed respondents felt that insufficient time allocation for 
research and supervision was a major constraint that curtailed productivity. Similarly, heavy 
teaching loads were closely related to insufficient time resources available. A senior academic 
remarked that, the university does not provide blocks of time for research, therefore, “academics 
have to create time in the midst of heavy teaching loads to engage in sensible research”.  
 
Kyviik (2009) argues, the availability and proper distribution of limited resources, such as; time 
is key to achieving the desired productivity. From the structured interviews with the academics, 
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both teaching and administrative work appeared to be conflicting with research and student 
consultation time. Similar to the above observations, are major debates in higher education on 
whether teaching and research are complimentary or competitive to each other. Some authors 
argue teaching is more competitive than complimentary to research (Altbach & Boyer, 1994). 
The Respondents noted that time, as a resource was limited in the university. The following 
quote illustrates this point: 
 
 Considering that I am doing other administrative activities apart from classwork [teaching], 
such as chairing committees –environmental, ICT- member of curriculum review programmes, 
assisting the chair [man] in timetabling, member of task forces – tree planning, committee of 
examination of thesis – board of external examination of thesis and internal examination of 
thesis…. in other words this is why I am talking of heavy workload even without research work 
and travelling to the fields to supervise the students. (Senior academic, Personal Interview, 
November 2012)  
 
The above quote illustrates that both administrative work and teaching consume much time of 
the academics. Depending on the department and the position in the academic hierarchy some 
academics teach many courses, which consume a large portion of their time.  A senior academic 
and former head of department indicated that this situation can be a dis-incentive for academics 
to engage in research, consult with students and publish:  He stated that:  
 
There are some people [academics] who teach evenings from Monday to Saturday so time is a 
challenge because there are some people who may opt to teach and not do any research … But 
you see younger people who are also not attracted to the consultancy world … if you are young 
then you may want to just teach … so time is a constraint for some people especially the young 
scholars. (Personal Interview, November 2012)  
 
The above quotation denotes the earlier argument made on many programmes to teach at both 
Module I and Module II. Teaching as a function was deemed to be demanding. With particular 
reference to student assessment, academics noted that it is not only time consuming but it is also 
a continuous process that is rigorous and can take a long time. A senior academic in the Faculty 
of Arts commented:  
  
Teaching is really engaging, you teach - you mark … and I would say and I am now also talking 
as a former chair of the department, which is very busy. If you try and teach in sociology you will 
make some money because the classes are large but you will not do anything else …  Of course 
the size of classes and the frequency of examining is too high … we examine after every three 
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months and you mark, and the modules are too many … I am talking of Module I, II and III. 
(Personal Interview, November 2012)  
 
Time is a very important resource in research. Academics that are active in research need time to 
read, write and re-write, to collect and analyze data, to conduct fieldwork, establish networks 
with other researchers nationally or internationally through the use of technologies or by 
attending conferences, seminars and workshops. Several activities that could be argued to 
explain the research dimension are described in relation to time. A senior academic staff member 
in the Faculty of Arts stated that:  
 
If I have to engage in research in this university I have to apply for research grants … it requires 
time to collect data analyze and get to write a report, to create and develop research 
networks…you need to have time to attend seminars and workshops I need that time. But where 
do I get that time given the kind of teaching that we to do in this university. (Personal Interview, 
November 2012)  
 
Nevertheless, the interviewed respondents who conduct research indicated that they enjoy 
research. It is time consuming but at the same time it is satisfying. Academics noted that they 
find pleasure in producing knowledge. Some academics indicated they were ‘stealing time’ from 
other activities in order to focus on research. Academics make deliberate decisions to distribute 
and organize their time in a very strict manner in order to devote time to research and 
consultancy. A senior academic in the Faculty of Arts noted that:  
 
My case is a bit different when I talk about time. You remember I told you I teach only two units 
during the day and two during the evening, I did that by choice because I want to reserve time for 
research and consultancies […] this year I have not done any research, I have not done any 
consultancies, I have found myself with more time to sell but I didn’t have a lot of work but still I 
insisted I still needed my time to keep trying here and there for consultancies or research money. 
(Personal Interview, November 2012)  
 
In relation to the above quotation, the statistical data established that over 70 percent of the 
respondents reported that the “university or department encourages them to arrange their 
administrative and teaching commitments to allow time for research, publishing and 
supervision”. This is in agreement with the policy items on a balanced work load as discussed 
above. Academics noted, as much as they engaged in research consultancies in the University 
they were not able to publish the works because of time constraints together with other 
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conditions demanded by the research funders. Closely related to time resources, is workload 
allocation for the academics in the university discussed in detail in the next section.  
 
4.5.7. Workload Allocation  
 
Subsequent to the description in the policies linked to incentives, allocation of workload in the 
university is one of the key areas that incentivize academics to research and supervise 
postgraduate students. In the same way as the allocation of the time resources, percentage of 
workload is spread across the key duties of academics including research, teaching, consultancy 
and service. The documents that were analyzed showed that a balance between research and 
teaching load was required of the university to meet its goals of production of knowledge for 
national development. For instance, it has been suggested that the general load should be 70 
percent research and 30 percent teaching for research institutes. On the other hand, for academic 
departments to observe the balance between research and teaching load, their schedule should 
consist of 30 percent research and 70 percent other mission-oriented activities. Similarly, 
academics are to be allocated students for supervision based on the “teaching load, 
administrative duties and supervision experience and capacity” (Commission for Higher 
Education [CHE], n.d., pp. 19-20). The maximum number of the supervision load in an academic 
year indicated to be (i) Master’s – 5 (ii) Doctorate – 3. The statistical data analysis showed that, 
on average, at least 18 percent of the interviewed academics were currently supervising 4 
Master’s students; and 44 percent were currently supervising 2 doctoral students. This shows that 
those respondents were still within the limits of the intended supervision load.   
 
The relevant literature reviewed in Chapter Two showed that, manageable workloads in terms of 
staff: student ratios and ample class sizes are incentives to academics (Herbst, 2007). Despite the 
policy initiatives on balancing academic workload, academics felt that a heavy teaching load, to 
some extent administrative work, is a hindrance to academics that want to engage in research and 
supervise postgraduate students. This challenge was commonly stated across the two selected 
colleges for this study. This finding is consistent with the observations made in several studies, 
indicated in the literature review that teaching load was found to be one of the strongest negative 
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predictors of knowledge creation productivity (Smeby & Try, 2005; Chen et al., 2006; Hemming 
et al., 2007; Hassan et al., 2008; Hardre et al., 2011).  
 
Similarly, work load particularly teaching load, was operationalized as full-time equivalent 
(FTE) student: full-time equivalent (FTE) staff ratios in this study. Like other African 
Universities, the student: staff ratios at UoN steeply increased from 13:1 in 2001 to 18:1 in 2007; 
followed with a subsequent increase to 36:1 in 2011. There was an increase of about 50 percent 
in the student: staff ratios between 2007 and 2011. The student: staff ratios at UoN were reported 
to have unfavorable ratios (36:1) by 2011 relative to other universities such as Cape Town and 
Dar es Salaam (15:1 and 17:1 consecutively) (see Bunting et al., 2014). Arguably, the increase in 
the student: staff ratios, leads to increase in academic workload. One of the main reasons that 
explain the increase in the ratios is the rapid increase in the student enrolment at the university, 
particularly on Module II programmes (see section 4.2). For instance, Pillay (2010), comments 
that in 2008/2009 there were over 40, 000 students enrolled at UoN, 16, 000 on Module I 
programmes and 33, 000 on Module II. Also, yearly, the faculty of Arts at UoN is reported to 
admit 850 students on Module I programme and 1, 200 students on module II programme (UoN 
Website). Despite the increase in the student: staff ratios over the years, in the structured 
interviews, participants argued that, when they refer to heavy teaching load, it doesn’t 
necessarily imply large class sizes, but rather the several different programmes of students at 
UON, that is, Module I, Module II and Module II. In the interview responses, a respondent 
stated, “Heavy teaching loads at UoN are because of too many groups [Module I, Module II, 
Module III”], however the class sizes are normal”. Although, the collected data shows that on 
average the class sizes range from 200-600, which could very well be large. The above claim 
resonates with the examination of Wangenge-Ouma (2012, p. 213), in the “public by day, private 
by night” as the respondents explained they have to teach Module I students during the day and 
most of the Module II classes are conducted in the evenings (Wangenge-Ouma, 2012).  
 
To expound further on the issue of heavy work load, the evidence collected showed that amidst a 
heavy teaching load, UoN suffers a shortage of permanent staff and teaching assistants, thus 
sometimes academics are forced to teach several courses/classes (Personal Interview, November 
2012). The analyzed data revealed that few participants, about 15 percent, reported that the 
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university provides well-trained teaching assistants and research assistants.  In several instances, 
academics had to make their own arrangements with their PhD students they were currently 
supervising to assist in research and teaching (Personal Interview, November 2012).  
 
The discussion on the availability of time resources signaled a relationship between research 
time and teaching load. To expound the following quotation illustrates how heavy teaching loads 
limits research time at the university. One of the participants noted that:  
 
Finding time to engage in research is difficult; the university has bogged us down with a lot of 
teaching. We are fundamentally becoming just classroom teachers, teaching and marking, 
supervising, these have become like a 24hr job for us (Personal Interview, November 2012). 
Following the heavy teaching loads at UoN you have to single handedly work and create time for 
research. (Personal Interview, November 2012)  
 
In the above quote the influence of the teaching load on research is evident. Further, the above 
sentiments can be related to the claims by academics that, at UoN there is emphasis on teaching 
more than on research. A senior lecturer indicated, “here the university is happy with you if you 
teach more” (Personal Interview, November 2012). Thus, the named circumstances limit 
academics to engage in research and produce human capital required for national development.  
 
Furthermore, apart from the said increase in student enrolment, the rise in private universities has 
also influenced teaching loads in the public universities. Private Universities, it is argued, have 
insufficient academic members, thus they tend to use the academics from the public universities 
to teach on a part-time basis (Oketch, 2009). However, academics in the public universities 
largely look at it as an opportunity to supplement their meager salaries.  If the claims of heavy 
teaching loads in the public Universities are considered (Mwiria et al., 2007), the additional load 
from the private Universities can be straining the academics thus they are left with minimum 
time to supervise postgraduate students and engage in research.    
 
In conclusion, despite the above claims on heavy teaching load illustrated by increase in student: 
staff ratios over the years, the study by Cloete al., (2011) seem to suggest the student: staff ratios 
are low in relation to other disciplines such as Science, Technology and innovation, except for 
business management. Therefore, the above authors argue that the universities should be able to 
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produce graduates in STI whose skills are critical in the knowledge economy. However, despite 
the argument of some favourable conditions and incentives available to encourage academics to 
engage in research and supervision of postgraduate students, despite the insufficiencies, this 
study revealed that there are dis-incentives as well. The following section discusses the various 
disincentives for knowledge production.	  	  	  
	  
4.6   Competing incentives for knowledge production  
 
This section provides an analysis of how available competing incentives impact the engendering 
of the research culture. Considering that academics tend to have multiple principals who 
incentivize different outputs (research, consultancy reports, extra teaching), these incentives may 
conflict with the incentives meant to reinforce research behaviour.  Academics may focus on 
other activities that might not contribute to the mission areas of the university as intended by the 
principals. The main focus of this study was to understand the knowledge producing incentives, 
but these competing incentives reinforce non-research behaviour, hence will be analyzed in 
detail in this section.  
 
The data collected shows that apart from the research-related incentives provided by UoN, there 
exist ‘competing incentives’, which may not necessarily reinforce research behaviour. As noted 
in the above sections, academics work within an environment where multiple principals 
including the university itself, the research council and the government make attempts to reward 
research, although they are largely perceived to be inadequate. For instance, on one hand, 
academics talk of limited research funding, limited fellowships and scholarships and inadequate 
financial allocations on research publications and postgraduate supervision. On the other end, 
there are claims of large amounts offered for extra teaching and research consultancies. In the 
cases described above we could argue there are competing incentives for academics. Therefore, 
following time constraints that academics are faced with, as indicated in the above sections, they 
constantly make ‘trade-offs’ in terms of which incentives to respond to. From the structured 
interviews, a senior academic noted:  
 
So you are paid so little, then there is no research money and the challenges of time. So what is 
really an environment conducive to working? Here we are employed for two things we teach and 
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do research, but there is no research money and salary for teaching is very small. So we go out to 
look for our own income through consultancies and teaching on module II, which tend to be 
attractive. (Personal Interview, November 2012)   
 
In addition, one lecturer stated: 
  
The salary here is ridiculous, this is something that is in the press, this is an open thing, 
Universities in Kenya pay very little, and that is why people are running around making money 
from other sources, teaching overloads on ‘Module II’, teaching courses elsewhere. (Personal 
interview, November 2012)  
 
 From the above extract, academics given the weak nature of research-related incentives, 
academics favorably get attracted to other ‘complex and contradictory’ non-research incentives 
offered to them. The above finding resonates with the observation of Altbach et al., (2012) who 
stress that elements of academic salary might include constructs of both basic salary and income 
supplements, as academics will earn their income from other sources such as consultancies to 
augment their meagre salaries.  Similarly, the principal-agent model assumes that employees 
being utility maximizers will make rational choices mostly guided by opportunity cost, therefore, 
they will “look out for themselves” i.e., other means that are attractive and have the possibility of 
increasing their income.  
 
The additional payments academics earn on extra teaching on the full fee paying stream in the 
university is claimed to be a great incentive for academics. Similarly, in their study, Altbach et 
al., (2012) noted that academics are attracted to teaching overloads in the university to earn extra 
money. Hence, Income generation at UoN through innovation of Module II programmes, 
followed by remuneration for academics who teach on these programmes has resulted in 
academics taking up heavy teaching loads, with the aim of earning the revenue and supplement 
their incomes. To some extent, the proliferation of private universities, which, largely rely on 
academics from the public universities, imply that academics teach extra loads. Statistical data 
shows that, about 63 percent of respondents engage in extra teaching, of whom, around 84 
percent teach within the university, and 16 percent teach outside the university.  
 
The significant rewards attached to consultancies and additional payments for extra teaching are 
so attractive to the academics, they may reinforce non-research behaviour in the university. To 
illustrate,  
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And there are some people who teach evenings from Monday to Saturday (…) these are some of 
the people who may opt to teach and not do any research. And then there is an attraction there 
because when you teach Monday to Friday you are assured of that money, when you refuse to 
teach and go out looking for either research money or consultancy it’s risky because you are not 
sure … since this is money that is assured they [academics] will want to teach more. (Personal 
interview, November 2012)  
 
From the above extract it is evident academics make choices to engage in extra teaching and 
consultancy for the incentive.  However, intensive research required for publishing in 
international peer-reviewed journals and postgraduate supervision, becomes a poor competitor 
against the time of extra teaching and consultancy. That is, academics have limited time to teach 
students, engage in research and supervise postgraduate students.  Responses to the structured 
interviews showed that, it’s much easier and more rewarding to teach extra loads at the 
university and conduct research consultancies than publish and supervise postgraduate students. 
These findings are consistent with those of Migosi et al., (2012), who observed that 72.5 percent 
of the academics agreed or strongly agreed with the statement “teaching is more important than 
publishing”. Also, in the same study, a large proportion, around 78.4 percent, agreed or strongly 
agreed with the statement; “I will rather spend my time as a part-time lecturer than on writing an 
article” (p. 119). It’s unclear in the above study why academics were of this view, however, I 
would say, based on the impressions from this current study, the ‘incentive’ attached to extra 
teaching would attract them.  
 
The statistical data shows about 88 percent indicate they receive payment for the extra teaching. 
However, in most instances, academics claimed that the amount was an “honorarium” for the 
“service courses” at the university. The academics argued, the amounts were too little in relation 
to the workload. The study revealed that academics are paid 30 percent of the money earned on 
module II programmes. The majority of academics were not satisfied with these amounts as they 
claimed they were low compared to the revenue the university makes from the programmes. 
Scrutiny of the data by ranks shows, only a small proportion of the respondent who teach the 
extra classes are full professors  (6.3 percent), associate professors (8.3 percent), senior lecturers 
(13 percent; while the majority being the lecturers (31 percent). Some interview respondents felt 
that the lecturers at the entry level in the university were not able to attract research consultancies 
or research grants. Hence opting for “teaching overloads especially on the evening programmes” 
(Personal Interview, November 2012). 
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Extra teaching and payments vary greatly in the colleges that were selected for this study. Of the 
academics reporting they were paid on extra teaching majority of the academics 37 % were from 
the Faculty of Arts; 30 %, from the School of Business while 12 % were from the Faculty of 
Agriculture. This finding can be explained by high numbers of students on Module II 
programmes in the named faculties (Personal Interview, November 2012). The Dean further 
declared that, unlike other faculties that depend on additional payments for extra teaching on 
Module II programmes, the academics in the Faculty of Agriculture rely on research grants for 
their sources of ‘extra’ money (Personal interview, November 2012).  
  
The gathered data revealed that some respondents reported although they were faced with weak 
research-related incentives, they would not leave the university as they utilize their current status 
and positions at the university to win research grants and research consultancies. This 
observation can be linked to the suggestions of Langa (2010), who contends having a strong 
academic network link, together with research publications is a key determinant for academics to 
be allocated research consultancies. Interestingly, Langa discovered in his study that it is not that 
academics choose research and postgraduate supervision over research consultancies, but rather, 
some academics ‘balance out’ research and consultancy, while others tend to be intensely 
involved and dependent on consultancies and foreign aid networks (Langa, 2010). The 
anticipation of balancing research and consultancy, could explain why consultancy is seen as one 
of the key research activities that has “great potential … to contribute towards national 
development (UoN, 2008b, p. 3). Inasmuch as the university and the government expect the 
academics to ‘balance out’ these activities, they fail to do so as a result of time constraint and the 
element of competing incentives that exist between them.  
 
An analysis of the gathered data shows that, the majority of the academics who were involved in 
consultancy projects, were lecturers (31 percent), senior lecturers (21 percent) and full professors 
(12 percent). In relation to the Faculties, 21 percent were from the Faculty of Arts; 26 percent 
from the School of Economics; 12 percent from the School of Business and 16 percent from the 
Faculty of Agriculture. From the responses in the study it can be concluded that academics will 
be attracted to competing incentives in their environment owing to, among others, insufficient 
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knowledge producing incentives such as poor remuneration, limited access to research funding 
and sabbatical leave.  While the question of engagement in consultancy by academics at UoN 
remains such findings seem to manifest in other countries. For instance, a study conducted in the 
SADC region in 2008, by the Centre for Research on Evaluation, Science and Technology 
(CREST) in 14 countries, revealed that the majority of the survey respondents indicated they 
engaged in some consultancy work. When asked about the type of the consultancy they were 
engaged in, the respondents responded among those groups whom they consulted included: (a) 
governments in their countries, (b) the industry sector in their country, (c) academics in their 
country, (d) academics in other African countries, (e) academics in non-African countries, (f) 
governments of other African governments, and (g) industry in other African countries (Mouton 
et al., 2008).  This shows that there are multiple principals who are offering alternative incentives 
to academics. Similarly, the reasons established in this study as to why academics engage in 
consultancy are consistent with the findings of Mouton et al., (2008). Their research revealed 
that academics engage in research consultancy for the following reasons: (a) Inadequate salary 
(b) consultancies advance their network and career (c) respondents’ interests were not being met 
by their institutions (iv) consultancies improve knowledge and skills.   
 
The implication of the above discussion is that the existence of competing incentives for 
academics can reinforce non-research behaviour, especially within a context where the 
knowledge producing incentives are weak. These factors result in a weak, output-oriented culture 
of research and Master’s and Doctoral production.  In this environment where academics are 
faced with competing supplements, the question arises, how does the government re-organize the 
incentives so that the knowledge producing incentives become more attractive? Altbach et al., 
(2009) argue, globally, the academic career is flexible. Therefore, this study has argued it is in 
this flexibility of the academic profession that the incentive regimes become important in 
aligning them (Shapiro, 2005), to the core mission of the universities, teaching research, 
innovation and service.  
 
In conclusion, considering the weak nature of the research-related incentives, the academics at 
UoN seem to be more attracted to the non-research incentives because: (i) the magnitude of the 
competing incentives is greater than that of the knowledge producing incentives (ii) the non- 
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research incentives are easily accessible compared to those of knowledge production, and (iii) 
the poor socio-economic conditions of the average academic in Kenya reinforces the attraction to 
these non-research incentives.  
 
4.7. Incentives: Theoretical Explanations to the Empirical Findings 
 
This section provides an analysis that links the findings of this study to the main predictions of 
the principal-agent model. These explanations, using the economic principals provide an 
understanding of the incentives linked to research in the higher education context. 
 
This study has established that multiple principals exist who are responsible for providing 
incentives for academics at UoN. Ntshoe and De Villiers (2004), claim that, in higher education 
“the identity of the principal is indistinguishable” (p. 19). The question paused always is, ‘who is 
the principal’? Like other higher education contexts at UoN, there is more than ‘one single clear-
cut principal-agent relationship’ relevant for setting incentives. In this case, there is a close 
principal- agent relationship between the university (represented by the department chair, dean, 
director, college head, DVCs and VC) and its academics as the agents. On the other hand, there 
is a similar but less close-relationship between the government (represented by the research 
council), foundations, societies or professional societies and the academics in the respective 
disciplines. These principals also incentivize different research outputs, consultancy reports and 
extra teaching. In cases where there are multiple principals, like in this context, other principals 
may or may not reinforce the key goals of the organization. Shapiro, (2005), is of the view that it 
is common in a principal-agent relationship for multiple principals to disagree or compete over 
interests or goals of an organization, a feature of the agency relationship dubbed as “hydra 
factor” (p. 267). For instance, the research council provides a research grant to the academics 
aimed at encouraging academics to engage in research that will contribute both to the mission of 
the university and meet the national developmental plans. On the other hand, the government 
may offer academics consultancies (both advising and policy), which according to the data 
collected in this study, tend to detract the academics from the activities that contribute to the 
academic core. Data collected in this study revealed that consultancy has a great advantage over 
university research. The research consultancies take away the time from academics to engage in 
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extensive research that will result in publishing as well as engage in successful supervision of 
postgraduate students. As signaled earlier, since academics are assumed to make rational 
choices, the incentive attached to consultancy is argued to be more attractive than the research 
grants, which have also been declared to be inadequate for research. Similarly, in the context, 
where the Council of University Education (CUE), the University, the Faculty Deans and HoDs 
are principals conflicting interests exist among these principals. For example, the CUE may 
indicate the need of research and training graduates; while HODs question how knowledge will 
be produced given the challenges academics are faced with such as heavy teaching loads, poor 
pay and limited research funding.  
 
From the above discussion, it can be concluded that the presence of multiple principals providing 
multiple conflicting incentives may also negatively influence productivity. Therefore, according 
to Shapiro (2005, p. 267), the question remains, “how do agents understand and reconcile the 
duties delegated to them when they are receiving mixed messages and conflicting instructions – 
and – incentives from the multiple principals?” While the presence of multiple principals may 
mean a setting of conflicting incentives, the principals may also have conflicting goals or 
interests. In this context, the different principals mentioned often have contradictory instructions. 
For instance, as it is established in both the national and university policy, both the government 
and university expect academics to engage in research that will contribute to the economic 
growth and development of the nation. On the other hand, as has been discussed before the 
different policies have advocated for increase in student enrolment at the Kenyan public 
universities. There is a conflict of interests and goals in this case. The increase in the student 
enrolment has resulted in an increase in the staff: student ratio. Similarly, increased student 
enrolment has also resulted in an increase in the groups of students in the university, namely, 
Module I, Module II and Module III programmes. As mentioned earlier, academics felt that, 
inasmuch as there is an increase in the work load following increase in the staff: student ratio, the 
major problem is - being required to teach on the different programmes in the university. 
Therefore, academics are left with minimum time to engage in research and supervise 
postgraduate students. Similarly, as Munene (2013), claims the increase in the student enrolment 
has not been in tandem with the increase in academic staff, which also affects the workload 
allocation to staff.  
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Similarly, following the call to the universities to find alternative sources of income generation 
for the university operations, Module II programmes were introduced. Inasmuch as Module II 
programmes provide income for the universities, it has been argued to be an attractive incentive 
to the academics. Academics earn extra payment for teaching on the Module II programmes. 
However, the presence of this incentive detracts academics from engaging in rigorous research 
required for publishing and supervision of postgraduate students. From the above discussion, it is 
evident that, while the principal(s) have a key goal, which is knowledge production, the agents 
are faced with the conflicting interest and goals from the alternative principal(s) which may 
negatively influence productivity.  
 
In the policy it is spelled out clearly that there are incentives linked to research and successful 
postgraduate supervision. However, looking at the magnitude of these incentives, there is a 
challenge in their implementation. Stolovitch, Clark and Condly (2002, p.1) argue, “when 
tangible incentives (monetary and awards) are carefully selected, implemented, and monitored, 
they increase incentivized work performance an average of 22 percent”. Stolovitch and the 
colleagues emphasize that the impact of an incentive regime largely relies on “reliable and fair 
implementation” (Stolovitch et al., 2005, p. 5). The incentives available are inadequate, are not 
systematically applied in the universities and the rewards available are discontinuous. Therefore, 
these incentives are not strong enough to have significant impact on research and postgraduate 
supervision. The key argument of the principal- agent model is that employees should receive 
good compensation (sufficient and consistent) for their performance, efforts, capabilities and 
contribution to the institution for them to be effective and efficient in their productivity and 
commitment to their jobs. Arguably, if the incentive is small then the workers will not be 
attracted towards it (see Cameron and Pierce, 1997). For instance, although the extra payment on 
Module II is argued to be an attractive incentive in relation to research money, these programmes 
are not widely covered in the university. From the data collected in this study, it has been 
illustrated that through the efforts of the unions, there is an increase in the academic salaries. 
However, although the increase in 2014 was 33 percent, it occurred at a low base, and given the 
high inflation rate of 12 percent, the academics’ purchasing power may remain stagnant. 
Furthermore, participants that were interviewed felt that the monetary allowances provided to 
them are too small to claim. These incentives may not be attractive to the academics. Lunenburg, 
 
 
 
 
	  	   129	  
(2011, p. 2), discussing the expectancy theory argues that individuals are motivated when they 
believe that the “value of the rewards is highly attractive”. Similarly, Gneezy and Rustichini 
(2000), found that providing monetary incentives to subjects/agents strictly decrease their 
performance, unless the incentive is raised to a high enough level. Therefore, the incentive 
should be large enough so that workers are ‘tempted’ to earn it.  
 
Similarly, the rewards available at the university are not systematically applied in the university. 
Module II programmes which are argued to provide alternative incentives to the academics 
through extra payment, have not been implemented in all departments. When incentives are not 
systematically and consistently applied in the university, it may also have unintended 
consequences. In their research Stolovitch et al. (2002) established that longer and systematic 
incentive programs had greater impact on performance. For instance, incentive programs 
extending beyond one year yielded an average of 44 percent gain in performance, relative to 
short-term programs of one week or less that yielded a 20 percent performance increase.    
 
Furthermore, incentive proponents argue that incentives should not be for employees of certain 
sections/departments only. The incentives should have a wide coverage and almost all the agents 
should be covered and be provided access to the incentives. They argue that the wide coverage of 
the incentives in the institution makes the incentives ‘popular’ at all levels and among all 
categories of employees (Bland et al., 2005). Therefore, the employees make the effort to deliver 
certain acceptable performance that can result in earning the incentives. Furthermore the 
incentives provided by the institutions should be equitable. This implies that, they should provide 
equal opportunity to all the employees to be productive and efficient to earn them.  
 
Following evidence collected from the reviewed literature and the predictions of the principal-
agent model, there is a central argument that incentives may result in increased effort and 
performance or productivity (see Lazear, 2000; Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000; Benabou & Tirole, 
2003). Benabou and Tirole (2003) emphasize,, incentives may act as “positive reinforcers for the 
desired behaviour” (p. 489). In spite of this argument, in this study it is not conclusive that 
incentives lead to higher productivity. Benabou and Tirole (2003), argue that incentives are good 
for “engagement” (current activity) but they have a negative impact on the “re-engagement” 
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(persistence) of the activity (p. 490). Then, given the case relating to incentives Vis- a-Vis 
knowledge production, the question remains how do you apply these incentives to ensure     
sustainable “re-engagement”? Similarly, in their study Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) illustrated 
provision of (monetary) incentives resulted in increased performance. However, in some 
instances, offering monetary incentives did not always result in the desired performance, as some 
subjects offered monetary incentives performed more poorly than in cases where there were no 
incentives. Therefore, inasmuch as it is argued that incentives will steer academics in African 
universities to engage in research, it is not conclusive from the data collected in this study that 
incentives will result in higher productivity. In this study, the data does not illustrate 
conclusively whether proportionately, higher productivity is as a result of increased output of 
‘new researchers’ (Master’s, PhDs or post docs), those seeking promotion, or mainly as a result 
of established researchers in the university.  
 
Considering the analysis in this study, it is therefore not conclusive whether all the items denoted 
as incentives contribute to high productivity. There are some indications of the principals 
reinforcing productivity, however there is no conclusive evidence. The study confirms the 
economic principle that incentives influence desired behaviour, in this case, high knowledge 
production. Therefore, in the presence of very attractive non-research incentives, provision of 
adequate research incentives would reinforce the research culture.   
 
4.8 Conclusion  
 
In this chapter the researcher has presented and discussed the findings from the analysis of the 
collected data. The researcher started by presenting and analyzing the data on the shifts in the 
remuneration regimes of academics, dividing them into three distinctive periods. From this 
analysis, it was evident that, given the relevance of higher education in the new nations, during 
the period between 1960 and 1970 academics earned competitive salaries in the civil service, 
which were not performance driven. Similarly, the period experienced economic prosperity and 
low inflation rates, which resulted in high purchasing power of the academics’ salaries. The 
1980s and 1990s era was described as a period of decline or stagnation in the remuneration of 
academics. The decline was mainly attributed to decline in government funding of higher 
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education. Higher inflation rates and lower economic growth similarly implied low purchasing 
power. The period of the 2000s to date illustrates an era where academics receive multiple 
incentives including: (a) additional payments for teaching on Module II programmes and, (b) 
incentives attached to consultancy reports.  
 
The discussion on the current levels of academic salaries has revealed that academic salaries at 
UoN are centrally determined with the integration of the academic unions through collective 
bargaining agreement. The academic salaries are not performance based, as they are mainly 
attached to seniority, which is a key feature of the union determined salaries.  
 
The study has shown that there are several incentives linked to research and successful 
postgraduate supervision. A typology of the incentives available is as follows: (i) Direct financial 
incentives (Pay – Basic salaries) (ii) Other direct financial incentives: financial allowances to 
publications and supervision, benefits such as allowances (housing) and paid sabbatical leave, 
provision of research infrastructure and research facilities, funding for research and PhD training 
(fellowships and scholarships) (iii) non-financial rewards: recognition through public 
acknowledgement, study leave and time resources. However, it has been seen that in practice it’s 
difficult to insert the different incentives. Similarly the study shows that from the incentives 
provided at UoN the performance-based incentives (monetary allowances for research) are more 
attractive and will be appreciated compared to the fixed rate incentives such as salaries. Multiple 
principals in higher education contexts provide these incentives. The general impression is that 
the incentives are inadequate, not systematically applied and discontinuous. Overall, the research 
incentive regime of UoN is regarded to be weak and one that does not impact knowledge 
production significantly.  
 
The analysis has also showed that apart from the multiple principals who provide knowledge 
producing incentives, academics also encounter other principals who offer them non-research 
incentives. These principals could be argued to reinforce non-research behaviour in the 
universities. The data revealed, these principals include non-governmental organizations, the 
government, industry and businesses that reward consultancy. On the other hand the university 
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provides additional payments over and above regular salaries for extra teaching on the parallel 
programmes.  
 
In general, this study has revealed that individuals, particularly academics in this context, 
respond to incentives. However, research incentives at UoN are weak compared to the competing 
incentives that academics respond to favourably; consequently the research culture at UoN is 
negatively affected. For incentives to motivate, attract and retain the talented academics, the 
incentives have to be adequate, consistent and systematically applied, to reinforce positive 
research behaviour.  
 
In the next chapter final conclusions are drawn for reasons that academics may accept UoN 
incentives in spite of the lower value compared to incentives offered by other principals. The 
chapter also highlights certain limitations of the study and offers suggestions for further research 
opportunities in the field. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
	  
Conclusion and Recommendations 
	  
5.1 Introduction  
 
This study is built on and has contributed to the broader debates of incentives in the higher 
education context today. Following the several aspects involved in these debates, this study has 
sought to explore the link between incentives and knowledge production at the University of 
Nairobi. In doing so, it has analyzed the shifts in the remuneration regime of academics from the 
1960s to date in Kenyan public universities generally and UoN in particular and identified the 
key incentives to research and successful postgraduate student supervision at UoN. The overall 
sequence and structure of this study is provided in the next section.  
 
5.2 Summary of the Study  
 
This study comprises of five chapters. Chapter One provides the background of the study. 
Departing from the understanding that incentives influence behaviour both in terms of eliciting 
and sustaining it, this study seeks to understand the link between incentives and knowledge 
production at the University of Nairobi. In the background to this study it is argued, that higher   
education institutions have a key role to play in economic development through research and 
production of human capital. Therefore, in a case where knowledge production levels are sub-
optimal, this study argues, incentives could be utilized to attract, motivate, retain and encourage 
academics to research and supervise Master’s and PhD students. The study is underpinned by the  
central research question and the four sub-questions:  
 
Central Research Question: How do incentives and disincentives available at UoN influence 
knowledge production and productivity?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	   134	  
The sub-questions:  
I. How does UoN incentivize research and successful postgraduate supervision; and how do 
the incentives influence knowledge production and productivity?  
II. How do academics at UoN perceive the incentives available for research and successful 
postgraduate supervision? 
III. How do competing incentives available at UoN influence knowledge production and 
productivity? 
IV. How have the remuneration regimes of academics in Kenya shifted overtime? 
 
Chapter Two reviews the relevant literature and provides the theoretical framework of the study. 
From the relevant literature reviewed in this study, the main argument that emerges is that 
incentives can be used to steer employees to increase their effort and hence lead to improved 
productivity. Given the argument that incentives can attract, motivate and retain the best talents, 
use of incentives in higher education could result in engendering the desired research behaviour. 
Mainly, what is garnered from the reviewed literature is that productivity of academics in as far 
as knowledge production is concerned is a function of various factors.  These include: direct 
monetary compensation such as salaries among other research-related incentives such as 
promotion, benefits and allowances (housing allowances, transport allowances, paid sabbatical 
leave), time resources, research funding and non-financial incentives such as recognition.  
Incentives for academics, as used in other contexts illustrate that incentives (monetary, 
promotion) provided to the academics resulted in the increase in research output. Also, literature 
has provided ample evidence that the use of (monetary) incentives for research, have not only 
positive effects but could also have negative impact such as ‘crowding out’ of the intrinsic 
motivation required for ‘ground breaking’ research. Overall, incentives are the master key to the 
elements of engendering a vibrant research culture in the university.   
 
Importantly, whereas there is significant literature on challenges facing African higher education, 
including low knowledge production, the literature reviewed does not offer much on how this 
low knowledge production is linked to incentives that this study tries to elucidate. This study has 
mitigated this knowledge gap by contributing important insights on the link between incentives 
and knowledge production in African higher education. Similarly, the literature does not offer 
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comprehensive explanations on multiple principals, how they work in relation to provision of 
incentives and how the agents have to respond to the several conflicting incentives.  
The principal-agent model mainly informs this analysis, whose primary argument is that for 
incentives to attract, motivate and retain employees these incentives have to be sufficient, fair 
and consistent. Additionally, the model predicts that a higher sum of monetary compensation 
(monetary incentives) triggers higher effort, resulting in higher productivity. Thus, the principal-
agent model suggests that performance related pay (incentive) is more preferable than plain fixed 
pay, because it provides incentives and attracts workers, whose productivity is higher than 
average, thus they believe they can earn more within a performance related scheme. Applied to 
academics, we use the model to understand (a) how research-related incentives have shaped 
research behaviour and, (b) considering that academics tend to have multiple ‘principals’ who 
incentivize different outputs (research, consultancy reports, extra teaching, etc.), how the 
existence of competing incentives, which often require mutually exclusive responses, have 
affected the engendering of a research culture. 
 
Chapter three discusses the research methodology used in the study. A qualitative approach with 
elements of quantitative research has been the main research approach utilized in this study. This 
chapter provides a detailed account of the case study, case study selection, participant selection, 
the process of collection of data, and the ethical considerations. The use of the case study was 
mainly informed by the argument that incentives are contextual in nature when applied to the 
higher education context. Inasmuch as knowledge production is the key role of the universities 
worldwide, the way the universities reward research differs from one to another.  
 
Chapter four presents and discusses the data. This section is divided into four broad areas (a) the 
changes in the remuneration regimes of academics since the 1960s to date (b) the incentive 
opportunities multiple principals offer to academics for research (c) the perceptions of academics 
on the incentives available to them (iii) the existence of the competing incentives and how they 
have influenced research and supervision of postgraduate supervision.    
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5.3 Summary of the Findings  
 
The analysis of the shifts in the remuneration regimes of academics shows that, the 1960s to the 
1970s was a period hailed as a ‘golden past’, when academics were said to earn competitive 
salaries that were not performance driven. The economic prosperity and low inflation rates 
exhibited during this period saw large scale funding of higher education, and hence high 
percentage of government expenditure on the wages and salaries of academics. The low inflation 
rates also meant high purchasing power for the academics. In the 1980s, there was a decline in 
the remuneration of academic salaries. This period saw decline in the economic growth, high 
inflation rates, influence of the structural adjustment programmes, devaluation of exchange rates, 
large external debts, which could be argued to have resulted in a decline in the large-scale state 
funding. The decline in higher education funding resulted in decline or stagnation in the 
academic salaries. During the current period since 2000 to date academics have had access to 
multiple incentives. The sources of multiple incentives include: (a) Kenya’s public universities 
incentivize extra teaching by offering additional payments, over and above the regular salaries, 
for academics who teach on Module II programmes (b) the vast growth of private universities 
has also resulted in academics earning extra for teaching in these universities as part-time 
lecturers.  
 
Section two highlights on how UoN rewards research and successful postgraduate supervision. 
The findings of this study have showed that there are several incentives related to research at the 
University of Nairobi. The typology of the incentives available at UoN include:  (a) direct 
financial compensation such as pay (basic salaries), (b) other direct financial incentives such as 
benefits and allowances (sabbatical leave, paid study leave, house allowances), research funding 
(fellowships and scholarships, travel assistance to conferences), research infrastructure (library 
resources, equipment, computers and computer software, laboratory and internet), monetary 
allowances for publications and successful supervision of postgraduate students;  (c) indirect 
financial incentives such as promotion opportunities and (d) non-financial rewards such as time 
resources, advocacy for a balanced work load, recognition through public acknowledgement. 
Further analysis reveals presence of multiple principals that provide these incentives, including: 
the university itself, the national research council, and government. The study has revealed that, 
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multiple principals may disagree or compete over the goals of an organization. Looking at the 
above, the multiple principals are not complimentary and coordinated to reinforce a vibrant 
research culture.  
 
The general perception of academics is that the UoN incentives are inadequate; they are not 
systematically applied in the university and are discontinuous.  In particular, the analysis has 
showed several weaknesses in the incentive regime.  Inasmuch as the promotions procedures 
were recently reviewed, participants in the study argued the promotion procedures were unfair 
and influenced by ‘politics’ in the university.  Module II programmes appeared to be great 
incentives in the university however they are not applied across all departments. Monetary 
rewards attached to publications and supervision were said to be “too little” for academics to 
claim. The university has attempted to provide research infrastructure (library resources, 
computers and internet); however, respondents often described the available research facilities 
and research equipment as inadequate, obsolete and poorly maintained. Similarly, respondents 
reported on the impossibility to acquire the equipment maintenance funds. This analysis has 
revealed that, inasmuch as key incentives such as promotion are linked to research publications 
and supervision of PhD and Master’s students, research funding and heavy teaching remain a key 
challenge in the university.  Overall, the analysis has showed that the existing research incentive 
regime is regarded as weak, and one that does not encourage the maximization of the 
University’s research goals. Nevertheless some respondents reported although they were faced 
with weak research-related incentives, they would not leave the university as they utilize their 
current status and positions at the university to win research grants and research consultancies. 
 
Other than the multiple principals who reward research, academics are also confronted with other 
principals who reinforce non-research behavior. Such principals include non-governmental 
organizations and government departments that offer significant rewards for consultancies; and 
the University itself offers incentivized teaching on the full-fee-paying stream by providing 
additional payments, over and above regular salaries to academics who teach on these Module II 
programmes. These incentives can be argued to detract academics from research to other 
activities that don’t reinforce research behaviour. For instance, when government and the 
institutions offer supervision allowance to academics with a small research grant, poor pay and 
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small incentive amounts, the university itself offers additional payment for academics who teach 
extra hours on Module II programmes. In this case, there are competing incentives that can 
undermine the weak incentive regime at UoN. Therefore, respondents reported academics make 
rational choices, particularly given their time constraint. They don’t have time to teach 
undergraduate students, engage in research and successfully supervise PhD and Master’s 
students. 
 
Given the weak nature of the incentives for research, academics at the University of Nairobi 
seem to respond more favorably to the competing incentives. This is because of three main 
reasons: (a) the magnitude of these incentives tends to be greater than those for research (b) the 
non-research incentives are easily accessible compared to those for research, and (c) the 
unfavorable socio-economic circumstances of the average academic in Kenya, such as poor pay 
and low or stagnated purchasing power, which reinforce the attraction to the non-research 
incentives have a greater magnitude and are easily accessible.  
 
5.4 Limitations of the Study  
 
In this study, several aspects have been examined on incentives for knowledge production in 
general and in the University of Nairobi context in particular. There are, however a number of 
theoretical, methodological and conceptual limitations that were observed.   
 
This study focused on one institution in the Kenyan context, with a brief reference to the 
research council (NACSTI). This study limited its focus of research to one public university, the 
University of Nairobi in Kenya, with a particular focus on two colleges, that is, the college of 
Humanities and Social Sciences and the college of Agriculture and Veterinary medicine. 
Therefore, the views of academics on incentives for knowledge production in other Kenyan 
public universities have not been included in this study. Given the peculiarities and differences in 
each institution in designing and determining knowledge producing incentives as indicated in the 
data collected, the findings in this study may not be generalizable. In addition, differences and 
variances exist on the income supplements earned on extra teaching on Module II programmes 
and consultancies, both within UoN and in other public universities. These aspects are 
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highlighted in this study. However, it was beyond the scope of this study to determine the extent 
of and the exact differences.  
 
Second, this study has not studied the Research Council. Inasmuch as Kenyan public higher 
education institutions are under the auspices of a Research Council that is claimed to support 
research/knowledge production it is only mentioned briefly in this study, as referred to in the 
insights of academics. From their insights, it could be deduced that, NACSTI recently strongly 
emerged in support of research, especially in the research themes that are aligned to the three key 
pillars (economic, social and political).  of the Vision 2030.  
 
Since this study has been confined to examining incentives and dis-incentives for knowledge 
production in a university context, the study’s sample for the structured interviews largely 
involved senior academics, with PhD qualifications that research, publish and supervise 
postgraduate students although academic administrators were also interviewed to expound some 
policy issues and clarify several perceptions raised by the academics. The views of university 
administrators in the research, production and extension services office, personnel officers in the 
human resource and management offices who directly deal with promotions, pay and other 
rewards, and lastly government officials who deal with salaries, have not been covered in this 
study.  
 
This study has not focused on status as an incentive. This study briefly signals status in 
comparison to other civil servants and professionals positions, and the status that comes with 
promotion in the university. However, the study has not focused on rewards and status beyond 
promotion of academics in the university. 
  
5.5 Recommendations for Further Research  
 
This section highlights potential research areas that have emerged following this analysis. They 
are systematically discussed below. 
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First, the researcher believes there is need for further and detailed research on the research 
environment of the system of higher education. This study has focused on the research 
environment in one institution in Kenya, it could expand the current sample to involve (a) other 
colleges at the University of Nairobi, and (b) select one or two other public universities in Kenya 
which might be ranked lower in knowledge production relative to UoN.  
 
Similarly, this study might involve studying policies of the Research Council (the National 
council of Science, technology and innovation). Universities in Kenya are located within a 
research council which is claimed to support science, innovation and technology. From the 
responses in the structured interviews, academics are aware of the government’s efforts to 
support knowledge production, for instance, through providing incentives, though they seem to 
have little or no significant impact on the research activities and postgraduate supervision. 
Therefore, understanding the research environment of a higher education system could develop 
another area of research.  
 
Second, another field of study could focus/compare and examine reasons why academics   
continue to publish after receiving promotion versus the academics that stop publishing after 
promotion. This study will be significant in understanding and examining the views of these two 
different groups of individuals. This will address the issue of status and rewards beyond 
promotion. In addition, the analysis in this study has highlighted promotion as the main premium 
attached to research productivity. An interesting finding has contradicted previous assumptions 
in this study that junior researchers publish more than academics in the senior ranks.  Literature 
reviews show that academics in high cadres at times out-publish the junior academics. In her 
study, Tien (2007, p. 15) established, “the higher the level of the promotion reward, the greater 
the motivating effect the reward has on faculty research performance”. Therefore, it would be 
interesting to investigate and establish how academics could be rewarded even after promotion to 
full professorship (the senior most rank).  
 
Another aspect that could inform an area of research is a study that focuses on the issue of status 
amongst academics. This study only briefly signals status among academics, civil servants and 
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other professionals. As the study is weak on the area of status among academics future research 
could introduce new insights on this challenging theme. 
 
5.6 Conclusion  
 
Overall, the study confirms the economic principle that individuals, in our case, academics, 
respond to incentives. However, the current set-up of research incentives at the University of 
Nairobi is such that they are weak and, in the context of competing incentives, negative 
reinforcers of a vibrant research culture. Given the presence of competing incentives, the 
multiple principals who reward research have to ensure the incentives are adequate, 
systematically applied and continuous, to reinforce research behaviour.  
 
The assumption exists that incentives play a key role in attracting, motivating, rewarding and 
retaining the academics to engage in knowledge production. Therefore, it has been the aim of 
this study that results will prove to be useful to Kenyan higher education institutions and the 
government. Greater awareness of the requirements to organize the knowledge producing 
incentives to be attractive to the academics can fill the existing gap, since it is in the flexibility of 
the academic profession that the incentive regime becomes important. As argued in (Yin, 2008), 
the experiences of the University of Nairobi, the oldest and largest institution of higher education 
in Kenya, “could contribute to understanding of similar cases” in Kenya and other institutions in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and the developing world. The data gathered in this study could also form 
the basis for future research on incentives for publishing and supervision, as well as 
understanding knowledge producing environments at higher education institutions in Sub-Sahara 
Africa.  
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Ethical Clearance Form  
                                                                                                                                               SR1         
UNIVERSITY of the WESTERN CAPE 
UWC RESEARCH PROJECT REGISTRATION AND ETHICS CLEARANCE 
 
This application will be considered by UWC Faculty Board Research and Ethics Committees, 
then by the UWC Senate Research Committee, which may also consult outsiders on ethics 
questions, or consult the UWC ethics subcommittees, before registration of the project and 
clearance of the ethics. No project should proceed before project registration and ethical 
clearance has been granted. 
 
 
A.     PARTICULARS OF INDIVIDUAL APPLICANT 
 
NAME:  Agnes Omulyebi Lutomiah                                                                              TITLE: 
Ms. 
 
DEPARTMENT: Institute for Post-School Studies  
FACULTY: Education  
 
FIELD OF STUDY: Higher Education 
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ARE YOU: 
A member of UWC academic staff? 
A member of UWC support staff? 
A registered UWC student? 
From outside UWC, wishing to research at or with 
UWC? 
 
Yes  
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No 
No 
No 
No 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
PARTICULARS OF PROJECT 
 
PROJECT NUMBER:  TO BE ALLOCATED BY SENATE RESEARCH COMMITTEE:  
EXPECTED COMPLETION DATE: November 2014 
PROJECT TITLE: 
Examining the Incentives for Knowledge Production: The case of the University of Nairobi in 
Kenya.  
 
 
 
THREE KEY WORDS DESCRIBING PROJECT: Higher education, Incentives, Knowledge 
production 
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PURPOSE OF THE PROJECT: To understand the link between incentives and knowledge 
production   
M-DEGREE:  M.Ed. Degree                                                                       D-DEGREE: N/A 
 
POST GRADUATE RESEARCH:N/A 
 
C.     PARTICULARS REGARDING PARTICULAR RESEARCHERS 
 
 
                                                                                    FAMILY NAME:                           INITIALS:                         
TITLE: 
 
PRINCIPAL RESEARCHER: N/A 
 
OTHER PROJECT LEADERS: N/A 
 
 
OTHER CO-RESEARCHERS: N/A 
 
 
THESIS:  STUDENT RESEARCHER:  Agnes Omulyebi Lutomiah  
 
THESIS SUPERVISOR: Prof. Gerald Wangenge-Ouma and Prof. Nico Cloete 
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GENERAL INFORMATION 
 
 
STUDY LEAVE TO BE TAKEN DURING PROECT (days): N/A 
 
 
COMMENTS:           DEPARTMENTAL CHAIRPERSON: N/A 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IS IT INTENDED THAT THE OUTCOME WILL BE SUBMITTED FOR PEER REVIEWED 
PUBLICATION? 
YES      NO  
SIGNATURE OF THESIS STUDENT RESEARCHER:  
SIGNATURE OF THESIS SUPERVISOR – WHERE APPROPRIATE:  
DATE: 4 October 2012 
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SIGNATURE OF HEMA COORDINATOR 2012  
(In absentia of Dr. Wangenge-Ouma, G; the main supervisor): 
DATE: 4 October 2012 
 
 
SIGNATURE DEPARTMENTAL CHAIRPERSON:  
                                                                             
NOTE:  THESE SIGNATURES IMPLY AN UNDERTAKING BY THE RESEARCHERS, TO 
CONDUCT THE RESEARCH ETHICALLY, AND AN UNDERTAKING BY THE THESIS 
SUPERVISOR (WHERE APPROPRIATE), DEPARTMENTAL CHAIRPERSON TO 
MAINTAIN A RESPONSIBLE OVERSIGHT OVER THE ETHICAL CONDUCT OF THE 
RESEARCH. 
 
 
E.     DESCRIPTION OF PROJECT AND RESEARCH ETHICS STATEMENT 
 
 
Introduction 
Given the understanding that incentives influence behavior both in terms of eliciting and sustaining it, 
this thesis sought to understand the link between incentives and knowledge production at the 
University of Nairobi. Following the backdrop on the importance of knowledge in economic 
development, higher education institutions are required to increase production of knowledge, hence 
need to see how academics can be steered to produce knowledge. 
According to Chen & Dahlman, 2005 universities are at the centre of the knowledge economy, 
training skilled and competent workers needed for the knowledge economy, majorly producing and 
distributing relevant knowledge and providing a global link to the world’s knowledge system. 
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Universities as institutions that produce and transfer knowledge have become both politically and 
economically important in the knowledge economy.  
However, the main concern is that knowledge production as an integral part in feeding the knowledge 
economy and a key factor of development is argued to be low particularly in Kenyan public 
universities. In a continuum debate about the low level of knowledge production, Cloete et al (2011) 
argue that this trend cannot only be underpinned by the commonly held view of lack of resources and 
capacity in the universities. The scholars are of the view that, incentives could be one way of 
attracting, motivating and retaining academics to engage in research. It’s because of these suggestions 
that the study sought to understand the link between incentives and knowledge production at the 
University of Nairobi.  
Aim of the study: The main aim of this study is to understand the link between incentives and 
knowledge production at the University of Nairobi.  
The aim of the study is met by the following research questions: 
Central Research Question: How do incentives and disincentives available at UoN influence 
knowledge production and productivity?  
 
In addressing the above central research question, the following associated sub-questions were 
formulated:  
1. How does UoN incentivize research and successful postgraduate supervision; and how do the 
incentives influence knowledge production and productivity?  
2. How do academics at UoN perceive the incentives available for research and successful 
postgraduate supervision? 
3. How do competing incentives available at UoN influence knowledge production and 
productivity? 
4. How have the remuneration regimes of academics in Kenya shifted overtime? 
 
Literature Review and Theoretical Approaches  
From the relevant literature reviewed in this study, the main argument that stems out is that, 
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incentives can be used to steer employees to increase their effort and be productive (Gneezy et al., 
2011). The key arguments garnered from the reviewed literature is that, productivity of academics, in 
as far as knowledge production is concerned is a function of various factors. These include: money, 
among other research-related incentives such as promotion, pay, benefits and allowances, time 
resources and research funding (Bland et al., 2005; Bland et al., 2006). Incentives for academics, as 
used in other contexts illustrate that incentives provided to the academics resulted to the increase in 
research output and production of postgraduate students.  
The principal-agent model mainly informs this study, whose primary argument is that for incentives to 
attract, motivate and retain employees, they have to be sufficient, fair and consistent. Additionally, the 
model predicts that a higher sum of monetary compensation (monetary incentives) triggers higher 
effort, resulting to higher productivity (Bonner &Sprinkle, 2002). This model is applied in the higher 
education context to understand (a) how research-related incentives have shaped research behaviour 
and, (b) how the existence of competing incentives, which often require mutually exclusive responses, 
have affected the engendering of a research culture. 
Research Methodology 
The study adopted a qualitative research approach, with some elements of quantitative data. A single 
case study, the University of Nairobi was selected. The study utilized the structured interviews, 
document reviews and archival records to collect data.  
Ethic Statement  
Denscombe (2010) argues it has become increasingly common for researchers the need to gain formal 
approval from a research ethics committee before they embark on research. Following the above, the 
study was approved by the University of the Western Cape’s Senate Research Committee. In Kenya, 
which is the context of the study, the university offered an affiliation letter approving the study to be 
conducted within its premises; thereafter, the National Council for Science and Technology used the 
same letter to approve the study by offering a research permit (see appendix 4). Participants were 
provided with written consent for participation by signing after review of the information sheet. 
Before conducting the structured interviews, consent forms (see appendix 2) clarifying the research 
problem and the aims of the study were presented to the selected participants for review. In the letter, 
the information to be collected from the participants and the way in which the participants were to 
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participate were clearly indicated.  
With the exception of the university and the main units selected for the study, voluntary participation, 
anonymity and confidentiality of the participants involved in the study, were highlighted on the 
information sheet; and this was to be ensured both during and after the study as well as in the research 
report (Denscombe, 2010). The researcher obtained a signed written consent form from the Research, 
Production and Extension office that allowed me to collect data from the selected colleges. While this 
study was keen to consider the ethics guidelines pertaining the participant’s confidentiality (Merriam, 
1998; Denscombe, 2010), it was impossible to conceal the name of the university.  The researcher 
ensured that the information and data collected were used for the intended purpose. This study has 
been under supervision of academics in higher education that ensured that the stated ethical guidelines 
and procedures were addressed.  
 
 
Form issued by: Professor Renfrew Christie, Dean of Research, February 2002. 
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Appendix 2: Information Sheet 
	  
UNIVERSITY OF THE WESTERN CAPE 
FACULTY OF EDUCATION  
 
Participant Information Sheet 
Project title: 
 
Examining the incentives for knowledge production: The case of the University of Nairobi 
Description of the study and benefits 
This research project is being conducted by a M.Ed. (HEMA) student from the University of the 
Western Cape in South Africa.  
The study focuses on the link between incentives and knowledge production at the University of 
Nairobi (UoN). The project involves a structure interview guide on the incentive and dis-
incentives for research and postgraduate supervision.  
There are no direct benefits for the participating academics or the case university.  It is hoped 
that your responses would improve the understanding of the link between incentives, and 
research.  
Participation in the study  
Selected participants in two colleges (from selected departments) at the UoN are asked to 
participate by responding to the interview guide. A special session will be organized with each 
participant.  It takes about 30-35 minutes for completion of each session.  
Confidentiality  
Confidentiality of the participants will be ensured during and after the research process. Consent 
forms will be attached to the structured interview guides and signed by the participants before 
taking part in the research project and remains under private custody upon completion of the 
thesis. Anonymity of the participants in the study will be ensured. The information gathered will 
be used in aggregate form and no identity will be disclosed to anyone.  
Voluntary participation and withdrawal  
Participation is voluntary. The decision on participating must be indicated by signing the consent 
form (on the next page). The participants are free to withdraw from the research process at any 
time without any prior explanations. In case of further information, complains or withdrawal at a 
later stage, you can contact the persons whose details are provided below.   
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Independent approval of the structured interview guides  
The interview guide is currently undergoing a research ethics review process conducted by the 
ethics committee and senate research committee of the University of the Western Cape. The 
academic staff at the UoN will be requested to participate in the study.  Similarly, the university 
will be asked affiliation for the researcher to be allowed to conduct research and if possible use 
the name of the university while compiling the report.  
Informed consent  
Before responding to the structured interviews your decision to participate in the study must be 
indicated by signing the consent form (attached on the next page). The consent form has to be 
reviewed before you decide on providing the required information by the researcher.  
In case you need more information or follow up on the results, please do contact:  
 
The researcher:  Miss. Agnes Omulyebi Lutomiah,  
Tel: +254 726932065/+27 733913239, 
Email:  allutomiah@gmail.com or 3205945@uwc.ac.za 
 
 
Thesis Supervisors: 
1. Dr. Gerald Wangenge-Ouma, Senior Lecturer, HE Studies 
Tel: +27 21 9599360,    
Email: gouma@uwc.ac.za 
2. Prof. Nico Cloete, Extra-ordinary Prof of HE studies  
Tel:  +27 21 7637100, 
Email:  ncloete@chet.org.za  
You may keep this page for future reference 
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Appendix 3: Respondents Consent Form  
	  
UNIVERSITY OF THE WESTERN CAPE 
Faculty of Education 
Private Bag X17, Bellville, 7535, South Africa 
Tel: 021-959 2809, Fax: 021-959 2872 
 
INFORMED CONSENT 
Please if you agree to participate in this research project, you need to declare by signing this 
consent form in order for us to proceed with the interview. 
By signing below, I indicate that:  
− I assessed the information required for this project and had an opportunity to ask 
questions about it. 
− I agree to my responses being used for research purposes on condition that my privacy is 
not infringed.   
− I understand that my personal details will be used in aggregate form only so that my 
identity will not be disclosed  
− I understand that I am not obliged to take part in this research project/study and that I 
have the right to withdraw at any stage/time 
− I agree to participate in this research project  
 
 
Signature of participant: 
___________________________________________________________ 
 
Name and signature of researcher: 
__________________________________________________ 
 
Date: ____________________________________ 
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Appendix 4: Supervisor’s Letter 
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Appendix 5: Research Permit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	   188	  
Appendix 6: UoN’s Introduction Letter 
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Appendix 7: Structured Interview Guide  
	  
Questionnaire - Academic staff members   
This interview guide is part of the research project being conducted by Miss. Lutomiah O. Agnes 
on examining the incentives for knowledge production at the University of Nairobi, as part of her 
thesis for a master’s degree. 
Your sincere response will be highly appreciated.  Please tick accordingly, or use the blank 
space.  
Section 1: General characteristics of Respondents 
Please provide the following information   
1. Your Gender                          Male          Female   
2. Your age in years  
Below 30        30-34        35-39        40-44       45-49        50-55   56-60           
Above 60    
3. Your School/faculty/Institute___________________________________ 
4. Your department: ____________________________________________ 
5.  Highest academic qualification  
Bachelors       Master       Doctorate       Others [ ] (Please specify) _____________ 
6. Academic rank 
Lecturer   ;      Senior Lecturer          Associate Professer             Professer      
 Other  ________________________________________________________ 
7. How many years have you worked at the university? ________________________ 
 
Section 2: Teaching 
8.   Do you teach the following categories of students? (Tick all that apply)  
a. Under graduate students   
b. Post graduate diploma             
c. Masters                            
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d. Ph.D.                            
9. On average how many units/classes do you teach per week in the following categories?  
a. Module I   _________________ 
b. Module II  _________________ 
c. Module III   ________________ 
10. On average what are the class sizes for the following categories of students? 
a. Undergraduate   _________________________ 
b. Post-graduate students ____________________ 
11. How would you describe your teaching workload per week? 
     Light         moderate        Heavy   
            Please explain your response to question (11) above _______________________ 
____________________________________________________________________ 
12. Does your department provide you with teaching assistants? Yes       No   
   Please explain your response to question 13 above _________________________ 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
13. Does your department have a stated teaching workload policy per semester?  
     Yes         No   
   If yes, what is the policy __________________________________________________ 
14. Do you teach any extra classes/modules? Yes      No         If No skip to Q.26 (Skip to Q. 26) 
     If yes, in which of the following set-ups do you teach the extra classes? (Please tick 
accordingly) 
a. Within the department  
b. Outside the department      
If you teach the extra classes outside the department, is it within the university or outside the 
university? 
Within the university         outside the university  
15. Do you ever seek to teach the extra classes/modules in the department or university?  
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Yes      No  
    
Please explain the response to question (15) above  _________________________ 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
16. Are you paid for the extra teaching within the department or university?  
Yes            No   
Please explain your response to question (16) above ________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________  
17. How much on average do you earn from the extra classes you teach? ________________ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. If you teach any extra classes/modules, what reasons account for this? 
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________________________ 
19. If you do not teach any extra classes within or outside the university, what reasons accounts 
for this? ___________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Section 3: Supervision 
20. Are you involved in supervision of post-graduate students? Yes        No       (if no Skip to 
Q. 45) 
If yes, how long in years have you supervised post-graduate students? __________ 
21. How many post-graduate students are you currently supervising in the following 
categories? 
− Post-graduate diploma_______________ 
− Masters    _________________________ 
− Ph.D.   ___________________________ 
22. How many students have you supervised to completion in the last five years in the 
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following categories?  
− Post-graduate diploma_______________ 
− Master’s    _________________________ 
− Ph.D.   ___________________________ 
23. Have you authored any published papers from the dissertations that you have successfully 
supervised?      
 Yes         No   
If yes, how many articles have you authored from your student’s dissertations in the last 
five years? _____________________________________________________________ 
24. Have you co-authored published papers with some of your students from their 
dissertations that you supervised?        
 Yes          No  
If yes, how many articles have you co-authored with your post-graduate students in the 
last five years? ___________________________________________________________ 
25. If you have not co-authored any published papers with your post-graduate students, what 
reasons account for this?  
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
26. Are there any rewards in your institution/department for successful supervision of graduate 
students? Yes       No          (If NO, skip to Q. 45)  
If yes, please list these rewards (Please tick accordingly) 
a. Promotion                        
b. Supervision allowance       
c. Salary increase                   
d. Other, (specify) ________________________________________________ 
27. Is the amount and type of reward determined by the category of post-graduate students 
you successfully supervise? Yes        No  
If yes, which of the following categories of post-graduate students you successfully 
supervise attract the greatest amount and type of reward? (Please tick accordingly)  
a. Post-graduate diploma     
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b. Masters                                  
c. Ph.D.                                     
28. Are you guaranteed of the rewards upon successful supervision? Yes       No  
Please explain your response to question 28 above ________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
29. Have the rewards impacted on supervision of post-graduate students in any way? Yes          
No  
Please explain your response to question (29) above ________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
30. Which of the rewards has the greatest impact on supervision of post-graduate students? 
Please list and explain   
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
31. What challenges have you experienced in supervision of post-graduate students? 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
32. In your opinion what resources/institutional support do you think should be put in place to 
enable successful supervision of post-graduate students?  
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________
_________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Section 4: Research and publishing  
 
33. Does your department undertake any research activities? Yes       No  
If yes, how many research projects is the department currently undertaking?  
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________________________________________________________________________ 
 
34. Are you involved in research? Yes         No        (if no, Skip to Q. 69) 
If yes, how many research projects are you currently involved in? _____________ 
35. How would you categorize the research you are involved in? (Please tick accordingly) 
a. Institutional/departmental                     
b. Individual                                               
c. Part of larger research networks            
d. Other, (specify) ______________________________________________ 
36. Are these research projects academic or consultancies in nature?  
Academic        Consultancies  
37. How many of these are?  
1. Academic projects ____________________________ 
2. Consultancy projects __________________________ 
38. From whom do you mainly receive research funding?  
Self       University        the government           Foundations/donor agencies   
Other(specify) ___________________________________________________________ 
39. How many research publications have you produced in the following categories in the last 
five years (2008-2012) and what was your position? 
 Item  Number 
produced  
Position held 
Author  Co-author 
a.  International conference papers     
b.  National conference papers     
c.  Refereed articles in local journals    
d. Refereed articles in international journals     
e. Peer reviewed book chapters     
 f. Peer reviewed books     
 
40. If you were involved in research consultancies in the last five years, were you allowed to 
publish from the consultancy research reports?  
Yes                       No  
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If yes, how many publications have you produced from consultancy research reports in the 
last five years? ___________________________________________________________ 
 
41. If you have not published from the consultancy research reports, what reasons accounts 
for this? ____________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
42. Are there any incentives and rewards in your institution/department for refereed 
publications? 
 
Yes           No  
 
43. If yes, what are the incentives and rewards? (Please tick accordingly) 
a. Promotion                                                                                   
b. Appointment to senior positions (HoDs, director, etc.)              
c. Salary increase                                                                    
d. Support for International conference attendance 
e. Support for scholarships and fellowships  
f. Financial rewards  
g. Bonuses and allowances  
h. Others, (specify) ______________________________________________ 
44. Is the amount and type of incentive and rewards determined by the type of research 
publications you produce? Yes [ ]; No [ ] 
45. If yes, which of the following research publications attract the greatest amount and type of 
incentive and rewards? (Please tick accordingly) 
a. International conference papers 
b. National conference papers 
c. Refereed articles in local journals 
d. Refereed articles in international journals  
e. Peer reviewed book chapters 
f. Peer reviewed books 
46. Does your institution/department guarantee these incentives and rewards for refereed 
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publications?  
Yes       No  
47. Please explain your response to question (46) above ________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
48. Have the incentives and rewards impacted on your research outputs in any way?  
Yes        No  
49. Please explain your response to question (48) above  ________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________ 
50. Which of the incentives and rewards has the greatest impact on research publications? 
Please list and explain  
______________________________________________________________ 
______________________________________________________________ 
 
51. For what other reasons do you undertake research?  (Tick all that apply) 
a. To assist in graduate training  
b. To influence policy 
c. To solve existing societal problems 
d. Other, (specify) ______________________________________________________ 
52. If you are not involved in research, please give reasons ______________ 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
53. How would you rate your institution/department, in terms of providing access to the 
following resources/support to facilitate your research activities? 
 
 Very 
Strong 
Strong Don’t 
Know 
Weak Very 
Weak 
Literature e.g. books, journal 
articles and monographs in the 
library or on-line  
     
Computers      
Equipment, infrastructure and 
conducive offices  
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Internet connectivity       
Start-up research funds       
Travel assistance to conferences      
Fellowships and scholarships       
Release time/ sabbatical leave      
Mentorship      
 
54. Has the provision of the above resources/institutional support impacted research output in 
any way? Yes        No    
If yes, how?  
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
55. What would you comment about salary as a basic incentive for you to engage in teaching, 
supervision and engaging in research activities? ________ 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
56. What are the major challenges that you have encountered in your institution as you             
engage in research?  _________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
57. In your opinion what resources/institutional support need to be put in place to support 
scholars like yourself to engage in research and publish? (Please 
explain)_________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________ 
Section 5 – Policy overview  
58. Please indicate your views by ticking your response to the following statements:  
Strongly Agree AA, Agree -A, Uncertain- 0, Disagree –D, Strongly Disagree- DD 
 AA A 0 D DD 
1 The incentives and rewards encourage higher productivity in 
publications and successful supervision of graduate students.   
     
2 My institution has a clear and fair reward system      
3 My university rank fairly reflects my achievements and      
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accomplishments 
4 Consistent research standards are maintained for promotion and 
appointment purposes 
     
5 There are appropriate procedures in place to facilitate 
attendance/participation for conference.  
     
6 There are clear and appropriate procedures followed in approving 
and allocating research funds/grants. 
     
7 Academics are encouraged to arrange their teaching and 
administrative commitments to allow time for research and 
publishing.  
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Appendix 8: Interview Schedule  
University (Deans/Directors) 
Research  
1. Do members of the academic staff in your faculty/school have access to research funds?  
___________________________________________________________ 
 
2. What is the size of the research grants/funds to the faculty/school? ____________ 
 
3. How many applications for research funds by members of the academic staff qualify for 
funding in the faculty/school per year? _________________________ 
 
4. For the applications that are not funded, what could be the problem? ______ 
 
5. What are the conditions/requirements for the members of the academic staff to acquire 
research funds from the university/faculty? 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
6. How easy or difficult is it for the members of the academic staff to acquire/raise research 
funds? ___________________________________________________________ 
 
7. What are the funding guidelines in terms of the minimum and maximum amount of the 
research funds a member of academic staff can access? _______________ 
 
8. Does the university/faculty/school require members of the academic staff to use research 
funds on masters and PhD students work?  _______________ 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
9. Would you suggest that in future research funding should be attached to graduate 
teaching so that members of academic staff use the funds to mentor graduate students 
hence increase on the completion rates? ______________________ 
 
10. How many post-graduate students should a member of academic staff supervise? 
_______________________________________________________________ 
 
11. What is the number of supervisors that should be allocated to each post-graduate student? 
__________________________________________________________ 
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12. What are the guidelines on the teaching workload in terms of number of modules to be 
handled by the academic staff in a semester? __________________________ 
 
13. What system/structure is used in the faculty/school for module 2 payment of the 
academic staff? ___________________________________________________ 
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Appendix 9: Hypothetical Model  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NATIONAL POLICY UNIVERSITY POLICY AND PRACTICE 
	  
Principal (University/government) 
(Delegate tasks) 
Agent (Academic Staffs) 
(Performs tasks) 
Conflict of 
Interest 
FINANCIAL 
INCENTIVES 
NON-FINANCIAL 
INCENTIVES 
KNOWLEDGE 
PRODUCTION 
Publication 
(International 
recognized) 
0	  
0	  
Postgraduates  
	  
Remuneration 
Resources 
Research Funds 
Scholarships 
and Fellowships 
Time allocation 
Promotion 
Sabbatical leave 
COMPETING INCENTIVES 
Additional payment over and 
above regular salaries for teaching 
on module II programmes  
Internal 
External 
	  Consultancy monies  
Mandates	  &	  Incentives	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